Roland Pierik

Resources versus Capabilities: Social Endowments in Egalitarian Theory

Two of the most important theories in contemporary liberal egalitarianism are Ronald Dworkins equality of resources and Amartya Sens capability approach. Recently Dworkin has claimed that Sens capability approach does not provide a genuine alternative to equality of resources. In this article, we provide both an internal and an external critique of Dworkins claim. In the first part of the article we develop an internal critique by providing a detailed analysis of Dworkins claim. Andrew Williams has contested Dworkins claim, but he has failed to convince Dworkin of his objections. We analyze this debate, and offer an argument that, we hope, settles this dispute. In the second part of the article we argue that an analysis beyond the current parameters of the liberal-egalitarian debate points to three significant differences between Dworkins and Sens egalitarian theories: the degree to which they rely on an ideal-theoretical approach; their ability to judge social structures that are intertwined with peoples social endowments; and their endorsement of a well-defined criterion to demarcate morally relevant from morally irrelevant inequalities. This broader analysis not only reinforces our conclusion that Dworkins equality of resources and Sens capability approach are genuinely distinct, but it also suggests some more general insights that may be relevant for a better understanding of contemporary egalitarian thinking.

Conceptualizing Cultural Groups and Cultural Difference: The Social Mechanism Approach

The aim of this article is to present a conceptualization of cultural groups and cultural difference that provides a middle course between the Scylla of essentialism and the Charybdis of reductionism. The method I employ is the social mechanism approach. I argue that cultural groups and cultural difference should be understood as the result of cognitive and social processes of categorization. I describe two such processes in particular: categorization by others and selfcategorization. Categorization by others is caused by processes of ascription:the attribution by outsiders of certain characteristics, beliefs, and practices to individuals who share a specific attribute. Self-categorization is caused by processes of inscription and community-building: the adoption of certain beliefs and practices as a result of socialization and enculturation. I therefore shift the focus from groups to categories, and from categories to processes of categorization. I show that this analytical distinction between categorization by others and self-categorization can clarify an ambiguity in dominant debates in contemporary multiculturalism. I conclude by indicating how injustices, commonly associated with multiculturalism, can better be understood as socially generated injustices, and how government should deal with these injustices.

Mandatory Vaccination: An Unqualified Defence

The 2015 Disneyland outbreak in the US unequivocally brought to light what had been brewing below the surface for a while: a slow but steady decline in vaccination rates resulting in a rising number of outbreaks of measles. This can be traced back to an increasing public questioning of vaccines by an emerging anti-vaccination movement. This paper argues that, in the face of diminishing vaccination rates, childhood vaccinations should not be seen as part of the domain of parental choice but, instead, as a nonnegotiable legal obligation. The first part of the paper formulates and defends two arguments in favor of unqualified mandatory childhood vaccination laws. First, government should not permit parents to put their children at avoidable risks of death and suffering; second, government should guard the common good of herd immunity to protect vulnerable persons. The second part rejects legal and pragmatic objections against such mandatory vaccination laws. This paper is published in the Journal of Applied Philosophy.

Cosmopolitanism in context: perspectives from international law and political theory

Is it possible and desirable to translate the basic principles underlying cosmopolitanism as a moral standard into effective global institutions. Will the ideals of inclusiveness and equal moral concern for all survive the marriage between cosmopolitanism and institutional power? What are the effects of such bureaucratisation of cosmopolitan ideals? This volume examines the strained relationship between cosmopolitanism as a moral standard and the legal institutions in which cosmopolitan norms and principles are to be implemented. Five areas of global concern are analysed: environmental protection, economic regulation, peace and security, the fight against international crimes and migration.

The Neutral State and the Mandatory Crucifix

In this article we present a conceptual overview of relevant interpretations of what state neutrality may imply; we suggest a distinction between inclusive neutrality and exclusive neutrality. This distinction provides a useful framework for understanding the several positions as presented by the parties in the Lautsi case. We conclude by suggesting a solution of the Lautsi case that might provide a more viable solution.

On Religious and Secular Exemptions

This paper analyses exemptions to general law through the prism of vaccine waivers in the United States. All US states legally require the vaccination of children prior to school or daycare entry; however, this obligation is accompanied with a system of medical, religious, and/or philosophical exemptions. Nonmedical exemptions became subject of discussion after the 2015 Disneyland measles outbreak in California, which unequivocally brought to light what had been brewing below the surface for a while: a slow but steady decline in vaccination rates in Western societies, resulting in the reoccurrence of measles outbreaks. This can be traced back to an increasing public questioning of vaccines by a growing anti-vaccination movement. In reaction to the outbreak and the public outrage it generated, several states proposed—and some already passed—bills to eliminate nonmedical exemptions. I analyze two questions. First, can legal exemptions from mandatory childhood vaccination schemes for parents who are opposed to vaccination (still) be justified? Second, should legal exemptions be limited to religious objections to vaccination, or should they also be granted to secular objections? Although the argument in the paper starts from the example of the US, it seeks to provide a more general philosophical reflection on the question of exemptions from mandatory childhood vaccination.

