Rory Costello

Election Pledges and their Enactment in Coalition Governments: A Comparative Analysis of Ireland

Abstract This study examines election pledges and their enactment in Ireland. Much previous research focused on countries where single‐party governments are the norm (the United Kingdom, Canada and Greece), and the presidential system of the United States with separation of powers. The present research draws on evidence from existing studies of pledge enactment in Ireland and the Netherlands. In addition, it adds new evidence on election pledges and their enactment in the most recent Irish government: the majority centre‐right coalition of Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats, 2002–2007. By adding this new evidence, we are able to make stronger inferences on the impact of coalition governance on the types of pledges made and rates of pledge enactment. We also study the impact of prominent mechanisms of coalition governance – government agreements and ministerial portfolio allocations – on the likelihood of pledge enactment. In addition, in an effort to move beyond existing research, we present evidence on the extent to which election pledges are featured in media reports during the election campaign.

The policy impact of leadership in committees: Rapporteurs’ influence on the European Parliament’s opinions

What impact do leaders in the European Parliament’s (EP) committees have on the EP’s opinions? This study formulates and tests expectations about the conditions under which rapporteurs influence the EP’s opinions and also about what factors motivate that influence. In line with the informational theory of legislative committees, the most important factor affecting the EP’s opinion is the policy position of the median MEP, not a characteristic of the rapporteur. Nonetheless, the evidence shows that rapporteurs influence the EP’s opinions when legislative proposals are subject to early agreements under the co-decision procedure and when the consultation procedure applies. Rapporteurs’ influence is motivated primarily by national interests, rather than by the interests of their EP party groups.

European Parliament Elections and Political Representation: Policy Congruence between Voters and Parties

It is often said that European Parliament elections fail as an instrument to express the will of the European people. However, while the elections are not contested at the European level and are often dominated by national issues, this does not necessarily imply that they fail to connect policy views of voters and representatives. This article examines policy congruence between voters and candidates, utilising the candidate and voter surveys of the European Election Study 2009. First, it demonstrates that policy preferences of candidates and voters are constrained by three separate policy dimensions. Second, it shows that the quality of representation is high in terms of left/right, the main dimension of conflict in European politics, but lower on the cultural and European integration dimensions. Finally, it establishes that in some cases the aggregation of national parties in political groups in the European Parliament poses problems for effective political representation.

The nexus of bicameralism: Rapporteurs’ impact on decision outcomes in the European Union

When the chambers of a bicameral legislature must negotiate to reach a decision outcome, the bargaining strength of each side is affected by the composition of its negotiating delegations. We examine some of the implications of this proposition for legislative negotiations between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers. We develop and test hypotheses on how the bargaining success of the EP is affected by the choice of its chief negotiator, the rapporteur. Our findings support the argument that negotiators in a bicameral setting play a ‘two-level game’, where bargaining strength is shaped by the degree to which negotiators can credibly claim to be constrained by their parent chamber.

The distribution of power among EU institutions: who wins under codecision and why?

The codecision procedure was designed to change the distribution of power among the European Union (EU) institutions. In theory, the codecision procedure, at least the amended version introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty that came into effect in 1999, weakened the Commission and placed the Parliament on an equal footing with the Council. We assess how the codecision procedure works in practice using data on the preferences of legislative actors on a large number of proposals negotiated between 1999 and 2009. We also test theoretical propositions derived from Schelling regarding the effects of policy agreement within each chamber on the relative bargaining success of the Council and EP. Our findings suggest that, in comparison to the consultation procedure, codecision has strengthened the EP and weakened the Commission. However, the Council holds certain bargaining advantages over the EP, and as a result the EP has not achieved parity with the Council under codecision.

Does bicameralism promote stability? Inter-institutional relations and coalition formation in the European parliament

In the European Parliament, different coalitions form from one vote to the next. To understand the process of coalition formation it is necessary to consider the inter-institutional context in which decisions are made. This paper develops hypotheses regarding how changes in the relations between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers affect coalition formation in the European Parliament. The hypotheses are tested using roll-call data from the fifth parliamentary term. In line with expectations, it is found that coalition patterns are more consistent in relation to final decisions under the co-decision procedure (when both institutions come to an agreement) than they are under the consultation procedure. Furthermore, the closer relations between the institutions have increased the importance of the median party group on the left–right dimension in coalition formation.

Bicameralism, nationality and party cohesion in the European Parliament

Party cohesion in legislatures is a topic of longstanding concern to political scientists because cohesion facilitates democratic representation. We examine the cohesion of transnational party groups in the European Parliament, which is part of the EU’s bicameral system, and study the oftentimes competing pressures to which MEPs are subject from their EP party groups and national governments. Our explanation focuses on the conditions under which MEPs take policy positions that differ from those of their party groups. We propose that national governments lobby their national MEPs more intensely on issues of high national salience and on which they are in a weak bargaining position in the Council. The analyses offer a unique approach to the study of party cohesion that is based on the policy positions taken by each national delegation of MEPs in each of the three main party groups and national governments on specific controversial issues.

The fulfilment of election pledges

The televised debate on 17 May between the two candidates for Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern and Enda Kenny, was one of the more high-profile events of the 2007 election campaign. During the debate, each leader espoused the merits of his party’s election pledges, while attempting to undermine the credibility of those made by his opponent’s party. For example, when Kenny outlined the Fine Gael promise to provide 2,300 extra hospital beds, Ahern responded by saying that this was not feasible without cutting back on essential medical services. When Ahern discussed a plan for 2,000 extra gardai, Kenny argued that a similar commitment made by Fianna Fail in the previous election had not been met and so there was no reason to believe it this time. Ahern defended the government’s record by pointing to promises that had been fulfilled, such as the increase in the old age pension to over €200 per week. This pattern was repeated in relation to a wide range of issues, as both leaders sought to convince the viewers that the pledges made by their party were more attractive and more reliable than those of the other party.

The ideological space in Irish politics: comparing voters and parties*

ABSTRACT Drawing on an original survey of voters and parties, this article examines the policy space in Irish politics in the context of the 2016 general election. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses show that four broad ideological dimensions structure voters’ policy views across a range of salient issues. These are an economic dimension, a cultural dimension, a religious dimension and an austerity dimension. Comparing the location of voters and parties on these dimensions, gaps in the policy space are identified where voters are not represented by any party. Most noticeably, a significant segment of the electorate is found to have left-wing views on economic issues but conservative/authoritarian views on the cultural dimension, and this combination is currently not offered by any of the existing political parties. The article also highlights areas where political parties are out of step with the views of their own voters.

Governing together in good and bad economic times: the fulfilment of election pledges in Ireland

ABSTRACT The idea that parties make promises to voters during election campaigns and then attempt to fulfil those promises if elected to government is central to the theory and practice of democracy. This study examines how economic conditions affect the fulfilment of parties’ election pledges in Ireland. We formulate and test propositions relating to two aspects of economic conditions that negatively affect the likelihood of pledge fulfilment. The first is that parties do not adjust pledges to prevailing economic conditions, and the second is that they do not accurately anticipate future economic conditions. We test these expectations with evidence on the fulfilment of 3681 pledges made by Irish parties in the period 1977–2011, which is one of the largest country-specific datasets on pledge fulfilment currently available. Given the considerable variation in economic conditions faced by Irish governments in this time period, these cases offer a particularly powerful test of the impact of economic conditions on pledge fulfilment.