Robert Y. Shapiro

A New Partisan Voter

The American electorate today is different from that described in The American Voter. Both the 1950s era of ideologically innocent party voting and the subsequent period of partisan dealignment are over. Some political scientists began to describe the New American Voter as a new partisan evolution occurred. What has not been fully appreciated in the twentieth/twenty-first century history of voting studies is how partisanship returned in a form more ideological and more issue based along liberal-conservative lines than it has been in more than 30 years. This is visible in the strength of partisan voting, in the relationship between partisanship and ideology, and in the strength of the relationship of partisanship and self-reported liberal-conservative ideology to the publics economic, social, racial, and religious attitudes and opinions. Not only has the public responded in a striking way to changes in politics and its context, but the current transformation has also appeared to be strikingly enduring and difficult to shake, based on survey evidence for this new partisan voter.

Foreign Policy and the Rational Public

American public opinion about foreign policy is neither volatile nor capricious. Contrary to much conventional wisdom, collective opinion has tended to be rather stable. When it has changed, it has done so by responding in rational ways to international and domestic events that have been reported and interpreted by the mass media and by policymakers and other elites. The public has not always successfully judged the best interests of the United States or that of people elsewhere, nor have elites and the media always reported truthfully and interpreted correctly. Nevertheless, we maintain that Americans, as a collective body, have done well with whatever information has been provided, and that they have formed and changed their policy preferences in a reasonable manner. This conclusion is based upon analysis, both quantitative and historical, of a comprehensive set of data on foreign policy opinion changes in the United States from the 1930s to the 1980s.

Business Political Power: The Case of Taxation

We examine contending views about the forms and mechanisms of business power in U.S. politics by estimating time series models explaining taxation and redistribution. Taxation and redistribution constitute strong cases for theories about business and class power, since all firms have an interest in reducing taxation. We find that changes in corporate taxation and in redistribution between capital gains income and earned income and between corporate taxation and individual taxation are strongly influenced by political partisanship, with Democratic administrations increasing the tax burden on firms and their owners. How far corporations engage in electoral financing - measured through the establishment of corporate political action committees - is also influential. The models show some evidence consistent with the understanding of class power conceptualized by Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf and the presence of election cycle effects but inconsistent with implications arising from the structural dependence of the state on capital and asset concentration in the largest corporations as a mechanism of class power

Studying Substantive Democracy

Within the last decade, the amount and quality of research on the relationship between public opinion and policy making has taken a dramatic step forward. This research contributes to the development of democratic theory and to the (re)organization of political science as a profession. Further development of opinion-policy research, however, will require addressing several critical limitations. What Has Been Done Statistical analyses and interpretative case studies have reported (both in the United States and Western Europe) a systematic relationship between public opinion and decision making on a range of issues—from national security to social security (for a review see Shapiro and Jacobs 1989 and Shapiro and Young 1989). These results have emerged from several distinct research designs. The first relies on in-depth investigations of public opinions impact on formulating specific policies. These case studies rely on closely examining public opinion as gauged through polling results and policy decisions. Many of these studies offer cross-national studies; they discuss issues central to international relations, American politics, and comparative politics (Jacobs 1992a, 1992b, and 1993; Risse-Kappen 1991; Deese 1994 for essays by Shapiro and Page, Graham, and Bennett; Jasper 1990; Eichenberg 1989; Russett 1990; Graham 1989; Kusnitz 1984; Burstein 1985; Sobel 1993; Mattes 1993). For instance, Jacobs (1993) uses interviews and archival evidence to investigate the formulation of American and British health care policy.

DO THE FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES? PARTISAN DISAGREEMENT AS A CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRATIC COMPETENCE

ABSTRACT The partisan and ideological polarization of American politics since the 1970s appears to have affected pubic opinion in striking ways. The American public has become increasingly partisan and ideological along liberal‐conservative lines on a wide range of issues, including even foreign policy. This has raised questions about how “rational” the public is, in the broad sense of the publics responsiveness to objective conditions. Widespread partisan disagreements over what those conditions are—i.e., disagreements about “the facts”—suggest that large proportions of the public may be perceiving the facts incorrectly. The facts in question are important enough that these partisan disagreements may translate into sub‐optimal policy preferences and electoral decisions.

