Roberta Troisi

A Model of European Medicine Agency (EMA)'s Decisions on Human Medicines

This paper is aimed at examining the European medicine agency decisions in the field of human medicines. Different classes of human medicines approved in the last five years have been classified. They have been analyzed considering: i) the relation between non generic drugs and generic drugs, ii) time of approval, iii) objectives of the clinical trials, iv) criteria of efficiency, efficacy, safety. By using the Summary of the European Public Assessment Report for every human medicine in the period 2010-2015, a dataset has been arranged. A Structural Equation Model analysis was carried out. The degree of efficiency, the degree of safety, the tradeoff between efficiency and safety that lead to the EMA approval decisions are conditioned by the nature of the medicines and the characteristics of their class. Different degrees of benefits and risks underpinning the decisions have been identified together with the consequent guiding principles that lead to the EMA decision process. A latent general “safety” factor at the basis of EMA decision process was assessed. A Model of European Medicine Agency (EMA)’s Decisions on Human Medicines

Individual Preferences and Job Characteristics: An Analysis of Cooperative Credit Banks

The aim of this paper is to analyse individual preferences in relation to different job characteristics. More specifically, this work focuses on the case of employees of cooperative credit banks (CCBs) in Campania and accounts for certain fundamental institutional features: CCBs are designed to pursue specific member interests rather than profit maximization, and most employees are both owners and consumers. The research is conducted by applying a conjoint analysis approach with stated preference data. Novel features of the analysis include the application of this approach to empirical research on worker incentives and the use of a mixed logit model.

Property Rights and Incentives in Social Cooperatives

This paper analyses Italian social cooperatives as a typical delivery service firm focusing on employee incentive systems characterized by “role tension” linked to the dual position of being employee and owner at the same time. In line with this idea, the answers to three questions: “Why to incentivise”, “What to incentivise” “How to incentivise” are searched starting from both the lack of employee’s controllability in the sector and reconstruction of the property rights which could be consistent with the characteristics of social cooperatives and with the nonprofit distribution constraint. The conclusion is that, because social cooperatives are able to structure a richer incentive set, they are more efficient in the provision of social utility services even though they pay lower wages than public organizations and for-profit firms.