Roger E. Backhouse

New Directions in Economic Methodology

Contributors: Roger E. Backhouse, University of Birmingham Terence Hutchison, University of Birmingham David Colander, Middlebury College Philip Mirowski, University of Notre Dame D. Wade Hands, University of Puget Sound Mark Blaug, University of London Bruce Caldwell, University of North Carolina at Greensboro Lawrence A. Boland, Simon Frazer University Daniel M. Hausman, University of Wisconsin-Madison Alex Rosenberg, University of California at Riverside Uskali Maki, Academy of Finland Tony Lawson, University of Cambridge Kevin Hoover, University of California at Davis Donald N. McCloskey, University of Iowa Willie Henderson, University of Birmingham Vivienne Brown, The Open University

Equilibrium and evolution : an exploration of connecting principles in economics

Economic theory and economic problems the organization of knowledge economic organization firms markets innovation.

If Mathematics Is Informal, Then Perhaps We Should Accept That Economics Must Be Informal Too

Discussions of formalism in economics are bedevilled by confusion over what the word means. Though finer distinctions may be possible, it will suffice to distinguish three meanings of the term, which I will refer to here as axiomatisation, mathematisation and a third category that can be termed methodological formalisation. Axiomatisation is perhaps the best understood term. It involves reducing a body of knowledge to a set of independent axioms, with all propositions being derived from those axioms using well-defined logical rules. If a statement is well-defined, it is in principle possible to state unambiguously whether or not it follows from the axioms or is inconsistent with them. Proof is simply a matter of applying logical rules. It is a mechanical process. It is the approach of Debreu (1986, 1991) and has, as Weintraub (1998) points out, roots in a specific view of mathematics.1 More general is mathematisation: the use of mathematical techniques (geometry, algebra, set theory, topology) in economic arguments. This definition is informal,2 but it has the advantage of corresponding exactly to what people have in mind when they talk of the mathematisation of economics in the last fifty to sixty years. Put crudely, we are referring to the rise in the proportion of articles in this JoURNAL and the AER that use algebra from no more than 10% in 1930 to around 75% in 1980 (Backhouse, forthcoming; Middleton, 1998). This change is significant in that it signals a different mode of arguing a different rhetoric. Note that these remarks apply equally to economic theory and empirical or econometric work. Finally, there is methodological formalisation, defined as the use of an agreed set of methods for the solution of certain types of problem. Economics has become methodologically more formal during the twentieth century in

Defining Economics: The Long Road to Acceptance of the Robbins Definition

fields. Though often presented as self-evidently correct, both the definition itself and the developments that it has been used to support were keenly contested. This paper traces the reception, diffusion and contesting of the Robbins definition, arguing that this process took around three decades and that even then there was still significant dissent.

Economics and language

Roger Backhouse, University of Birmingham Meriel Bloor, University of Warwick Tom Bloor, Aston University Charles Bazerman, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA Vivienne Brown, Open University Tony Dudley-Evans, University of Birmingham Bill Gerrard, University of York Britt-Louise Gunnarsson, Uppsala University, Sweden Uskali Maki, United Nations University, Finland

The Cambridge companion to Keynes

1. A cunning purchase: the life and work of Maynard Keynes Roger Backhouse and Bradley Bateman 2. The Keynesian revolution in economic theory Roger Backhouse 3. Keynes and the birth of modern macroeconomics David Laidler 4. Keynes as a Marshallian Axel Leijonhufvud 5. Doctor Keynes: economic theory in a diagonistic science Kevin Hoover 6. Keynes and economic policy George Peden 7. Keynes and Cambridge Maria Cristina Marcuzzo 8. Keynes and his correspondence Donald Moggridge 9. Keynes and philosophers Tiziano Raffaelli 10. Keynes and probability Donald Gillies 11. Keynes and ethics Thomas Baldwin 12. The art of an ethical life: Keynes and Bloomsbury Craufurd Goodwin 13. Keynes between modernism and post modernism Matthias Klaes 14. Keyness political philosophy Samuel Brittan 15. Keynes and Keynesianism Bradley Bateman.

Progress in heterodox economics

There is great variety within contemporary economics. As Coats (2000) points out, not only are there several schools of thought that would conventionally be labeled “heterodox,†there are numerous economists whose work is in a significant sense unorthodox or unconventional. How, then, can a dividing line be drawn between dissent within orthodoxy and dissent from orthodoxy? The suggestion I make here is that a heterodox school of thought has to satisfy three criteria.

A Suggestion for Clarifying the Study of Dissent in Economics

The answer to this question might seem obvious: like Everest, dissent and controversy are there. However, for most academic economists, dissent is negligible and controversy is far less important than it is commonly made out to be. To draw attention to disagreements between economists is to offer a distorted picture of what economics is about. Instead, they argue, the focus of attention should be on the enormous extent to which economists agree. From this perspective, dissent and controversy are not worth much attention. Another justification for studying controversy is that it is exciting. James Tobin once argued (explaining the appeal of Keynesian economics) that when you are young you like theoretical controversy: you like hearing about the good guys and the bad guys, and the idea of being on the side of progressive thought and against an encrusted orthodoxy. Similarly, historians are interested in dissent and controversy in much the same way that writers of thrillers are more interested in neighborhoods where murders happen than in ones where everyone just watches TV all day! What these answers have in common is that they associate controversy and dissent with the pathology of the subject. Disagreement is something to be avoided and which reflects badly on the profession. The most famous representative of this view was probably Alfred Marshall. In his attempt to establish economics as a science that carried authority with the public, he studiously refrained (most of the time) from entering into controversy, and he sought to reconcile within his own work divergent trends that were tearing apart the subject in other countries.

History and equilibrium: A partial defense of equilibrium economics

This paper responds to the argument, made by many heterodox economists, that equilibrium theory should be abandoned in favor of theories that pay more attention to history. It considers some of the main ways in which the concept of equilibrium has been understood in economics, and the reasons why there has been confusion in discussions of equilibrium. The conclusion is drawn that the focus should be less on equilibrium as a concept than on equilibrium analysis as a method, and limited defense of this method is offered.

How Should We Approach the History of Economic Thought, Fact, Fiction or Moral Tale?

This paper reviews the way in which constructivist or anti-representationalist arguments have been used as an argument in favor of changing the way we write the history of economic thought. It is argued that though such arguments provide some important new perspectives on the subject, their use as a comprehensive methodological critique of “traditional†approaches to the subject rests on the theses that a non-foundationalist methodology is impossible, and that we can assume that contemporary economics is in a healthy state. If these theses are not accepted, the case against “traditional†histories collapses.