Economic Growth Strategies: The Effects of Ideological Partisanship on Interest Rates and Business Taxation in the United States

We reformulate the partisanship thesis in light of four claims leveled against it. The reformulated version, ideological partisanship, is based upon the theory that similar rates of economic growth may follow from the different use of policy instruments. Owing to their role as determinants of investment and growth, interest rates, business taxation rates, and the redistribution of the tax burden between capital gains and earned income are examined. We advance models that take into account other views of politics beside the partisan one, and test for political influences. The United States is characterized by very pronounced partisan differences in national economic policy with Democratic administrations seeking to promote growth through a consumption driven, while Republican administrations promote an investment-driven strategy. Democratic administrations also seek to shift the tax burden toward corporations and owners of capital. These findings are examined in light of the comparative political economy literature. We conclude that the forms and institutional foundations of left partisan policies differ among democratic capitalist countries.

Presidential Performance the Economy, and the Public's Evaluation of Economic Conditions

S TUDENTS OF PUBLIC OPINION and voting behavior have become increasingly concerned with the political consequences of pre-election fluctuations in national economic conditions. Using similar economic indicators but different methodologies, analysts have reported contradictory findings concerning the effects of economic conditions on both the publics assessment of presidential performance and the outcomes of congressional elections.1 Although these

Race, class, and culture : a study in Afro-American mass opinion

Tables Preface 1. Theoretical Perspectives 2. Patterning of Racial Differences in Mass Culture 3. Class and the Patterning of Racial Differences in Mass Culture 4. The Internal Foundations of Afro-American Mass Culture 5. Afro-American Culture and the Internal Dynamics of Mass Culture 6. Conclusion Appendix Notes References Index

Medical Care in the United States

MEDICAL care and government policies toward it have been changing slowly but significantly in the United States. Rapidly rising medical costs-especially cost increases larger than high general inflation during difficult economic timesbecame the catalyst for change. The Reagan administrations proposals, policies, and budget cuts have altered the course of health policy. Problems of equity and access to health care continue for the poor and uninsured (estimates of the latter ranging from 8 to 15 percent), and the recurring debate about forms of national health insurance may begin anew (cf. Erskine, 1975; Kingdon, 1984). Other related issues which also affect the costs of medical care are starting to become more prominent: the needs of an aging and older population, long-term care, catastrophic care, prevention, the development and use of new technology, and malpractice and the accountability of the medical profession. The public is only beginning to get acquainted with the new ways (and alphabet soup) in which patient care is provided, insured, and paid for-larger insurance premiums, deductibles, and out-of-pocket expenses; and, for example, the uses of preferred provider organizations (PPOs), health maintenance organizations (HMOs), and the new prospective payment cost controls for treatments: the diagnostic-related groups (DRGs) that are currently applied to Medicare and inevitably more broadly. Where, then, does the public stand? Public concern and support for government assistance in medical care is virtually on par with Social Security as an entitlement (cf. Shapiro and Smith, 1985). This support appears to have been strikingly stable for decades, and on the basis of limited data, it seems to be strikingly similar to public attitudes in other affluent Western countries that have more extensive national medicare programs (cf. Coughlin, 1980; Pescosolido et al., 1985). Support for more spending and government action in this policy area has been consistently high in general, especially because of the elderly and the poor, who are perceived to be truly needy. The public appears

Free Hand Abroad, Divide and Rule at Home

Under unipolarity, the immediate costs and risks of war are more likely to seem manageable for a militarily dominant power like the U.S. This does not necessarily make the use of force cheap or wise, but it means that the costs and risks attendant on its use are comparatively indirect, long term, and thus highly subject to interpretation. Unipolarity, combined with the opportunity created by September 11, opened a space for interpretation that tempted a highly ideological foreign policy cohort to seize on international terrorism as an issue to transform the balance of power both in the international system and in American party politics. This cohort’s response to the terrorist attack was grounded in ideological sincerity but also in the routine practice of wedge issue politics, which had been honed on domestic issues during three decades of partisan ideological polarization and then extended into foreign policy.