Roger E. Meiners

Common Law Environmentalism

The necessity to control environmental externalities is almost invariably given as justification for command-and-control regulation and other forms of state intervention in related markets. When even mentioned, common law remedies that protected environmental rights for centuries are quickly dismissed as either being unworkable or ineffective. A review of the common law experience indicates that the rule of law can be effective in protecting environmental rights. Indeed, it is quite possible that common law was too effective, which led to special interest demand for statute law. The rule of politics may be more attractive to rent seekers than the rule of law and markets.

Constitutional choice for the control of water pollution

Before passage of the Clean Water Act, water pollution was controlled by the common law of nuisance and the law of water rights. Had the common law not been superseded, it might have provided more ecologically sound pollution control than has occurred under the command-and-control statutory regime. The Clean Water Act imposes mechanical definitions and is subject to political interference. In contrast, the principle of the common law lies in its evolutionary and competitive nature, which is consistent with the market process.

Corrective Taxes and Auctions of Rights in the Control of Externalities

Auctions of pollution rights have sometimes been suggested as an alternative to corrective taxes. These two methods of pollution control are not, in general, equivalent, however. When pollution rights are auctioned, the right to pollute is equivalent to the right to produce, so the auction of rights raises the possibility that the competitiveness of the market could be reduced. Individual producers have an incentive to purchase large amounts of pollution rights in order to gain some degree of monopoly power over the market. This possibility does not exist when corrective taxes are used instead.

Regulation and the Reagan era : politics, bureaucracy, and the public interest

Lets read! We will often find out this sentence everywhere. When still being a kid, mom used to order us to always read, so did the teacher. Some books are fully read in a week and we need the obligation to support reading. What about now? Do you still love reading? Is reading only for you who have obligation? Absolutely not! We here offer you a new book enPDFd regulation and the reagan era politics bureaucracy and the public interest to read.

Corrective Taxes and Auctions of Rights in the Control of Externalities: A Reply

Our original article noted that auctions of pollution rights could increase a tendency toward monopoly in the offending industry. Professor Oates has provided some insightful comments in arguing for auctions rather than Pigouvian taxes, but the validity of the argument in our original article is not affected. Oatess suggestions for pricing externalities in the real world are a welcome addition to the discussion, but there are some reasons to believe that his approach would not be optimal under all circumstances.

Bad Economics, Good Law: The Concept of Externality

The term “externality” is pervasive in modern economics. Most microeconomic theory textbooks have a chapter devoted to the topic as do texts covering public economics. This chapter argues that law deals with the matter of externality in an economically efficient manner. Courts largely ignore the term externality despite its common use in economics and, more importantly, law has changed little to incorporate the now-common economic meaning of externality. Law, especially tort law, often deals with what economists would call relevant externalities. Economists often fail to understand what constitutes a relevant externality, resulting in the term being operationally meaningless.

Hardrock Homesteads: Free Access and the General Mining Law of 1872

Most discussions of the US General Mining Law of 1872 begin with the premise that the statute is an outdated relic of 19th-century attitudes towards resources and should be replaced with a modern system of royalties, permits and concessions. In contrast, this article argues that the statute provides institutional mechanisms that resolve incentive problems created by government ownership of mineral resources. Instead of calling for radical change in US mining laws, the authors hold up the free access principle of the General Mining Law of 1872 as a model for privatisation of assets whose value is unknown.

Property rights in higher education

Economics is a matter of choice and growth, of interaction and exchange among individuals. Because property rights define the rules of these interactions and the objects of exchange, it is vital to fully understand the institutions and implications of the various property-rights regimes. With over 20 original and specially commissioned chapters, this book takes the reader from the historical and moral foundations of the discipline to the frontiers of scholarly research in the field.

The contractual alternative to patents

Abstract A patent grants the holder a monopoly over the use of the patented invention for a specified time period. Although economists are generally opposed to monopoly, there seems to be a general consensus that the patent system is desirable.1 The rationale for the patent system is that without ownership rights in inventions, there would not be optimal allocation of resources to inventive activities, just as with any other valuable resource over which there are not well-defined property rights. However, the patent system, since it confers monopoly rights, has its drawbacks as well. If independent parties are working simultaneously toward an invention, the first to produce the invention will receive a monopoly over its use, even though others may have been only a month behind. This may encourage inventors to work too intensively toward a patent, and could also have the effect of producing monopoly in a market that was characterized by competition before the patent was issued. In addition, competitors have an incentive to develop substitute processes to avoid infringement of the patent, when the use of the patented process would be more economical. A substitute for patents which provides ownership rights in an invention without governmental grant of a monopoly is the trade secret. The purpose of this paper is to introduce and develop the idea of the law of trade secrets as a contractual alternative to patents.

Corporate Giving: A Form of Advertising?

After reviewing various rationales for corporate giving which have been developed in the literature we find the relation of giving and advertising one of the more interesting. Our testing suggests that contributions are partially motivated by profit consideration. In particular, considerations which influence advertising expenditures appear to influence corporate giving.