Rodger A. Payne

The Limits and Promise of Environmental Conflict Prevention: The Case of the GEF*

Sustainable development practices should be embraced not only to forestall environmental destruction and resource exhaustion, but also to prevent conflicts apparently triggered by these causes. Unfortunately, environmentally-caused conflicts are perhaps most likely to erupt in the worlds poorest states, which are least capable of pursuing sustainable development without substantial external aid. The global assistance burden is felt primarily by multilateral developments agencies, such as the World Bank, which distributes more than USD 20 billion annually. Interestingly, the Bank acts as Trustee for the sizable Global Environment Facility (GEF) which was specifically designed to add environmental dimensions to projects funded for more general development purposes. Ironically, before the GEF was created, the World Bank was long criticized for funding unsustainable development, for ignoring its own environmental standards, for making decisions without the input of affected parties or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and for withholding vital project information from potential critics, such as transnational environmental groups. While the danger of financing unsustainable projects and overlooking environmental standards is obvious, denying access to decision-making and program information also undermines environmental progress. In short, sustainable development depends upon the free flow of information and multiple inputs into decision-making. This article explores whether the GEF can be expected to identify and fund significant environmental projects in conflict-prone regions. It also examines the politics of GEF decision-making, with an emphasis on transparency, accountability, and participation.

Neorealists as critical theorists : the purpose of foreign policy debate.

The international relations field has recently taken a communicative turn. Social constructivists, for instance, regularly examine frames, persuasion, and other discursive mechanisms by which actors reach intersubjective agreement. Critical theorists add an overtly normative dimension by embracing the transformative potential of public deliberation. In contrast, realists and neorealists claim that outcomes are determined by the distribution of material power—political communication and discursive ideals are virtually meaningless elements in international politics. Put simply, talk is cheap. Given this view, it is puzzling that many prominent realists participate actively in national foreign policy debates and in that context both implicitly and explicitly embrace views about political discourse that are remarkably consistent with those held by constructivists and critical theorists. In the recent Iraq debate, the realists reveal lies, political spin, and other distortions of the debate promulgated by government elites and their allies. They challenge the legitimacy of established policies and critique excessive secrecy. Most importantly, these neorealists seek to transform public and elite consciousness so as to produce social pressures for alternative outcomes. Realists have apparently rejected their own theoretical presuppositions about the meaning and role of political communication, which has important implications for both policy debate and IR theorizing. Rodger A. Payne is Professor of Political Science at the University of Louisville and Director of the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order ( r.payne@louisville.edu ). He would like to thank Josh Busby, Peter Dombrowski, Peter Howard, Jacques Hymans, Piki Ish-Shalom, Avery Kolers, Doug Lemke, John Mearsheimer, Tom Mowle, Stan Scott, and the three anonymous reviewers for offering valuable comments and suggestions. Portions of this paper were previously delivered at the Annual Meetings of the International Studies Association, at Montreal in 2004 and at Honolulu in 2005. Financial and institutional support was provided by a Presidents Research Initiative Project Initiation Grant from the University of Louisville and by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard.

Global Debate and the Limits of the Bush Doctrine

The “Bush Doctrine” asserting the right to preemptively attack states that support or harbor terrorists and pursue weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has bitterly divided world opinion. Many seemingly long-settled questions of international politics, especially involving the unilateral use of force, have been reopened. Although we are concerned about the implications of the Bush Doctrine, we do not agree that it fundamentally changes world politics as some have asserted. Instead, we argue that the global debate leading up to the war in Iraq signals widespread support for existing international norms. Most states continue to see force as a last resort, properly subject to multilateral control in all but the most urgent cases of imminent self-defense. The nature of American diplomatic maneuverings in the United Nations and the public statements of high-level officials suggest that even the United States continues to recognize the importance of these norms.

