Robert W. Mitchell

Macaques but not lemurs co-orient visually with humans

The ability to engage in visual co-orientation (VCO) is suggested by naturalistic observations of primates, but experimental comparisons of different species are lacking. This study compared the propensity of lemurs (Eulemur macaco) and macaques (Macaca arctoides) to engage in VCO, defined as turning to look in the same direction as another individual whose focus of attention changes. The macaques consistently showed VCO whereas the lemurs showed no such response. This species difference has implications for understanding the evolutionary origins of more advanced abilities that build upon VCO, such as shared visual attention and theory of mind.

Kinesthetic‐Visual Matching and the Self‐Concept as Explanations of Mirror‐Self‐Recognition

Since its inception as a topic of inquiry, mirror-self-recognition has usually been explained by two models : one, initiated by P. Guillaume, proposes that mirror-self-recognition depends upon kinesthetic-visual matching, and the other, initiated by G. G. Gallup, that self-recognition depends upon a self-concept. These two models are examined historically and conceptually. This examination suggests that the kinesthetic-visual matching model is conceptually coherent and makes reasonable and accurate predictions; and that the self-concept model is conceptually incoherent and makes inaccurate predictions from premises which are themselves inaccurate. From a theoretical (and empirical) standpoint, the kinesthetic-visual matching model is the better explanation of self-recognition

A Comparative-Developmental Approach to Understanding Imitation

Imitation is so often an untractable phenomenon for comparative psychologists that some have declared the task of defining it hopeless. Yet commonalities in examples of imitation suggest that imitation is a coherent concept. To evaluate its meaning and significance, I examine the conception of imitation in accounts by four authors who have systematically investigated imitation: James Mark Baldwin, Conwy Lloyd Morgan, Paul Guillaume, and Jean Piaget. Each of these authors elucidates different stages or levels in the development of imitation which indicate significantly different psychological capacities in the production of imitation. The similarities between these developmental frameworks are remarkable (though differences are apparent), but the conceptions of imitation provided by these authors show some distinct differences. To offer a coherent account of imitation, I analyze it conceptually and offer necessary and sufficient criteria for its occurrence. I claim that imitation occurs when something C (the copy) is produced by an organism and/or machine, where: C is similar to something else M (the model); registration of M is necessary for the production of C; and C is designed to be similar to M. This definition offers formal criteria for imitation per se, but does not differentiate qualitatively different types of imitation. Thus, using and developing the accounts of Baldwin, Morgan, Guillaume, and Piaget, I depict five nested levels of imitation, such that imitation at each level is produced by a program which incorporates control over programs in preceding levels. I provide examples of imitation by humans and non-humans at each of these levels. These five levels of imitation are distinguished by the processes which bring about the imitation: first-level imitations are based on evolution, selection, and morphogenesis; second-level, on perception and action; third-level, on learning; fourth-level, on self-awareness; and fifth-level, on planning and the awareness of another’s awareness. Imitation, then, is a conceptually coherent phenomenon with various manifestations, which result from processes at different but hierarchically related levels.

Discrimination learning of scratching, but failure to obtain imitation and self-recognition in a long-tailed macaque

A long-tailed macaque was trained to scratch when a model scratched, but failed to generalize scratching when model scratched new target areas. The results confirm that monkeys can control their rates of scratching, but may not be capable of true imitation. The subject also failed on a test of mirror self-recognition. Imitation and self-recognition appear to be related capacities, which may be absent in monkeys.

The comparative and developmental study of self-recognition and imitation: The importance of social factors

Both mirror self-recognition (MSR) and “true” or “representational” imitation are among a host of different abilities that emerge in human infants between 18 and 24 months of age, when mental representation develops (Piaget, 1952). Mental representation is the highest cognitive achievement of the sensorimotor period. We believe that this is the basis for the expression of both self-recognition and imitation; by considering comparative and developmental evidence we shall discuss some of the cognitive conditions for each. Several researchers have suggested that the ability to imitate is a necessary condition for the development of self-recognition in human infants (e.g., Baldwin, 1903; Kaye, 1982; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; see also Gopnik & Meltzoff, SAAH 10; Hart & Fegley, SAAH 9). However, contrary to this position, one hypothesis of this chapter is that imitation is not necessary for the development of self-recognition. We believe that the developmental and comparative approaches must be used together in order to specify cognitive conditions for self-recognition and imitation (Mitchell, 1987; Parker, 1990, 1991). It is particularly difficult to determine the cognitive prerequisites by studying children alone, because many complex behaviors appear concurrently within a very narrow time frame. Developmental study of closely related primate species may be required to isolate the factors that are important in the development of cognitively complex behaviors such as self-recognition and imitation (Antinucci, 1989; Parker, 1991). Therefore, we shall utilize developmental data collected from our closest genetic relatives, chimpanzees, to compare with developmental data from human primates.

