Rod Thornton

The British Army and the Origins of its Minimum Force Philosophy

This article considers why the British Army of today holds to the conviction that its peace support operations be conducted with an emphasis on the concept of minimum force. Evidence is presented here to show that the origins of this concept lie in two particular historical determinants: first, the moral parameters set by a religious sentiment refined through interaction with Victorian sensibilities; and, second, the pragmatic necessities of imperial policing. This article goes on to indicate how both these factors shaped – and, most significantly, why they continue to shape – a particularly British approach to the question of low-intensity conflict and, in particular, to the question of the use of military technology in such conflict.

Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Stages of the British Army's Deployment to Northern Ireland (August 1969 to March 1972)

Abstract This article considers the way in which a military force committed to a ‘stabilization’ operation can, through its own mistakes, actually make that mission much more difficult than it need be. The British Army was committed to a peace support task in Northern Ireland in 1969 but the errors made by those within its ranks went a long way in moving that task away from one of peace support to one of countering a fully fledged insurgency. Through an examination of the clumsiness displayed by the British Army in Northern Ireland in its initial period of deployment (August 1969 – March 1972) several parallels can be drawn with events recently in Iraq. What is more, fundamental lessons can be learnt from the British experience. These lessons still have relevance today as the West continues to commit forces to interventionary operations; forces which are making the same mistakes the British Army did nearly 40 years ago.

‘Minimum Force’: a reply to Huw Bennett

The British military philosophy of ‘minimum force’, seen as a key aspect in any of its counterinsurgency campaigns, would appear to be alive and well today. In Afghanistan, British Army Apache helicopter pilots have different rules of engagement (ROE) to their American counterparts. British pilots will only engage suspected Taliban forces on the ground if those forces are clearly bearing arms (with the same ROE applying to British ground forces). US Apache pilots, on the other hand, can engage suspects on the ground whether they are armed or not. They are more likely than the British pilots, according to one journalist, to ‘press home their attacks until no-one is left standing’, while the latter are seen to be ‘less ruthless in finishing off their targets’. Overall, as a US Apache pilot pointed out, ‘The Brits are good but they don’t have the extreme aggression that we do’. Here we have the same war and the same equipment, but a different philosophy on the use of force. This employment by British forces in Afghanistan of what we may look upon as ‘minimum force’ is an idea deeply rooted in the British military psyche. In a previous article in Small Wars and Insurgencies, I went through the reasons as to why such an attitude would be present within the British Army, i.e. that the British Army had and continues to have a ‘minimum force’ philosophy. This article was brought to light again recently in the pages of another contribution to Small Wars and Insurgencies by Huw Bennett, entitled ‘The Other Side of the COIN: Minimum and Exemplary Force in British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya’. Bennett expresses a different point of view and says that, particularly in the Kenyan Case, there was little evidence of the application of minimum force by this army. I have a few concerns with Bennett’s article, particularly in the way that it brings into disrepute some of the actors involved at the time. Some straightening of the record is necessary. In October 1952, a State of Emergency was declared in the British colony of Kenya. The government there was concerned about the growing strength of a movement based within the Kikuyi tribe and known as Mau Mau. The Mau Mau,

The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare

While Western militaries recognise the logic and necessity of ‘irregular warfare’ in their military operations, the manifold aspects of irregular fighting have yet to be mastered fully. Information warfare, for example, appears to be a tool more capably employed by Russia, to the detriment of NATO. Rod Thornton explains how and why Russia has ‘won’ in Crimea by affording subversive information campaigns primacy in its military operations. Acknowledging the twofold constraints of international law and co-ordination that face Western governments seeking to play the same game, Thornton nonetheless expounds how the West might better pursue asymmetry in the security realm.

Counterterrorism and the neo-liberal university: providing a check and balance?

This article considers the relationship between counterterrorist security agencies and universities in the United Kingdom. Normally, the two would rarely come into contact. However, with recent government demand that more be done to deal with the threat of radicalisation on campuses, an increased link has developed between security agencies and universities. But when such agencies engage with universities, their activities must be challenged and limited by the latter. Universities have an important role in acting as a check and a balance to the often draconian mindsets of those charged with ‘national security’. But todays neo-liberal universities, conscious of their corporate images, may not adopt such a role. They may even end up becoming an actual partner in counterterrorist activity that can then, unchecked, generate the very radicalisation that they are supposed to help prevent.

Problems with the Kurds as proxies against Islamic State: insights from the siege of Kobane

Abstract The siege of the northern Syrian town of Kobane was lifted in January 2015. The Kurdish defenders there had triumphed against Islamic State (IS). The conflict then moved on. It moved on, though, with the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Western powers having adopted, almost by default, the Kurds as proxy fighters in this conflict. The Kurds, however, are a divided and fractious nation spread across three states and historically famous for fighting among themselves. In employing the Kurds as proxies against IS, as this article shows, these Western powers must be aware of the unintended consequences that can result.

Russian Military Modernization

At a time when most Western militaries are contracting and making room for budgetary cuts, the Russian military is going in the opposite direction. Anxious to make its defense capabilities more relevant to the contemporary security environment, the Russian political leadership has pushed for its military to modernize. But many substantial hurdles stand in the way.

A Bear with Teeth

the result of several factors; the most obvious of which has been the desire of a series of political leaders – from Mikhail Gorbachev to Dimitri Medvedev – to reduce spending on the military. Amid the general fall from grace, however, there have been instances of positive reform – patchy, and introduced at a glacial pace – but observable, nonetheless. Such improvements were on display in Georgia. However, by the same token, so were several other factors that do point to a military that has been sorely neglected.

Countering Arab Insurgencies: The British Experience

The military forces of several powers, most notably those of the US and Britain, are currently engaged in counter-insurgency campaigns against Arab opponents in Iraq. Given this, and the likelihood that the Middle East will continue to be an area where Western forces will be operationally active, this article looks at what insights can be gained from an examination of past experience; that is, how British forces dealt with Arab insurgencies during the imperial period. While there is much that is different in the contemporary period, this article points out that there are continuities that need to be appreciated. Not least among these is the pressing need for service personnel to have a strong knowledge of local languages, with the understanding of culture that accompanies such expertise. There is a template here that has clear relevance, and which needs to be examined by those conducting the counter-insurgency campaigns of today.

The Russian Threat to the Baltic States: The Problems of Shaping Local Defense Mechanisms

ABSTRACT This article examines the responses made by the Baltic States to the threat they face from Russian hybrid warfare. It looks first at the nature of this threat and at the many modes of warfare that are being employed by Russia, including, and in particular, information warfare. The article then goes on to examine the way in which this threat is viewed in the Baltic States and the debate over how it can best be countered. Raising defenses, though, as is made clear here, is not easy. Indeed, this article argues that the defenses that are being raised by the Baltic States will prove largely ineffective and possibly counterproductive.