Robert W. Jackman

Sources of Corruption: A Cross-Country Study

Why is government corruption more pervasive in some societies than in others? In this article we examine public choice explanations that attribute corruption to a lack of competition in either political or economic arenas or both. The principal part of our analysis draws on recently-published data about levels of corruption for a broad cross-section of countries reported for the early 1980s. We supplement this with an additional analysis of a second dataset on corruption measured during the late 1980s. Our analyses confirm that political competition affects level of corruption, but this effect is nonlinear. Corruption is typically lower in dictatorships than in countries that have partially democratized. But once past a threshold, democratic practices inhibit corruption. However, we obtained mixed results with respect to the relationship of economic competition and corruption: government size does not systematically affect corruption, but membership of the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) does. Finally, corruption is more pervasive in low-income countries which tend to underpay public sector employees.

Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe

We examine the systemic conditions that have influenced the electoral success of parties of the extreme right in West European politics from 1970 through 1990. Empirical estimates based on 103 elections in sixteen countries suggest that electoral and party-system factors interact with each other to generate conditions conducive to these parties. Specifically, increasing electoral thresholds dampen support for the extreme right as the number of parliamentary parties expands. At the same time, multi-partism increasingly fosters parties of the extreme right with rising electoral proportionality. Our analyses also indicate that higher rates of unemployment provide a favourable environment for these political movements. These results suggest that levels of electoral support for the extreme right are sensitive to factors that can be modified through policy instruments.

Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies during the 1980s

There are two contending accounts of cross-national variation in voter turnout rates. One emphasizes the role of institutions and electoral attributes, whereas the other stresses cultural and historical factors. The authors evaluate the merits of these two arguments. They first apply the model developed by R. W. Jackman to turnout rates during the 1980s, expanding the sample of industrial states to include three newer democracies with recent authoritarian histories: Greece, Portugal, and Spain. They then examine the potential impact of cultural variables on voter turnout rates. The authors conclude that the institutional argument outperforms the cultural account of conventional political participation.

A Renaissance of Political Culture

Theory: Cultural differences drive significant elements of political and economic life. Hypotheses: (1) effective govemance hinges critically on traditions of civic engagement; (2) political culture fundamentally drives economic performance and democratic stability. Method: Reanalysis of two data sets: (1) the first includes information collected by Putnam (1993) on a variety of political, economic and social indicators for the 20 Italian regions; (2) the second includes comparable information collected by Inglehart (1990) for the industrial democracies. Results: We find little evidence to indicate a systematic relationship between political culture and political and economic performance.

The Politics of Economic Growth, Once Again

Papers by Lange and Garrett and by Jackman have debated whether the political and economic power of the left influences economic growth in the western industrial democracies. Most recently, Hicks (1988) has concluded that they do, once Lange and Garretts model is modified, despite my claim to the contrary. This paper shows that there is no evidence for the claims advanced by Hicks. First, I demonstrate that Hickss elementary revision is misguided and insufficient to salvage the Lange-Garrett hypothesis. Second, I establish that the estimates for his expanded model are not robust, but instead depend entirely on influential observations. Third, I review some crucial theoretical issues that are misconstrued both by Lange and Garrett and by Hicks and suggest an alternative approach to the politics of economic growth.

Rating the Rating: An Analysis of the National Research Council's Appraisal of Political Science Ph.D. Programs.

Not surprisingly, the ratings of doctoral programs in the United States by the National Research Council (NRC 1995) are controversial. Some interpret the ratings as an indicator of relative program quality; others view them as little more than a gauge of the size and age of graduate programs, and still others deem them to be simply a popularity barometer. Employing data assembled in the NRC report, we examine whether the political science program ratings reflect two general sets of characteristics-the size and the