Rossy McLaren

Associations and propositions: The case for a dual-process account of learning in humans

We review evidence that supports the conclusion that people can and do learn in two distinct ways - one associative, the other propositional. No one disputes that we solve problems by testing hypotheses and inducing underlying rules, so the issue amounts to deciding whether there is evidence that we (and other animals) also rely on a simpler, associative system, that detects the frequency of occurrence of different events in our environment and the contingencies between them. There is neuroscientific evidence that associative learning occurs in at least some animals (e.g., Aplysia californica), so it must be the case that associative learning has evolved. Since both associative and propositional theories can in principle account for many instances of successful learning, the problem is then to show that there are at least some cases where the two classes of theory predict different outcomes. We offer a demonstration of cue competition effects in humans under incidental conditions as evidence against the argument that all such effects are based on cognitive inference. The latter supposition would imply that if the necessary information is unavailable to inference then no cue competition should occur. We then discuss the case of unblocking by reinforcer omission, where associative theory predicts an irrational solution to the problem, and consider the phenomenon of the Perruchet effect, in which conscious expectancy and conditioned response dissociate. Further discussion makes use of evidence that people will sometimes provide one solution to a problem when it is presented to them in summary form, and another when they are presented in rapid succession with trial-by trial information. We also demonstrate that people trained on a discrimination may show a peak shift (predicted by associative theory), but given the time and opportunity to detect the relationships between S+ and S-, show rule-based behavior instead. Finally, we conclude by presenting evidence that research on individual differences suggests that variation in intelligence and explicit problem solving ability are quite unrelated to variation in implicit (associative) learning, and briefly consider the computational implications of our argument, by asking how both associative and propositional processes can be accommodated within a single framework for cognition.

Elemental representation and configural mappings: combining elemental and configural theories of associative learning.

In this article, we present our first attempt at combining an elemental theory designed to model representation development in an associative system (based on McLaren, Kaye, & Mackintosh, 1989) with a configural theory that models associative learning and memory (McLaren, 1993). After considering the possible advantages of such a combination (and some possible pitfalls), we offer a hybrid model that allows both components to produce the phenomena that they are capable of without introducing unwanted interactions. We then successfully apply the model to a range of phenomena, including latent inhibition, perceptual learning, the Espinet effect, and first- and second-order retrospective revaluation. In some cases, we present new data for comparison with our model’s predictions. In all cases, the model replicates the pattern observed in our experimental results. We conclude that this line of development is a promising one for arriving at general theories of associative learning and memory.

Dissociating expectancy of shock and changes in skin conductance: an Investigation of the Perruchet effect using an electrodermal paradigm

Is human Pavlovian conditioning driven by a unitary, propositional system (as claimed by Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009) or by dual systems; one under conscious control, symbolic in nature, and requiring effort to deploy, and the other utilizing associative processes and automatic in its operation (McLaren, Green, & Mackintosh, 1994)? Past research has suggested that for electrodermal conditioning to occur in humans, conscious awareness of the contingencies is necessary to produce conditioned responding (e.g., Hinchy, Lovibond, & Ter-Horst, 1995), as predicted by single process theories that attribute the conditioned response (CR) to conscious expectancy of the shock. In this article, the authors examined the Perruchet effect (Perruchet, 1985), using an electrodermal paradigm to determine whether there is any role for associative processes in human electrodermal conditioning. The authors attempted to replicate the basic effect, whereby expectancy of an unconditioned stimulus (US) increases over a run of nonreinforced trials while the CR to the conditional stimulus (CS) declines, and the complementary pattern in which expectancy decreases over a run of reinforced trials while the CR to the CS grows in strength. In line with these patterns, the change in skin conductance response (our CR) as a function of US run length was found to follow a linear trend opposite to that of conscious expectancy of shock with respect to US run length. This dissociation supports a dual-processing system account of human Pavlovian conditioning, with conscious, controlled processes governing expectancy (and subject to the gamblers fallacy), whereas automatic, associative processes determine at least some of the strength of the CR to the CS.

The face inversion effect—Parts and wholes: Individual features and their configuration

The face inversion effect (FIE) is a reduction in recognition performance for inverted faces (compared to upright faces) that is greater than that typically observed with other stimulus types (e.g., houses). The work of Diamond and Carey, suggests that a special type of configural information, “second-order relational information” is critical in generating this inversion effect. However, Tanaka and Farah concluded that greater reliance on second-order relational information did not directly result in greater sensitivity to inversion, and they suggested that the FIE is not entirely due to a reliance on this type of configural information. A more recent review by McKone and Yovel provides a meta-analysis that makes a similar point. In this paper, we investigated the contributions made by configural and featural information to the FIE. Experiments 1a and1b investigated the link between configural information and the FIE. Remarkably, Experiment 1b showed that disruption of all configural information of the type considered in Diamond and Careys analysis (both first and second order) was effective in reducing recognition performance, but did not significantly impact on the FIE. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that face processing is affected by the orientation of individual features and that this plays a major role in producing the FIE. The FIE was only completely eliminated when we disrupted the single feature orientation information in addition to the configural information, by using a new type of transformation similar to Thatcherizing our sets of scrambled faces. We conclude by noting that our results for scrambled faces are consistent with an account that has recognition performance entirely determined by the proportion of upright facial features within a stimulus, and that any ability to make use of the spatial configuration of these features seems to benefit upright and inverted normal faces alike.

