Ronald L. Watts

Comparing federal systems in the 1990s

As Canadians question the future of their federation and consider changes to it, there is much that can be learned from federal systems elsewhere. At present there are twenty-three federations in the world (representing over forty per cent of the worlds population) comprising a variety of forms and variations. In this study, Ronald Watts provides a clear analysis of the design and operation of a sample of federations chosen for their relevance to Canadian issues.

Models of federal power sharing

Concurrent contemporary pressures for both larger and smaller political units have contributed to the appeal of federal political systems as a way of reconciling both these pressures and of accommodating social diversity within a polity. Among the major federal institutional models that have resulted have been unions, constitutionally decentralised unions, federations, confederations, federacies, associated states, condominiums, leagues, joint functional authorities, and hybrids. Furthermore, within each of these forms there has been considerable variation. Among federations, the issues in their design that have affected their operation have been: the number and character of the constituent units, the distribution of legislative and executive authority and financial resources, the degree of symmetry or asymmetry in the powers allocated to constituent units, the form and structure of the common federative institutions, the role of courts as adjudicative bodies, the constitutional recognition of individual and collective minority rights, and the processes for intergovernmental consultation, cooperation, and coordination. The successes and failures of federations during the past half-century point to four major lessons, which have a bearing on the ability of federations and more broadly federal systems to reconcile and manage social diversity.

Islands in Comparative Constitutional Perspective

The dual and seemingly contradictory pressures for both autonomous self-government on the one hand and for political partnership on the other are everywhere prevalent in the world today. But nowhere is the need to balance these two sets of pressures more pervasive than in the situation of island entities — not just for the islands of the North Atlantic but for the many islands elsewhere.

Origins of Cooperative and Competitive Federalism

The terms “cooperative federalism” and “competitive federalism” are widely used in a rather loose manner, and so let me begin by setting out the conceptual framework within which I shall discuss the subject. Developing views earlier expressed by Preston King (1982) and Dan Elazar (1987), I would distinguish for the sake of clarity three terms: “federalism,” “federal political systems,” and “federations.”

Equalization in Commonwealth Federations

This contribution focuses primarily on the similarities and differences of equalization arrangements in Australia, Canada and India, but also refers to significant features of equalization arrangements in Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria and South Africa. The following issues are considered: (1) horizontal disparities and the importance of financial equalization; (2) the degree to which equalization arrangements are constitutionalized; (3) federal-state versus inter-state equalization transfers; (4) revenue-capacity versus needs-based equalization; (5) formula-based or commission-assessed equalization; (6) the variety of criteria and formulae used to determine equalization transfers; (7) the relation of degrees of decentralization to the need for equalization; (8) the balances between equity and autonomy and between uniformity and diversity; and (9) processes for regular adjustment.

Introduction: federalism in an era of globalisation

Under the pressure of globalization we appear to be in the midst of a paradigm shift from a world of nation-states to one in which federalism provides the closest political approximation to the complex diversity of the contemporaryworld. In this context the Forum of Federations, as its first major activity, held an international conference at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, 5-8 October 1999, on ‘Federalism in an Era of Globalization’. The articles in this issue of the International Social Science Journal are drawn from among the many presentations and back-ground papers at that conference, and provide an insight into a range of salient issues within contemporary federations.

Introduction: Comparative Research and Fiscal Federalism

As long as cautions about the limits to the transnational transferability of institutions are kept in mind, there is a genuine value in comparative analyses of federal financial relations in different countries. In such studies it is essential to consider the broader social and political context within which these financial relations operate. Two sets of distinctions need to be made: between ‘decentralization’ and ‘non-centralization’ and between ‘decentralization’ and ‘autonomy’. A number of common elements of intergovernmental financial relations are identified and eight questions for consideration are presented.

Federal Evolution: The Canadian Experience

The original Canadian federal constitution of 1867 was marked by the allocation of strong central powers enabling the federal government to override the provinces in certain circumstances. Despite its originally centralized character, more than a century and a quarter of pressures to accommodate linguistic duality and provincial regionalism have made Canada one of the world’s most decentralized federations, legislatively, administratively, and financially (Watts 1999a: 75–80). The Constitution Act of 1867 recognized the particular character of Quebec by including some asymmetry in the provisions relating to language, education and civil law as these applied to Quebec. But efforts within the past four decades to recognize the reality of Quebec’s distinctiveness by comprehensive constitutional revision that would further increase constitutional asymmetry have been highly controversial.

University of East Africa Conferences on Public Policy: II. East African Federation

This was the second in a series of three conferences on public policy, organised by the University of East Africa and financed by the Ford Foundation, whose aim is to bring together policy-makers and academics for discussions on major public issues. In attendance were delegations, of at least a dozen each, from Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika, consisting mainly of Cabinet Ministers, parliamentary secretaries, other M.P.s, and civil servants, as well as representatives of public corporations, political parties, and trade unions. Small delegations from Ethiopia, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia, and Zanzibar were also invited. A group of 10 ‘visiting specialists’ from overseas with experience of federal systems and problems elsewhere were invited to take part. Among these were six economists: Ursula Hicks and Arthur Hazlewood from Oxford, Pitamber Pant of the Indian Planning Commission, Vladimir Kollontai from Moscow, Jan Auerhan from Prague, and Benton Massell (who was unable to attend but contributed a paper) from the United States. The others were a lawyer, S. A. de Smith from the London School of Economics, and three political scientists, Arthur MacMahon of Columbia University, A. H. Birch from Hull University, and myself. A group of a dozen ‘local specialists’ drawn mainly from E.A.C.S.O. and from the economists, lawyers, and political scientists at the University Colleges in East Africa also presented papers and played a significant role in the discussions. The total number of participants, including 22 observers, amounted to over 90.