Robert Weatherley

Defending the Nation: The Role of Nationalism in Chinese Thinking on Human Rights

This article examines the symbiotic relationship between Chinese thinking on human rights and Chinese nationalism. It analyses the three key periods in the Chinese discourse on human rights: late Qing, Republican, and post-Mao. In each case, discussions of rights have often (but not always) taken place within a wider debate about the protection of Chinas national interests from foreign infringement, although the nature of the foreign infringement has changed over time. During the late Qing debate, with China increasingly threatened by foreign military imperialism, scholars argued enthusiastically for the introduction of a new system of democratic rights as a vital tool of national resistance. During the Republican era that followed, the threat from outside remained the same. However by now many theorists had grown disillusioned with democracy and rights, believing that the only way China could withstand further foreign encroachments was to withhold rights from its people. In the post-Mao debate on rights, the interests of the nation are again at the fore. But with China now an emerging rather than a collapsing power, rights are often analysed – at least from an official perspective – within the context of cultural rather than military imperialism, the new ‘threat’ from abroad. The article then examines the views of Chinas ‘non-official’ rights thinkers, most of whom tend to be much less affected by nationalist concerns and ends with an assessment of the prospects for democracy and rights in China.

The Evolution of Human Rights Thinking in North Korea

The official discourse of human rights in North Korea has shown signs of evolution in recent times, reflecting a variety of philosophical foundations and a need to respond to mounting criticism from the West. While Confucianism and Marxism have been key in influencing North Korean rights thinking, some of the more recent official pronouncements on rights have a distinctly nationalistic or ‘juche-oriented’ complexion. This shift in emphasis reflects the growing importance of juche to North Koreas state ideology in light of what is perceived as an increasingly hostile international environment that has confronted North Korea since the end of the Cold War and in particular in consequence of its highly controversial nuclear weapons programme.

Owning up to the past: the KMT's role in the war against Japan and the impact on CCP legitimacy

Abstract This article examines the emergence of an increasingly vociferous public debate in China over the true contribution made by the KMT in the war against Japan. Following years of rigid adherence to the traditional Maoist line that the CCP won the war almost single-handedly, the party has finally moved towards a more realistic and honest assessment that recognises the pivotal role played by the KMT in defeating the Japanese. The rationale for conceding this point is ultimately linked to the question of nationalist legitimacy. At a time of increasing socio-economic uncertainty and in an effort to fill the ideological void left by the demise of Chinese Marxism, the party is trying hard to bolster its nationalist credentials. One way that it is doing this is by presenting a united patriotic front on the war against Japan, with itself at the helm. However, things have not materialised in the way the party had anticipated. Along with strong expressions of national pride in Chinas war effort, some members of the public have responded with sympathy towards the KMT veterans who fought the Japanese. With this sympathy has come antipathy towards the CCP who are accused of persecuting KMT soldiers after 1949, of re-writing the history of the war for its own propaganda purposes and of betraying the nation by, amongst other things, avoiding armed conflict with Japan and leaving the KMT to fight the war on its own. In light of this growing (although not necessarily majority) public reaction, we argue that instead of fortifying the partys nationalist legitimacy, the official reappraisal of the KMTs role in the war runs the risk of eroding that legitimacy.

The rise of ‘Republican fever’ in the PRC and the implications for CCP legitimacy:

This article examines the upsurge in Chinese public support for the legacy of the Republican era, a phenomenon known as ‘Republican fever’. The fever has arisen following the formal relaxation of restrictions on discussing the Republican period. The rationale for doing so is linked to political expediency and in particular to the CCP’s quest for nationalist legitimacy. By acknowledging the positive aspects of the Republican era as part of a placatory policy on reunification with Taiwan, the CCP is trying to present itself as a key partner in a united patriotic front with the Kuomintang. But things have not turned out as planned. As Republican fever has spread across a diverse section of Chinese society, so too has criticism of the CCP’s record in power. In light of this, we argue that instead of fortifying the Party’s nationalist legitimacy, the CCP has unwittingly started a process which appears to be eroding that legitimacy.