Public Opinion and Foreign Threats: Eisenhower's Response to Sputnik:

Renewed attention to the role of public opinion on foreign policy outcomes in quantitative correlational studies indicates that opinion influences foreign policy. However, authors of these studies note that their conclusions could be flawed if elites simply manipulate public opinion, rather than responding to it. Both realist and neorealist perspectives on public opinion are consistent with a manipulation perspective. As urged by those using quantitative data, this article examines a case using declassified archival information in order to examine responsiveness in a situation ripe for manipulation. Specifically, U.S. reactions to Soviet Sputnik launches are scrutinized. President Eisenhower was much less concerned about Soviet actions than was the general public but nonetheless substantially altered many defense programs in order to meet perceived public demands. The President acknowledged privately that at least two-thirds of a spending supplement was used to meet public fears, not real security needs. This finding is inconsistent with prevailing realist theories and standard historical interpretations.

Regimes, Public Spheres and Global Democracy: Towards the Transformation of Political Community

(2003). Regimes, Public Spheres and Global Democracy: Towards the Transformation of Political Community. Global Society: Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 273-295.

Bush: The Sequel

This article examines the likely foreign policy initiatives of the U.S. under the leadership of George W. Bush. The new president has outlined a fairly thorough critique of Americas international behavior in the 1990s. Because a leaders public statements arguably serve to persuade various audiences and to build support for policy change, the article takes Bushs words quite seriously—along with those spoken or written by his closest foreign affairs advisors. Bush intends to abandon the so-called Clinton Doctrine and deploy national missile defenses. He is critical of American policies toward China and Russia, but has not presented bold new initiatives toward those powers. Under the rubric of “compassionate conservatism,” Bush may alter U.S. relations toward the Global South in some interesting ways. The president and his advisors often purport to be realists, but the article demonstrates that their own words belie this claim as they often justify policies based on ideals rather than the pursuit of power.

American Foreign Policy Legitimacy and the Global Public Sphere

Since 9/11, the legitimacy of American foreign policy has been a topic of intense debate. Some conceptualize legitimacy in terms of power, others in terms of values, and still others in a broad consensus for underlying objectives. Legitimacy is vague and quite difficult to measure and consists of a blend of power, values, and popular consensus at home and abroad. Yet what is significant and intriguing about legitimacy in the post-9/11 era is not so much what it is, but where the appeals must be directed. Indeed, the Bush administration’s post-9/11 foreign policy has broadened the public sphere in which the United States must make its legitimacy appeals, thereby creating an expanded democratic check on the exercise of American power. Acknowledging and resolving this tension, part of a larger and longer-term shift in world politics, will sustain America’s legitimacy; it will also require an alternative to the “you’re either with us or against us” approach that characterized the pre-Iraq invasion rhetoric.

Cooperative Security: Grand Strategy Meets Critical Theory?

Major powers are frequently urged to embrace grand strategies tied to particular International Relations theories. In the case of United States foreign policy, scholars generally analyse a well-known set of strategic choices – primacy, selective engagement, offshore balancing, collective security and cooperative security – favoured by relatively mainstream realist and liberal thinkers in International Relations. This article explores the evolution of cooperative security as an idea from its clear ties to liberal and neoliberal international relations theory to its current understanding in world politics, which is surprisingly consistent with many emancipatory ideals of critical International Relations theory. Cooperative security no longer merely implies multilateralism, negotiation and arms control. Rather, security is now more frequently described as indivisible, and genuine cooperation is said to require shared decision-making and consensual practices. Non-governmental organisations are more and more granted a voice in security discussions, as are international institutions. While weapons and warfare remain important security concerns, the cooperative security agenda today includes ideas associated with human security, including environmental calamity, global inequality and hunger.

Constructing Sustainable Development By Neil E. Harrison. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. 175p.

Nearly 15 years has elapsed since the World Commission on Environment and Development—the so-called Brundtland Commission—popularized the idea of “sustainable development.” The phrase turned out to be unusually slippery, providing both political cover and ammunition for almost anyone engaged in debates about the global environment and/or development. Indeed, scholars and policymakers of all theoretical or ideological stripes found creative ways to employ the phrase “sustainable development” to support a wide array of arguments in these discussions.

54.50 cloth,

At the June 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the Global Environment Facility (GEF) was named the interim funding mechanism for both the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the two most important international agreements to emerge from the Rio meetings. GEF was also explicitly tagged as the major funding instrument for Agenda 21, UNCED’s forward-looking sustainable development blueprint. Consequently, for the impoverished states of the Global South and for the so-called ‘economies in transition’ of Eastern Europe, the GEF now serves as the principal source of development assistance for global environmental purposes. Over