Rocco J. Gennaro

Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT theory of consciousness

(2002). Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT Theory of Consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 293-330.

Consciousness, self‐consciousness and episodic memory

Abstract My aim in this paper is to show that consciousness entails self‐consciousness by focusing on the relationship between consciousness and memory. More specifically, I addreess the following questions: (1) does consciousness require episodic memory?; and (2) does episodic memory require self‐consciousness? With the aid of some Kantian considerations and recent empirical data, it is argued that consciousness does require episodic memory. This is done after defining episodic memory and distinguishing it from other types of memory. An affirmative answer to (2) is also warranted especially in the light of the issues raised in answering (1). I claim that ‘consciousness entails self‐consciousness’ is thereby shown via the route through episodic memory, i.e. via affirmative answers to (1) and (2). My aim is to revive this Kantian thesis and to bring together current psychological research on amnesia with traditional philosophical perspectives on consciousness and memory.

Misrepresentation, empty HOTs, and intrinsic HOTs: A reply to Pereplyotchik

David Pereplyotchik (DP) addresses some aspects of The Consciousness Paradox (CP), focusing mainly on the issue of whether or not my “wide intrinsicality view” (WIV) version of HOT theory is superior to Rosenthal’s “extrinsic HOT” (EHOT) theory. Of course, simply calling something a “fallacy” doesn’t make it so and this goes for what DP calls my “intrinsic-ergo-accurate fallacy.” I never make an inferential claim from “intrinsic” HOTs to “necessarily accurate.” I do hold that, unlike EHOT theory, the HOT is better construed as intrinsic to an overall world-directed complex conscious state. Even in the early passage quoted by DP, I say that it “seems” (p. 58) more difficult to make sense of misrepresentation on intrinsic theory, intentionally trying not to put too muchweight on this line of argument. Perhaps I could have made this even clearer throughout the entire book, but I do argue that no HOT theorist should take Levine’s option 1 (“the conscious experience is of a greenish sort”) or option 2 (“the conscious experience is of a reddish sort”), and that option 3 (“no consciousness”) has significant advantages. In this situation, we must decide how to handle a case of mismatch between a lower-order (LO) state representing red and a HO state representing green. I also argue for the WIV on many fronts, including how it can better explain the way that HO concepts color the very phenomenology of firstorder conscious states, how it better fits the neurophysiological facts, and how it handles the question of why some objects of thoughts (such as rocks) don’t become conscious whereas mental states do. When DP says that I hold that HOTs are “necessarily accurate” and that I “guarantee” a match between a HOT and its target, this is very misleading or at least oversimplified. So let’s look more closely. First, if we think about the intrinsic/extrinsic issue from a third-person neurophysiological perspective, there is something odd about holding that what makes a mental state M conscious is something else, i.e., something entirely extrinsic to M. If and when the true neural correlates of consciousness are discovered, it seems far more likely that they will be treated as part of conscious brain states. There can still be

Fiction, pleasurable tragedy, and the HOT theory of consciousness

Abstract The ‘feeling fiction problem’ asks: is it rational to be moved by what happens to fictional characters? The so-called ‘paradox of tragedy’ is embodied in the question: Why or how is it that we take pleasure in artworks which are clearly designed to cause in us such feelings as sadness and fear? My focus in this paper is to examine these problems from the point of view of the so-called ‘higher-order thought theory of consciousness’ (HOT theory) which says that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a thought that one is in that state. I examine the feeling fiction problem in light of the HOT theory and through a critique of Colin Radfords view. For example, I argue that Radford equivocates in his use of the term ‘aware’ in his response to some of the proposed solutions to the feeling fiction problem. Finally, I show how Susan Feagins approach to the paradox of tragedy can be analysed and supported by the HOT theory.

Inferring the Mental Processes of Other Minds

Abstract In 4 experiments, the authors examined how several variables influence the quality and quantity of information that people use to make judgments about other people. The results showed that when possible, participants consistently responded appropriately to variables that influenced information that they used to make inferences about other minds. The results also suggested that under circumstances with no opportunity to contrast behavior in different situations, people might not be sensitive to the quality and quantity of information present. The authors interpreted results to mean that under most circumstances, people make inferences in a way that efficiently uses information about the causes of behavior.