The Evolution of Chinese Thinking on Human Rights in the Post-Mao Era

In the post-Mao era, the evolution of an orthodox Chinese line on human rights has taken place. The past decade or so has seen a considerable increase in Chinese academic literature on the subject. In an effort to fortify the government position and thereby silence its numerous foreign critics, Beijing has carefully expanded the boundaries of legitimate debate to encompass scholarly discussion of this notoriously sensitive area. Although most Chinese academics have duly endorsed and in many areas elaborated upon the government stance on rights, a handful of scholars have published ideas that are indifferent and even hostile to the official approach. This bears testimony both to changes in official policy, to the influence of scholars in shaping a new, more subtle and complex official line on human rights.

Human rights in China: Between Marx and Confucius

Since the death of Mao Zedong and the subsequent implementation of an ‘open door’ economic policy, foreign criticism of Chinas human rights record has greatly increased. China maintains that it possesses a distinct understanding of rights deriving from its own history and national conditions. In particular, China cites the doctrine of Marxism, its state ideology since 1949, as the primary influence on its perception of rights. Yet, China also persists in a peculiarly Confucian orthodoxy, identifiable both in its official theory and practice of rights. Is there a universal principle of human rights, or does Chinas entrenched Confucian heritage of itself argue against the pertinence of foreign criticisms?

Aggressive Nationalism: Utilising the Yuanmingyuan Incident

This chapter provides the first of our two cases studies on aggressive nationalism, focusing on the official propagation of the Anglo-French destruction of Yuanmingyuan in 1860. Here we trace the different ways in which the party has reminded the Chinese public about this traumatic incident. The underlying objective has been to enhance the CCP’s status as the party which liberated China from the Century of Humiliation and established the PRC as a major international power. However, this has not always materialised. Instead, some members of the public have been critical of the CCP, accusing it of being no better at standing up for Chinese interests than the much-hated Qing dynasty during the Century of Humiliation, as epitomised by the Yuanmingyuan incident.

Consensual Nationalism: The KMT and the Second Sino-Japanese War

This chapter provides the first of our two case studies on consensual nationalism, examining the party’s recognition of the KMT’s key role in the Second Sino-Japanese War. Previously, stringent political controls were noticeably relaxed during 2005 to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of the war. This gave rise to an upsurge in investigative journalism and internet activity which highlighted the true role of the KMT during the war. The CCP’s underlying objective has been to promote itself as the party of national unity, but the public response has not always been supportive of the CCP. This has seen widespread anger over the CCP mistreatment of KMT veterans after the war and accusations of an historical cover-up over the KMT’s key contribution in defeating Japan and the CCP’s lack thereof.

Consensual Nationalism: The Republican Era and the Rise of Republican Fever

This chapter illustrates how similar criticisms have been levelled against the party concerning the truth behind the China’s Republican era. Although the CCP has been more tolerant of media, academic and public discussion of this era with a view to broadening its consensual nationalism, this has once again backfired. In particular, exponents of Republic fever has expressed a preference for the greater educational, democratic and diplomatic achievements of the Republic and dismissed the CCP’s economic reforms as simply making up for the time lost under the calamitous Mao regime.

Aggressive Nationalism: The Legacy of Japanese Imperialism

In this chapter, we will see how the party uses the legacy of Japanese imperialism as a form of aggressive nationalism. The wounds of this legacy are often salted by the party in the wake of a bilateral spat over the disputed Diaoyu Islands or a visit by a high-level Japanese politician to the Yasukuni Shrine, after which Japan is accused of still behaving like an imperialist power. Here again, the objective is to bolster the CCP’s position as the sole protector of Chinese national interests in the face of an aggressive foreign opponent. However, critics have derided the party’s weakness in its dealings with Japan, expressing a preference for the strongman approach epitomised by Mao Zedong or Vladimir Putin.