Rochelle E. Cox

Does oxytocin influence the early detection of angry and happy faces

Oxytocin has a crucial role in social behaviour, although its effects on social cognition are not fully understood. Past research shows that oxytocin enhances encoding and conceptual recognition of positive social stimuli over social-threat stimuli. In this study, we evaluated whether oxytocin modified responses to positive and threatening social stimuli at an earlier perceptual stage of processing using the visual search task. In a double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled, between-subject design, oxytocin (24 IU) or a placebo was administered to 104 healthy volunteers. Participants returned to complete the visual search paradigm 45min later. Results showed that angry faces were detected more efficiently than happy faces. Participants also gazed longer and more frequently toward angry faces. Oxytocin did not, however, influence response time, accuracy, or gaze toward angry or happy faces, even when participants were separated into high- and low-social anxiety. The results of this study suggest that oxytocin may not influence the detection of positive and threatening social stimuli at early perceptual levels of processing. Oxytocin may have greater influence in altering the cognitive processing of social valence at more conceptual and elaborate levels of processing.

Developing hypnotic analogues of clinical delusions: Mirrored-self misidentification

Introduction. Despite current research interest in delusional beliefs, there are no viable models for studying delusions in the laboratory. However, hypnosis offers a technique for creating transient delusions that are resistant to challenge. The aim of this study was to develop an hypnotic analogue of one important delusion, mirrored-self misidentification. Methods. Twelve high hypnotisable participants received an hypnotic suggestion to see either a stranger in the mirror, a mirror as a window, or a mirror as a window with a view to a stranger. Participants’ deluded beliefs were challenged, and following hypnosis, Sheehan and McConkeys (1982) Experiential Analysis Technique was used to explore participants’ phenomenological experience of the delusion. Results. The majority of participants did not recognise their reflection in the mirror, described the person in the mirror as having different physical characteristics to themselves, and maintained their delusion when challenged. Conclusions. The hypnotic suggestion created a credible, compelling delusion with features strikingly similar to clinical cases of mirrored-self misidentification. Our findings suggest that Factor 2 within Langdon and Colthearts (2000) two-factor framework may involve a lowering of the criteria used to accept or reject delusional hypotheses.

Hypnotic illusions and clinical delusions: Hypnosis as a research method

Introduction. Hypnosis is not only intrinsically interesting, but it can be used instrumentally as a powerful tool to investigate phenomena outside its immediate domain. In focusing on instrumental hypnosis research, we first sketch the many contributions of hypnosis across a range of areas in experimental psychopathology. In particular, we summarise the historical and more recent uses of hypnosis to create and explore clinically relevant, temporary delusions. Methods. We then describe in detail the steps that hypnosis researchers take in constructing a hypnotic paradigm to map the features and processes shared by clinical and hypnotic delusions, as well as their impact on information processing (including autobiographical memory). We illustrate with hypnotic versions of mirrored-self misidentification, somatoparaphrenia, alien control, and identity delusions. Results. Finding indicate that hypnotic analogues can produce compelling delusions with features that are strikingly similar to their clinical counterparts. These similarities encompass phenomenological features of delusions, delusional resistance to challenge, and autobiographical memory during delusions. Conclusions. We recognise important methodological issues and limitations of such hypnotic analogues, including: indexing response (behaviour vs. experience), alternative explanations (e.g., social compliance), the need for converging data, the need for close and continuing dialogue between the clinic and the laboratory, and generalisability of the findings.

Hypnotic Illusions and Clinical Delusions: A Hypnotic Paradigm for Investigating Delusions of Misidentification

Abstract In 2 experiments, the authors created a hypnotic analogue of delusions of misidentification and explored their impact on autobiographical memory. In Experiment 1, to establish the paradigm, high and low hypnotizable participants were given a suggestion to become someone similar or dissimilar to themselves. In Experiment 2, to further test the paradigm and to examine autobiographical remembering, highs were given a suggestion to become a same-sex sibling, administered 2 challenges to the temporary delusion, and asked to generate autobiographical memories. For high hypnotizable participants, the suggested delusions of misidentification were compelling and resistant to challenge. During these temporary delusions, participants generated specific autobiographical memories that reflected previously experienced events viewed from the perspective of the suggested identity. These findings highlight the instrumental value of hypnosis to the investigation and understanding of delusions and autobiographical memory.

Mirrored-self misidentification in the hypnosis laboratory: Recreating the delusion from its component factors

Introduction. Mirrored-self misidentification is the delusional belief that ones reflection in the mirror is a stranger. According to Langdon and Colthearts (2000) “two-factor” theory of monothematic delusions, the delusion can arise from deficits in face processing (Factor 1) and belief evaluation (Factor 2). This study gave participants separate hypnotic suggestions for these two factors to create a hypnotic analogue of the delusion. Method. Forty-six high hypnotisable participants received a hypnotic suggestion for either Factor 1 alone or for Factors 1 and 2, either with hypnosis (hypnosis condition) or without (wake condition). Participants were asked to look into a mirror and to describe what they saw. Participants who reported seeing a stranger in the mirror also received a series of challenges. Results. Overall, 70% of participants in the hypnosis condition passed the delusion; only 22% of participants in the wake condition passed. Importantly, in hypnosis, the Factor 1 alone suggestion was just as effective in creating the delusion as the combined Factor 1 and Factor 2 suggestion. Conclusion. These results suggest that hypnotic suggestion can recreate the mirrored-self misidentification delusion from its component factors. Notably, the hypnotic context, itself known to disrupt belief evaluation, can act as Factor 2.