Switching off perceptual learning: Anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) at Fp3 eliminates perceptual learning in humans.

Perceptual learning can be acquired as a result of experience with stimuli that would otherwise be difficult to tell apart, and is often explained in terms of the modulation of feature salience by an error signal based on how well that feature can be predicted by the others that make up the stimulus. In this article we show that anodal transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) at Fp3 directly influences this modulation process so as to eliminate and possibly reverse perceptual learning. In 2 experiments, anodal stimulation disrupted perceptual learning (indexed by an inversion effect) compared with sham (Experiment 1) or cathodal (Experiment 2) stimulation. Our findings can be interpreted as showing that anodal tDCS severely reduced or even abolished the modulation of salience based on error, greatly increasing generalization between stimuli. This result supports accounts of perceptual learning based on variations in salience as a consequence of pre-exposure, and opens up the possibility of controlling this phenomenon. (PsycINFO Database Record

Mackintosh lecture : association and cognition : two processes, one system

This article argues that the dual-process position can be a useful first approximation when studying human mental life, but it cannot be the whole truth. Instead, we argue that cognition is built on association, in that associative processes provide the fundamental building blocks that enable propositional thought. One consequence of this position is to suggest that humans are able to learn associatively in a similar fashion to a rat or a pigeon, but another is that we must typically suppress the expression of basic associative learning in favour of rule-based computation. This stance conceptualises us as capable of symbolic computation but acknowledges that, given certain circumstances, we will learn associatively and, more importantly, be seen to do so. We present three types of evidence that support this position: The first is data on human Pavlovian conditioning that directly support this view. The second is data taken from task-switching experiments that provide convergent evidence for at least two modes of processing, one of which is automatic and carried out “in the background.” And the last suggests that when the output of propositional processes is uncertain, the influence of associative processes on behaviour can manifest.

The effect of scrambling upright and inverted faces on the N170

The face inversion effect refers to a decrement in performance when we try to recognise familiar faces turned upside down (inverted), compared with familiar faces presented in their usual (upright) orientation. Recently, we have demonstrated that the inversion effect can also be found with checkerboards drawn from prototype-defined categories when the participants have been trained with these categories, suggesting that factors such as expertise and the relationships between stimulus features may be important determinants of this effect. We also demonstrated that the typical inversion effect on the N170 seen with faces is found with checkerboards, suggesting that modulation of the N170 is a marker for disruption in the use of configural information. In the present experiment, we first demonstrate that our scrambling technique greatly reduces the inversion effect in faces. Following this, we used Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) recorded while participants performed an Old/New recognition study on normal and scrambled faces presented in both upright and inverted orientations to investigate the impact of scrambling on the N170. We obtained the standard robust inversion effect for normal faces: The N170 was both larger and delayed for normal inverted faces as compared with normal upright faces, whereas a significantly reduced inversion effect was recorded for scrambled faces. These results show that the inversion effect on the N170 is greater for normal compared with scrambled faces, and we interpret the smaller effect for scrambled faces as being due to the reduction in expertise for those faces consequent on scrambling.

Structure and implementation of novel task rules : a cross-sectional developmental study

Rule-based performance improves remarkably throughout childhood. The present study examined how children and adolescents structured tasks and implemented rules when novel task instructions were presented in a child-friendly version of a novel instruction-learning paradigm. Each miniblock started with the presentation of new stimulus-response mappings for a go task. Before this mapping could be implemented, subjects had to make responses in order to advance through screens during a preparatory (“next”) phase. Children (4–11 years old) and late adolescents (17–19 years old) responded more slowly during the next phase when the next response was incompatible with the instructed stimulus-response mapping. This instruction-based interference effect was more pronounced in young children than in older children. We argue that these findings are most consistent with age-related differences in rule structuring. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of rule-based performance, instruction-based learning, and development.

How we can change your mind: Anodal tDCS to Fp3 alters human stimulus representation and learning

ABSTRACT The aim of the current work is to advance our understanding of both the mechanisms controlling perceptual learning and the face inversion effect. In the three double blind experiments reported here (total N = 144) we have shown that anodal tDCS stimulation (10 min at 1.5 mA) delivered over the left DLPFC at Fp3 affects perceptual learning and drastically reduces the, usually robust, face inversion effect. In Experiment 1, we found a significantly reduced inversion effect in the anodal group compared to that in the sham group. Experiment 2 replicated the pattern of results found in Experiment 1. In both experiments recognition performance for upright faces in the anodal group was significantly impaired compared to that in the sham group. Finally, using an active control in Experiment 3 (same behavioural task but different tDCS targeted brain area) we showed that the same Fp3 anodal tDCS stimulation effect is not obtained when a different brain area is targeted. HighlightsExperiment 1& 2 show that anodal tDCS delivered (10 min at 1.5 mA) over the Fp3 reduces the face inversion effect.Experiment 3 shows that the same tDCS stimulation does not have the same effect when applied to a different brain area.Anodal tDCS to Fp3 brain area reduces face recognition.