Robin Hörnig

Causal and noncausal conditionals: An integrated model of interpretation and reasoning

We present an integrated model for the understanding of and the reasoning from conditional statements. Central assumptions from several approaches are integrated into a causal path model. According to the model, the cognitive availability of exceptions to a conditional reduces the subjective conditional probability of the consequent, given the antecedent. This conditional probability determines peoples degree of belief in the conditional, which in turn affects their willingness to accept logically valid inferences. In addition to this indirect pathway, the model contains a direct pathway: Availability of exceptional situations directly reduces the endorsement of valid inferences. We tested the integrated model with three experiments using conditional statements embedded in pseudonaturalistic cover stories. An explicitly mentioned causal link between antecedent and consequent was either present (causal conditionals) or absent (arbitrary conditionals). The model was supported for the causal but not for the arbitrary conditional statements.

Two principles of premise integration in spatial reasoning.

We propose two principles that facilitate integration of two relational premises in spatial reasoning. Integration is easier if the anaphor in the second premise, P2, bears the role of the relatum (relatum = given). Moreover, integration is easier if, in P2, the anaphor is mentioned before the new element (given-new). In premises with canonical word order (grammatical subjects mentioned first), these principles always conflict with one another. In topicalized statements mentioning the prepositional phrase first, the two principles work in tandem. By varying word order, we tested the two principles by measuring P2 comprehension times. Comprehension times indicated that integration was easiest when P2 obeyed both principles and most difficult when both principles were violated. Canonical premises were of intermediate difficulty. This pattern emerged regardless of whether the anaphor was a definite description or a pronoun.

Effects of directionality in deductive reasoning: II. Premise integration and conclusion evaluation.

Previous research (Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2000) has shown an inherent directionality between the two terms linked in premises of typical deductive reasoning tasks. With three experiments we investigated the effect of inherent directionality on the time to integrate two premises and for the derivation of a conclusion. We varied figure (i.e., order of terms in the premises) and direction of inference (i.e., order of terms in the conclusion) in deduction tasks from various domains (propositional reasoning, syllogisms, spatial, temporal, and linear order reasoning). Effects of figure on premise reading times varied with the directionality of the relations. Effects of direction of inference reflected the same directionality for a subset of relations. We propose that two factors are jointly responsible for a large part of observed directionality effects in premise integration: the inherent directionality of relational statements and a general advantage for a given–new order of terms in the second premise. Difficulty of deriving a conclusion is affected by the directionality or relations if and only if the relation is semantically asymmetric, so that the directionality must be preserved in the integrated mental model.

Working memory capacity and the construction of spatial mental models in comprehension and deductive reasoning

We asked 149 high-school students who were pretested for their working memory capacity (WMC) to read spatial descriptions relating to five objects and to evaluate conclusions asserting an unmentioned relationship between two of the objects. Unambiguous descriptions were compatible with a single spatial arrangement, whereas ambiguous descriptions permitted two arrangements; a subset of the ambiguous descriptions still determined the relation asserted in the conclusion, whereas another subset did not. Two groups of participants received different instructions: The deduction group should accept conclusions only if they followed with logical necessity from the description, whereas the comprehension group should accept a conclusion if it agreed with their representation of the arrangement. Self-paced reading times increased on sentences that introduced an ambiguity, replicating previous findings in deductive reasoning experiments. This effect was also found in the comprehension group, casting doubt on the interpretation that people consider multiple possible arrangements online. Responses to conclusions could be modelled by a multinomial processing model with four parameters: the probability of constructing a correct mental model, the probability of detecting an ambiguity, and two guessing parameters. Participants with high and with low WMC differed mainly in the probability of successfully constructing a mental model.

Logical Reasoning and Probabilities: A Comprehensive Test of Oaksford and Chater (2001)

We report two experiments testing a central prediction of the probabilistic account of reasoning provided by Oaksford and Chater (2001): Acceptance of standard conditional inferences, card choices in the Wason selection task, and quantifiers chosen for conclusions from syllogisms should vary as a function of the frequency of the concepts involved. Frequency was manipulated by a probability-learning phase preceding the reasoning tasks to simulate natural sampling. The effects predicted by Oaksford and Chater (2001) were not obtained with any of the three paradigms.

