Roberto Fortich

Collective Decisions in Asset Titling

Recent literature on economic development and poverty has stressed the issue of property rights, informal institutions and their relationship with capital markets. This paper intends to model some aspects of economist Hernando De Sotos work on informality, particularly how does the establishment of a property system allows people to choose from a larger set of trading partners?, and why is the individual cost-benefit decision of getting a legal property title considered a network issue?. A game theory approach was followed to model this problem: payoffs are correlated with the distribution of total population between official and unofficial sectors, and issues of positive feedback and externalities arise. Conclusions include some policy analysis for the case of housing in Colombia.

The Stock Exchange Law: Analysis of its Possible Consequences over Colombian Corporations

Law 964 of 2005 modifies the existent regulation on the management and investment of resources associated with the Colombian stock exchange. This paper makes notice on some possible effects derived from this law that might affect corporations in Colombia. Several previous reforms of the market are studied, preceded by a description of the configuration of property among Colombian corporations on the basis of recent methodological approaches (including La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishnys research agenda). We conclude that given the particularities of the Colombian market, the new Stock Exchange Law may favor the growth of foreign investment funds with a Colombian portfolio, but it could also alter the incentive schemes by which corporations operate in Colombia.