Robert W. Hahn

Market Power and Transferable Property Rights

The appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal. When competition is not a foregone conclusion, the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage. This paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights. First, a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence. This is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem—the control of particulate sulfates in the Los Angeles region.

Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?

Benefit-cost analysis can play an important role in legislative and regulatory policy debates on protecting and improving health, safety, and the natural environment. Although formal benefit-cost analysis should not be viewed as either necessary or sufficient for designing sensible public policy, it can provide an exceptionally useful framework for consistently organizing disparate information, and in this way, it can greatly improve the process and, hence, the outcome of policy analysis. If properly done, benefit-cost analysis can be of great help to agencies participating in the development of environmental, health, and safety regulations, and it can likewise be useful in evaluating agency decision-making and in shaping statutes.

The Promise of Prediction Markets

The ability of groups of people to make predictions is a potent research tool that should be freed of unnecessary government restrictions.

Designing More Efficient Markets: Lessons from Los Angeles Smog Control

Market-based approaches for environmental protection are beginning to take root around the world. This article attempts to improve our understanding of the performance of environmental markets by constructing and evaluating an information base on trades in Los Angeles, which includes the first detailed data on trading prices. The analysis suggests that trading activity has been shaped by the detailed regulations governing the market. In addition, transaction costs have played a crucial role. We argue that the move toward adopting market-based approaches for environmental protection needs to be accompanied by a vigorous effort to assess the properties of these systems as they are actually implemented.

The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System Performance

An implication of the Coase theorem is that under certain conditions, the market equilibrium in a cap-and-trade system will be cost-effective and independent of the initial allocation of tradable rights. That is, the overall cost of achieving a given aggregate emission reduction will be minimized, and the final allocation of permits will be independent of the initial allocation. We call this the independence property. This property is important because it means that the government can establish the overall pollution reduction goal for a cap-and-trade system by setting the cap and leaving it up to the legislature to construct a constituency in support of the program by allocating the allowances to various interests without affecting either the environmental performance of the system or its aggregate social costs. We examine the conditions under which the independence property is likely to hold—both in theory and in practice.

How Well Does the U.S. Government Do Benefit-Cost Analysis?

To make prudent recommendations for improving the use of benefit-cost analysis in policy settings, some measures of how well it is actually done are essential. This article develops new insights on the potential usefulness of government benefit-cost analysis by examining how it is actually performed in the United States. We assess the quality of a particularly rich sample of benefit-cost analyses of federal regulations. The data set we use for assessing the quality of regulatory analysis is the largest assembled to date for this purpose. The seventy-four analyses we examine span the Reagan administration, the George H. W. Bush administration, and the Clinton administrations. The article is the first to assess systematically how government benefit-cost analysis has changed over time. There are three key findings. First, a significant percentage of the analyses in all three administrations does not provide some very basic economic information, such as information on net benefits and policy alternatives. For example, over 70 percent of the analyses in the sample failed to provide any quantitative information on net benefits. Second, there is no clear trend in the quality of benefit-cost analysis across administrations. Third, there is a great deal of variation in the quality of individual benefit-cost analyses.

The behavior of the allowance market: Theory and evidence

Abstract Emission allowance prices are likely to be linked between Phase I and Phase II in a way that is predictable and broadly consistent with economic theory. Data suggest that allowance prices have declined over time, and that actual and predicted prices are converging.

Environmental markets in the year 2000

This article examines the prospects for marketable emissions permits in the coming decade. We identify both the reasons that politicians are reluctant to embrace marketable emissions permits as a solution to environmental problems and also changes in the political landscape that could lead to the increased use of this approach. Over the next decade, we believe there is reason to be cautiously optimistic. Selective experimentation with market-based approaches is likely to continue; however, we are not optimistic about the prospects for widespread application of this tool. Moreover, applications of this tool will necessarily reflect important political constraints, thus rendering the tool substantially less effective than the textbook applications examined by economists. An important intellectual challenge is to work on the design of market-based approaches that address political concerns, enhance efficiency, and promote innovation, so that it will be easier to meet the environmental challenges that lie ahead.

How Well Does the Government Do Cost-Benefit Analysis?

To make prudent recommendations for improving the use of cost-benefit analysis in policy settings, some measures of how well it is actually done are essential. This paper develops new insights on the potential usefulness of government cost-benefit analysis by examining how it is actually performed. We assess the quality of a particularly rich sample of cost-benefit analyses of federal regulations. The data set we use for assessing the quality of regulatory analysis is the largest assembled to date for this purpose. The 55 analyses we examine span the Reagan administration, the first Bush administration and the Clinton administration. The paper is the first to assess systematically how government cost-benefit analysis has changed over time. There are three key findings. First, a significant percentage of the analyses in all three administrations do not provide some very basic economic information, such as information on net benefits and policy alternatives. For example, over 70 percent of the analyses in the sample failed to provide any quantitative information on net benefits. Second, there is no clear trend in the quality of cost-benefit analysis across administrations. Third, there is a great deal of variation in the quality of individual cost-benefit analyses.

Trade-offs in designing markets with multiple objectives☆

Abstract This paper explores some of the problems involved in designing markets with multiple objectives. The first part of the paper considers the issue of how such markets are designed in theory while the second part reviews some evidence on actual applications in the field of air pollution control.