The Effects of Familiarity on Dog-Human Play

AbstractIn social play, the actions of players are organized into projects—sequences of actions that are repeated in order to calibrate an organisms control over these actions or over the actions of the play partner. These social projects are coordinated into routines, or repeated interaction patterns. When projects are not compatible, players are expected to entice each other through self-handicaps, refusals to play, manipulative self-handicaps or refusals, and manipulations. This theoretical framework is evaluated in relation to interspecific play between familiar and unfamiliar dogs and people. Familiar players were expected to engage more in routines based on compatible projects, to show idiosyncratic projects, and to entice less than were unfamiliars. Forty-eight play interactions, 24 between familiars and 24 between unfamiliars, were videotaped and coded for actions, projects, routines, and enticements. Dogs engaged in 12 and people in 14 distinct projects. Familiars were more likely to play and to...

Familiarity and the rarity of deception: two theories and their relevance to play between dogs (Canis familiaris) and humans (Homo sapiens).

One theory of the relation between familiarity and the frequency of deception predicts that familiarity leads to the rarity of deception and another, that familiarity increases deception. We examined which theory applied to play by comparing familiar and unfamiliar partners during play between dogs (Canis familiaris) and humans (Homo sapiens). Deceptions by humans were based on directionality of movement and petting the dog and on the projects show object and throw object, which are specialized for play. Likewise, deceptions by dogs were based on directionality of movement and the project retrieve object (an analogue to show object). Deceptions based on directionality and petting were rare among familiars (and unfamiliars), whereas those based on show object, throw object, and retrieve object were more frequent. The findings suggest that, in play at least, deception may occur frequently.

Bateson's concept of “metacommunication” in play

Abstract Gregory Batesons concept of “metacommunication,” defined as communication which refers to communication, is examined in relation to play. Bateson believed that animals in play recognize that their activities simulate, and therefore refer to, other activities, and in this way metacommunicate. A similar conception of play by H. Paul Grice is described, and the development and demise of metacommunication in the play literature is presented. Two forms of metacommunication are present in some nonhuman play: The first occurs when an organism recognizes that another is simulating, and the second occurs when an organism recognizes that it is itself simulating. Some nonhuman organisms-rhesus monkey—also appear to intend to metacommunicate in play. Metacommunication in animal behavior tells us something about how these organisms interpret themselves and one another, and informs us that animals understand that an activity can have more than one reference. The existence of metacommunication in nonhumans suggests that nonhuman primates already have capacities for depiction and denotation necessary for the evolution of human language.

Children's Understanding of Their Own and Others' Mental States. Part A. Self-Understanding Precedes Understanding of Others in Pretence.

We examined 3- to 6-year-old childrens attributions of pretence when their own or anothers behaviours were characterized as similar (usually unintentionally) to that of a real or nonexistent animal. In some pretence tasks, we asked children if they were trying to look like or looked like the animal they were characterized as looking like; in others, if and how they could (or why they could not) pretend to be a real or nonexistent animal. Children at 4-6 years of age understood their own pretences better than anothers pretences, but even by 6 years of age children continued to fail to understand pretence by another. Across ages children tended to be consistent in their claims about whether or not they looked liked (or were trying to look like) the animal, and whether or not they were pretending to be it. Children appear to take someones merely looking like an animal as evidence that the person (whether self or other) is pretending to be that animal. Their success on self-pretence tasks probably results from their unwillingness to believe that their own actions look like those of the animal because they had not intended to look like it.

Cat Person, Dog Person, Gay, or Heterosexual: The Effect of Labels on a Man’s Perceived Masculinity, Femininity, and Likability

Abstract American undergraduates (192 male, 521 female) rated masculinity, femininity, and likability of two men (one highly masculine and unfeminine, one normally masculine with low femininity) from a videotaped interaction. Participants were informed that both men were cat persons, dog persons, heterosexual, adopted, or gay, or were unlabeled. Participants rated the men less masculine when cat persons than when dog persons or unlabeled, and less masculine and more feminine when gay than when anything else or unlabeled. The more masculine man received lower feminine ratings when a dog person than when a heterosexual, and higher masculine ratings when a dog person than when unlabeled. Labels did not affect likability. Overall, the gay label consistently promoted cross-gender attributions, the dog person label encouraged somewhat heightened gender-appropriate attributions, and the cat person label allowed for normative attributions.