Roger Koppl

Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer Effects in Forensic DNA Interpretation

Sir: Observer effects are rooted in the universal human tendency to interpret data in a manner consistent with one’s expectations (1). This tendency is particularly likely to distort the results of a scientific test when the underlying data are ambiguous and the scientist is exposed to domain-irrelevant information that engages emotions or desires (2). Despite impressions to the contrary, forensic DNA analysts often must resolve ambiguities, particularly when interpreting difficult evidence samples such as those that contain mixtures of DNA from two or more individuals, degraded or inhibited DNA, or limited quantities of DNA template. The full potential of forensic DNA testing can only be realized if observer effects are minimized. We met on December 1 and 2, 2007 in Washington, D.C. to discuss the implications of observer effects in forensic DNA testing and ways to minimize them. The interpretation of an evidentiary DNA profile should not be influenced by information about a suspect’s DNA profile (3–6). Each item of evidence must be interpreted independently of other items of evidence or reference samples. Yet forensic analysts are commonly aware of submitted reference profiles when interpreting DNA test results, creating the opportunity for a confirmatory bias, despite the best intentions of the analyst. Furthermore, analysts are sometimes exposed to information about the suspects, such as their history or motives, eyewitness identifications, presence or absence of a confession, and the like. Such information should have no bearing on how the results of a DNA test are interpreted, yet may compound an unintentional confirmatory bias. This bias can result in false inclusions under not uncommon conditions of ambiguity encountered in actual casework. It can also render currently used frequency statistics or likelihood ratios misleading. These problems can be minimized by preventing analysts from knowing the profile of submitted references (i.e., known samples) when interpreting testing results from evidentiary (i.e., unknown or questioned) samples. The necessary filtering or masking of submitted reference profiles can be accomplished in several ways, perhaps most easily by sequencing the laboratory workflow such that evidentiary samples are interpreted, and the interpretation is fully documented, before reference samples are compared. A simple protocol would dictate a separation of tasks between a qualified individual familiar with case information (a case manager) and an analyst from whom domain-irrelevant information is masked. Such a protocol would have the following steps. First, the analyst interprets the results of testing on the evidentiary samples. In this initial interpretation, the analyst would perform the following:

Market Processes and Entrepreneurial Studies

In 2006, Israel Kirzner received the International Award for Entrepreneurship and Small Business Research prize.1 The award cemented Kirzner’s status as a leading figure in the study of entrepreneurship. It also brought at the forefront of the literature, the important contributions that the Austrian view of markets has provided and continues to provide to the field. Indeed, the last 5 years have seen a significant amount of work in entrepreneurship as well as the emergence of a new generation of scholars whose works are rooted in the Austrian tradition. While some have continued developing Kirzner’s encompassing view of the entrepreneur and entrepreneurship (for example, see works by Koppl and Minniti), others have branched out in areas such as the theory of the firm (among others see works by Klein and Foss), institutions (see Boettke and Coyne), and economic growth (see Sautet and Leeson). The purpose of this chapter is to review the most important contributions to entrepreneurship emerging from the Austrian approach and position them properly within the context of Austrian social science.

All That I Have to Say Has Already Crossed Your Mind

We present three arguments regarding the limits to rationality, prediction and control in economics, based on Morgensterns analysis of the Holmes-Moriarty problem. The first uses a standard metamathematical theorem on computability to indicate logical limits to forecasting the future. The second provides possible nonconvergence for Bayesian forecasting in infinite-dimensional space. The third shows the impossibility of a computer perfectly forecasting an economy with agents knowing its forecasting program. Thus, economic order is partly the product of something other than calculative rationality. The joint presentation of these existing results should introduce the reader to implications of these concepts for certain shared concerns of Keynes and Hayek.

Does The Sensory Order

Cognition and psychology have become central issues in economics. While this interest represents a radical change in economic theory, it does have a useful history that we believe is only partially recognized by contemporary economists. Although it is customary to cite Herbert Simons important work in this regard,1 we suggest Hayeks earlier work The Sensory Order (1952) should enjoy similar billing.

Complex bubble persistence in closed-end country funds

Abstract We seek to resolve the ‘misspecified fundamental’ problem in speculative bubbles through examining the behavior of closed-end country funds which possess well-defined fundamentals based on their net asset values. We study six funds during an episode when large premia emerged and subsequently disappeared. We apply rescaled range and regime switching tests which reject the ‘no bubble’ null hypothesis for these premia. These results are placed in a complex bubble model framework interpretable according to the ‘Big Player’ model.