The Return of the Measles to the Low Countries: A Legal-Philosophical Exploration

The introduction of vaccines against infectious diseases has been one of the most important contributions to public health of the last century. Diseases like smallpox, polio, measles, mumps, whooping cough, and rubella were far and away the major killers of human beings until the beginning of the twentieth century. Nowadays, these diseases have been dramatically reduced or even eliminated, as a result of large-scale vaccination programs. A very large majority of parents voluntarily enrol their children because they are convinced by the beneficial effects of vaccination. At the same time, since the introduction of these programs certain groups of parents have persistently refused to vaccinate their children. Until recently, non-vaccination in the Netherlands was mainly confined to ‘pietistic reformed’ protestant communities (bevindelijk gereformeerden) in the Bible Belt. However, in the last two decades, a broader anti-vaccination movement has emerged. This is a multifaceted movement, including anthroposophists, homeopaths and adherents of ‘natural’ and ‘alternative healing.’ They question the self-evidence with which government provides and promotes large-scale vaccination programs. Some argue that diseases such as measles could – in the case of otherwise healthy children – contribute to mental growth and to immunity building. This, so they argue, provides someone with greater resilience against diseases like cancer and allergies later in life. Others emphasise the negative effects of vaccines, because, so they argue, they contain dangerous toxic chemicals and overwhelm the immune system of young children. The most famous example of such a backlash against vaccination programs is the MMR-vaccine causes autism-controversy a decade ago, in the wake of the publication of Andrew Wakefield’s notorious 1998 paper in The Lancet.1 By now, the claim is debunked, the paper is retracted, and the author is stripped of his medical license and academic reputation.2 Still, the suggested vaccine-autism link remains ‘the most damaging medical hoax of the last 100 years.’3 The claim was widely reported in the media and went viral on anti-vaccination websites. It resulted in a sharp drop in the vaccination rates in the UK and Ireland, followed by an significantly increased incidence of measles and mumps, and ending in severe

State Neutrality and the Limits of Religious Symbolism

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has concluded that the mandatory display of crucifixes in public school classrooms does not violate the European Convention. Many have questioned whether a supra-national court like the ECtHR is entitled to interfere in issues that are so intimately linked to the national identity of state parties. However, even if one agrees that the Court’s Grand Chamber was in the end correct not to interfere (by employing the margin of appreciation), one can still question whether a constitutional democracy like Italy is justified in enforcing an explicit Christian symbol in public schools. In this chapter, I analyze the Lautsi case from the perspective of state neutrality. It is generally acknowledged in legal and political philosophy that contemporary constitutional democracies cannot be formally linked to some religious confession, except in a vestigial and largely symbolic sense. As Rajeev Bhargava argues, the idea of neutrality requires a “principled distance” between religion and the state, two entities that should be seen as distinct spheres with their own respective areas. In this chapter, I analyze whether the wish to hold on to such a religiously inspired tradition is consistent with the idea of state neutrality, a central value of contemporary constitutional democratic states. In the first part of the Chapter (sections II–III), I analyze the arguments that were employed when the case was before the ECtHR. In the second part (sections IV-VIII), I analyze the obligatory crucifix in terms of state neutrality. I argue that the Italian insistence on holding on to the obligatory display of the crucifix is an example of what I will call the European constitutional deficit: the unwillingness or inability of European states to justify government institutions in a way that does justice to the pluralistic nature of European societies.

Human Rights and the Regulation of Transnational Clinical Trials

One of the more worrying trends in globalization today is the growing practice of Western companies relocating clinical trials to impoverished countries. This article begins by providing a comprehensive description of the practice and its current regulatory oversight. It is argued that this regulatory scheme is insufficient for protecting the interests of test subjects in such relocated trials. The article then suggests an alternative scheme, embedded in the general framework of human rights protections, and develops the contours of such a human-rights-based regulatory scheme. It concludes by arguing why this alternative regulatory framework does a better job of protecting the interests of test subjects than those regulatory schemes currently available: the Declaration of Helsinki and the statement of Good Clinical Practice.

Religion Ain’t Sacrosanct

This paper is largely an endorsement and a further elaboration of Cohen’s critical discussion of the Hobby Lobby and Hosanna-Tabor cases and the conceptual overstretch of religious freedom they embody. I disagree with Cohen, however, on the proper interpretation of this debate. Cohen construes the ominous Court cases as an anti-liberal attack on the liberal state order. My main thesis is that the root of this dispute can be traced back to a fault line within liberalism between a more tolerance-leaning and a more equality-leaning tradition. I argue that the ominous cases are instances of the tolerance-leaning tradition in liberalism, which once was characteristic of the liberal tradition. Still, I agree with Cohen that this tradition should be rejected because it reverts to an obsolete interpretation of religious freedom that defends unwarranted privileges for certain groups that are out of sync with the egalitarian underpinnings of contemporary liberal political orders.