Ronald Rogowski

Trade and the variety of democratic institutions

Students of comparative politics have long acknowledged the importance of such institutional factors as electoral systems, parliamentary versus presidential rule, and the strength of parties; but they have either regarded the institutions as given or have explained them entirely in domestic terms (associating proportional representation, for example, with the intensity of social cleavages). In economically advanced democracies, however, these institutional aspects can be plausibly linked to dependence on trade: proportional representation, the parliamentary system, strong parties, and large electoral districts have “survival value” for developed democracies exposed to trade. That the recently revived agitation for proportional representation in the United Kingdom has been cast explicitly in terms of economic necessity and dependence on trade adds force to this argument, and suggests the need for further historical research on other cases of institutional adaptation and change.

Internationalization and Domestic Politics: The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview

A stethoscope in which two diaphragms are used to amplify sound. The diaphragms are axially spaced, and to one diaphragm a piece of stainless steel is attached and a magnetized metal is attached to the other diaphragm, whereby a magnetic field exists between the spaced diaphragms. In order to better transmit sound, the interior of the Y-fitting is coated with carbon.

The Political Economy of International Trade Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry

A similar set of concepts has been central to the literatures on the formation of trade policy coalitions and the “new economics of institutions”: the political and economic consequences of the degree to which assets are specific to a particular economic activity. In this survey, the authors take the necessary first step of summarizing the main findings of these two literatures and then suggest ways in which the issue might be joined. In addition to providing a more coherent understanding of the findings of these two literatures and some new directions for them, the authors show that many puzzles remain in the field of trade politics—puzzles for which there are no appealing answers or, where there are answers, no strong evidence in support of them. This essay, then, in addition to being a theoretical review of the literature, puts forward an agenda for future study of international trade politics.

Electoral Systems and Real Prices: Panel Evidence for the OECD Countries, 1970 2000

In a recent article, Rogowski and Kayser introduced a claim to the political economy literature that majoritarian electoral systems: (a) systematically privilege consumers relative to producers and, consequently, (b) reduce real prices. The authors, modifying an established model of regulation, showed that, within a competitive political system, politicians favour those who provide only votes (consumers) over those who provide both money and votes (producers). When producers provide only money, the intuition becomes apparent even without a model: politicians respond more to voters under (majoritarian) systems in which a small change in vote share can produce a large change in seat share. Cross-sectional evidence for the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries in 1990 was strongly supportive, suggesting that real prices were, all else equal, about 10 per cent lower in the averageOECDcountry with single-member district (SMD) electoral systems than in those that used some form of proportional representation (PR). As with all new empirical claims, healthy scepticism is warranted. Indeed, recent research in related areas has to be contrasted with – but it has not contradicted – these price results, associating proportional electoral arrangements with more positive social welfare outcomes including (a) less income inequality, (b) higher public spending, or, in combination with central banking institutions, (c) greater price stability. We acknowledge the possible incongruity of these results with those of Rogowski and Kayser; after all, verification of the price effects would suggest a more complicated relationship between electoral institutions and social welfare than is indicated in the extant literature.

Electoral systems and the balance of consumer-producer power

1. Introduction 2. Electoral systems and consumer power: theoretical considerations 3. Electoral systems and real prices: panel evidence for the OECD countries 4. Electoral systems and real prices around the world 5. A closer look: case studies and mechanisms 6. Socio-economic origins of electoral systems 7. Discussion and conclusion.

Rationalist Theories of Politics: A Midterm Report

Rational-choice theories of politics have gained acceptance rapidly and may soon dominate the field. Their popularity is due in part to their real successes, which can be demonstrated in several areas, and to their hypothetical-deductive structure. But some students, in their eagerness to embrace what is by now a theoretical fad, have either ignored inconvenient facts or weakened the theory to fit them. Both the promise and the risk are demonstrated by reference to recent works by Mayhew, Niskanen, Rabushka and Shepsle, and de Swaan.

Lower Prices: The Impact of Majoritarian Systems in Democracies Around the World

Recent theoretical work has proposed that majoritarian electoral systems, by creating incentives for legislators to favor the interests of consumers over producers, should lead to more consumer-friendly and procompetitive regulatory policies and hence to lower real price levels. Empirical analysis confirming this effect has so far been confined to OECD democracies, but there are reasons to believe that, due to differences in state capacity and consumer-producer preferences, the same price effects might not obtain—or might even be reversed—in less economically developed democracies. Using a generalized estimating equation approach, we find that the expected relationship indeed holds in all democracies worldwide between 1972 and 2000. The marginal long-run price level in majoritarian systems is estimated to be lower by over 10%.

Shooting (or Ignoring) the Messenger

Political science produces highly policy-relevant research, but politicians ignore it in favor of their own (or their supporters’) biases. I give examples from such fields as anti-immigrant politics, political business cycles and the politics of redistribution. The sole area in which politicians do attend closely to scholarly research is where it assists their own efforts at electoral success (e.g. effect and duration of political advertising). But politicians equally ignore the expertise of climatologists, physicists, biologists, economists and even spies, where that expertise contradicts their own preferred policies. All of this points more to a problem of democratic politics than of political (or any other) science.

How To Be a Peer Reviewer: A Guide for Recent and Soon-to-be PhDs

Peer review is central to political science. In this article we collect the ideas of journal editors in political science and several recent PhDs, who met as a panel at the 2011 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting to discuss the principles of the review process. This includes why reviewing is important to the development of ones own scholarship but also offers some nuts and bolts on reviewing.

Report of the Editors of the American Political Science Review , 2008–2009

We report here on the journals operations during the year from July 1, 2008, to June 30, 2009. In doing so, we want first to express our thanks to the APSA: its staff, Council, and Publications Committee, both for good advice and for important material support. The impact of both is documented, albeit only partially, in the following article. The APSR Editorial Board and its Executive Committee have also been invaluable, and we have benefited particularly from the concentrated counsel that a subcommittee provided during a two-day site visit to UCLA in July. Editorial Board members have also given unstintingly of their time to serve as guest editors on UCLA-connected submissions that might otherwise raise conflicts of interest. We owe very special debts of gratitude to our Senior Editor, Joseph Riser, whose serene and wise disposition seems never to falter; our graduate editorial assistants (EAs), Megan Gallagher, Diana Ichpekova, Rebekah Sterling, and Matt Spence; two of our original co-editors, Kathleen Bawn and Michael Chwe, who gave extraordinarily dedicated service but decided to leave the group effective July 1, 2009; and Gary Cox (UCSD) and Arthur Lupia (Michigan), who agreed to join our weekly meetings via videoconference—in Garys case, for the long term; in Skips, temporarily. Finally, we thank the authors of the nearly 700 papers submitted to us and the over 2,000 referees who gave, unremunerated and anonymously as always, their astute and often admirably detailed counsel.