Time for DNA Disclosure

The legislation that established the U.S. National DNA Index System (NDIS) in 1994 explicitly anticipated that database records would be available for purposes of research and quality control “if personally identifiable information is removed” [42 U.S.C. Sec 14132(b)(3)(D)]. However, the Federal

A Battle of Forensic Experts is not a Race to the Bottom

We apply concepts from the small, but growing literature on the economics of experts to forensic science. An economic theory of experts must build on the assumption that experts are no more or less influenced by incentives than actors in other areas of human action. We suggest changes in the organization of forensic science that will improve error prevention, detection, and correction. In particular, a right of forensic expertise for the defense would bring the adversarial process of criminal courts closer to an ‘equality of arms’ and increase the probability that the biases in the system will be neutralized, errors minimized, and truth discovered. It is our contention that by including competing forensic experts among a series of needed changes, we are wresting decision making from the forensic experts and returning it to the finders of fact, the judge or jury.

The Criminal Justice System Creates Incentives for False Convictions

Abstract The American criminal justice system creates incentives for false conviction. For example, many public crime labs are funded in part per conviction. We show that the number of false convictions per year in the American criminal justice system should be considered “high.” We examine the incentives of police, forensic scientists, prosecutors, and public defenders in the U.S. Police, prosecutors, and forensic scientists often have an incentive to garner convictions with little incentive to convict the right person. These incentives create what economists call a “multitask problem” that seems to be resulting in a needlessly high rate of false convictions. Public defenders lack the resources and incentives needed to provide a vigorous defense for their clients. Corrective measures are discussed, along with a call for more research.

Comments on the review of low copy number testing

Dear Sir,A challenge to the reliability of low copy number (LCN)DNA profiling in the trial of Sean Hoey in Belfast CrownCourt in Northern Ireland (R v Hoey [2007] NICC 49, 20December, 2007) prompted the UK’s new Forensic ScienceRegulator (Andrew Rennison) to commission a review oflow template DNA profiling techniques. That review [2],conducted by Professor Brian Caddy (with the assistance ofDr. Adrian Linacre and Dr. Graham Taylor) was released on12 April, 2008 and concluded that LCN DNA profiling is“robust” and “fit for purpose.” Yet, the review accepts thatthe evidence presented in Sean Hoey’s trial was insufficientto establish the validity of the technique. It also enumerates21 recommendations for specific improvements that shouldbe undertaken to improve the methodology, including suchbasic steps as the development of a consensus on theinterpretation of test results and efforts to establish “bestpractices” for interpretation.We believe the conclusions of the review are inconsistentwith its recommendations in a number of respects. Forexample, it is difficult to see how a forensic techniquecould be deemed adequately validated for use in thecourtroom when there is not yet a consensus on how itsresults should be interpreted. The review thus raisesimportant issues about what it means for a forensic sciencetechnique to be validated. It also establishes grounds forconcern about the way that LCN DNA test results havebeen interpreted in earlier cases.We are concerned that the review team relied only oninput regarding the merits of LCN approaches fromorganizations that are dedicated to promoting its use bylaw enforcement. Consultation with known critics of thetechnique (or even a review of their published works)would have provided the reviewers with a broaderperspective of what work remains to be done before theapproach can become generally accepted within theinternational scientific community. There are in fact thingsabout LCN approaches upon which the reviewers andcritics do agree. For instance, caution that “[p]ublicizing thepotential of the application of LCN typing withoutdescribing its limitations may cause misunderstanding” [1]which is consistent with the review’s recommendations 1,3, and 13. But given the conclusion that “[t]he methodcannot be used for exculpatory purposes” [1], the review’sultimate conclusion that LCN testing is “fit for purpose”leaves the important but unanswered question of “what isthat purpose?”

Entrepreneurship and Human Action

As defined by the editors of this book, ‘non-market entrepreneurship’ consists of all forms of entrepreneurship not being undertaken solely for purposes of profit maximization or commercialization, and encompasses entrepreneurial activities such as social enterprise and entrepreneurship, public sector entrepreneurship, policy entrepreneurship, non-profit entrepreneurship, and philanthropic enterprise, among many others. The eminent cast of contributors gives coherence to the academic and public discussions on the topic, builds a theoretical edifice within the field of entrepreneurship and helps to establish and delineate the contours of the research field of non-market entrepreneurship.