Word order variation in spatial descriptions with adverbs

Previous research has shown that in a three-term spatial reasoning task, the second premise of a German premise pair is especially easy to comprehend if (1) the prepositional object rather than the grammatical subject denotes the given entity, and if (2) the term denoting the given entity precedes the term denoting the new entity. Accordingly, the second premise is easiest to comprehend with noncanonical word order—that is, with the prepositional object in preverbal position denoting the given entity (e.g.,To the right of the given object is the new subject). This finding is explained in terms of contextual licensing of noncanonical word order. Here, we discuss and tested two alternative accounts of contextual licensing,given-new andpartially ordered set relations (Poset). The given-new account claims that noncanonical word order is licensed by the term denoting the given entity preceding the term denoting the new entity. On the Poset account, noncanonical word order is licensed if the preverbal constituent introduces a new entity that stands in a transitive, irreflexive, and asymmetric relation to a given entity. Comprehension times for second premises with spatial adverbs in four different word orders support both accounts of contextual licensing; Poset licensing was stronger than given-new licensing.

Effects of focus and definiteness on children's word order: evidence from German five-year-olds' reproductions of double object constructions.

Two experiments tested how faithfully German children aged 4 ;5 to 5 ;6 reproduce ditransitive sentences that are unmarked or marked with respect to word order and focus (Exp1) or definiteness (Exp2). Adopting an optimality theory (OT) approach, it is assumed that in the German adult grammar word order is ranked lower than focus and definiteness. Faithfulness of childrens reproductions decreased as markedness of inputs increased; unmarked structures were reproduced most faithfully and unfaithful outputs had most often an unmarked form. Consistent with the OT proposal, children were more tolerant against inputs marked for word order than for focus; in conflict with the proposal, children were less tolerant against inputs marked for word order than for definiteness. Our results suggest that the linearization of objects in German double object constructions is affected by focus and definiteness, but that prosodic principles may have an impact on the position of a focused constituent.

Räumliches Schließen als Sprachverstehen

AbstractdThe other side of mental models: theories of language comprehension” reads the title of a paper of Garnham (1996). At the opposite side is inference (see subtitle of Johnson-Laird, 1983). Inference as well as language comprehension have been extensively examined within the framework of the mental model theory. But investigations in these two areas seem to be pursued largely independently of each other, looking at the coin from only one of both sides. Taking spatial inference as an example, we argue that inferring a conclusion from premises describing a definite spatial layout is reducible to language comprehension, namely the construction of a single mental model; no model variation is performed to evaluate a tentative conclusion. The constitutive process in spatial reasoning is therefore the integration of the information of several premises into one mental model. This process is enlightened by figural effects that refer to principles of model construction that might conflict with one another. We suggest it to be helpful to consider anaphora resolution as part of the integration process.Zusammenfassung„The other side of mental models: theories of language comprehension„ lautet der Titel eines Aufsatzes von Garnham (1996). Der anderen Seite eine Seite ist das schlußfolgernde Denken (siehe Untertitel von Johnson-Laird, 1983). Sowohl das schlußfolgernde Denken als auch das Sprachverstehen wird im Rahmen der Theorie mentaler Modelle eingehend untersucht. Doch erscheint uns in beiden Gebieten weitgehend unabhängig voneinander geforscht und die Medaille mentales Modell von nur je einer Seite betrachtet zu werden. Anhand des räumlichen Schließens werden wir argumentieren, daß sich bei Prämissen, die eine bestimmte räumliche Anordnung beschreiben, das Inferieren der Konklusion auf das Sprachverstehen reduziert, nämlich die Konstruktion eines einzelnen mentalen Modells; eine gezielte Variation der mentalen Modelle zur Evaluation einer möglichen Schlußfolgerung findet nicht statt. Der wesentliche Prozeß beim räumlichen Schließen ist daher die Integration der Information aus mehreren Prämissen zu einem mentalen Modell. Über die Prozesse der Prämissenintegration geben Figureffekte Aufschluß, die auf mitunter konfligierende Prinzipien der Modellkonstruktion verweisen. Wir enden mit dem Ausblick darauf, daß bei der Untersuchung der Prämissenintegration beim räumlichen Schließen der Prozeß der Anaphernresolution stärker berücksichtigt werden sollte.