Déjà Vu in the Laboratory: A Behavioral and Experiential Comparison of Posthypnotic Amnesia and Posthypnotic Familiarity

Abstract This experiment aimed to create a laboratory analogue of déjà vu. During hypnosis, 1 group of high hypnotizables completed a puzzle game and then received a posthypnotic amnesia suggestion to forget the game (PHA condition). Another group of highs were not given the game but received a posthypnotic familiarity suggestion that it would feel familiar (PHF condition). After hypnosis, all participants were given the game and described their reactions to it. Whereas 83% of participants in both conditions passed their respective suggestions, more in the PHF condition felt a sense of déjà vu. An EAT inquiry revealed that they experienced sensory fascination and confusion about the source of familiarity, akin to everyday déjà vu. These findings highlight the value of using hypnosis as a laboratory analogue of déjà vu and provide a framework for investigating clinical manifestations of this phenomenon.

'Faultless' ignorance: Strengths and limitations of epistemic definitions of confabulation

There is no satisfactory account for the general phenomenon of confabulation, for the following reasons: (1) confabulation occurs in a number of pathological and non-pathological conditions; (2) impairments giving rise to confabulation are likely to have different neural bases; and (3) there is no unique theory explaining the aetiology of confabulations. An epistemic approach to defining confabulation could solve all of these issues, by focusing on the surface features of the phenomenon. However, existing epistemic accounts are unable to offer sufficient conditions for confabulation and tend to emphasise only its epistemic disadvantages. In this paper, we argue that a satisfactory epistemic account of confabulation should also acknowledge those features which are (potentially) epistemically advantageous. For example, confabulation may allow subjects to exercise some control over their own cognitive life which is instrumental to the construction or preservation of their sense of self.

Mirror agnosia and the mirrored-self misidentification delusion : a hypnotic analogue

Introduction. Mirrored-self misidentification is the delusional belief that ones reflection in the mirror is a stranger. Current theories suggest that one pathway to the delusion is mirror agnosia (a deficit in which patients are unable to use mirror knowledge when interacting with mirrors). This study examined whether a hypnotic suggestion for mirror agnosia can recreate features of the delusion. Method. Ten high hypnotisable participants were given either a suggestion to not understand mirrors or to see the mirror as a window. Participants were asked to look into a mirror and describe what they saw. Participants were tested on their understanding of mirrors and received a series of challenges. Participants then received a detailed postexperimental inquiry. Results. Three of five participants given the suggestion to not understand mirrors reported seeing a stranger and maintained this belief when challenged. These participants also showed signs of mirror agnosia. No participants given the suggestion to see a window reported seeing a stranger. Conclusion. Results indicate that a hypnotic suggestion for mirror agnosia can be used to recreate the mirrored-self misidentification delusion. Factors influencing the effectiveness of hypnotic analogues of psychopathology, such as participants’ expectations and interpretations, are discussed.

Can we recreate delusions in the laboratory

Clinical delusions are difficult to investigate in the laboratory because they co-occur with other symptoms and with intellectual impairment. Partly for these reasons, researchers have recently begun to use hypnosis with neurologically intact people in order to model clinical delusions. In this paper we describe striking analogies between the behavior of patients with a clinical delusion of mirrored self misidentification, and the behavior of highly hypnotizable subjects who receive a hypnotic suggestion to see a stranger when they look in the mirror. Based on these analogies, we argue that the use of hypnosis is a reliable method to investigate the surface features of clinical delusions. But to what extent can hypnosis successfully recreate delusions? Can it also contribute to a better understanding of delusion formation? Although clinical delusions and hypnotically induced beliefs are different in etiology, some analogies can be identified in the underlying processes that characterise them, based on the two-factor theory of delusion formation.

“That's not my arm”: A hypnotic analogue of somatoparaphrenia

Introduction. “Instrumental hypnosis” allows researchers to model clinical symptoms in the laboratory, creating “virtual patients” with reversible disturbances in, for example, perception, action, memory, or belief. We used hypnosis to temporarily recreate somatoparaphrenia, a delusional belief that ones own limb belongs to someone else. Methods. We compared a “Fully Formed” somatoparaphrenia suggestion with a “Factor 1 + Factor 2” suggestion that attempted to generate the delusional belief from analogues of its hypothesised underlying factors (i.e., paralysis plus disrupted critical belief evaluation). We tested and then challenged subjects’ responses to these suggestions. Results. Although many hypnotic subjects experienced temporary paralysis, only a minority claimed their arm did not belong to them. Notably, the Fully Formed suggestion was more successful in recreating features of somatoparaphrenia than the Factor 1 + Factor 2 suggestion. In response to the challenges, some of those who developed temporary somatoparaphrenia maintained their belief throughout the hypnosis session. Conclusions. We discuss these findings in terms of the “two-factor” theory of delusions and we highlight the advantages versus disadvantages of using hypnosis to explore such delusional beliefs in the laboratory.