Rostislav Kapelyushnikov

Performance of closely held firms in Russia: evidence from firm-level data∗

This paper evaluates the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance in a weak institutional environment. Specifically, using new survey evidence, we seek to appraise quantitatively the performance of block-holder-controlled firms in Russia and to identify, within the domain of corporate governance theory, factors that may explain such performance. We find evidence of negative association between the size of the dominant owners’ shareholding and performance parameters such as investment, capacity utilization, and profitability. At the same time, we establish that control structures with multiple, large shareholders increase efficiency. The ambiguity of the effects of ownership concentration suggests that country-specific factors play an important role.

The Role of the Informal Sector, Flexible Working Time and Pay in the Russian Labour Market Model

Unlike most other transition economies in Europe, in Russia correlation between employment dynamics and GDP dynamics has been weak, contributing to a relatively low rate of unemployment. This article seeks to explain this phenomenon by investigating a combination of inefficient enforcement of labour regulations and the emergence of a vast informal sector of the labour market, leading to the unusually broad implementation of flexible working time and flexible pay, as a critical factor in the stabilisation of employment in the country.

Diversity within capitalism: The Russian labour market model

We establish a link between inefficient enforcement and the emergence of compensating institutional arrangements on the one side and the unusually broad implementation of flexible working time and flexible pay on the other as a crucial factor that made the stabilisation of employment in Russia possible.

Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance in a Transition Economy: Evidence from Russia

This chapter looks at the impact of ownership structure on the performance of firms in Russia and identifies, within the domain of corporate governance theory, the factors that may explain any revealed differences in such performance and that of their counterparts in other industrialized countries. When market reforms started in Russia, it was anticipated that mass privatization would create ‘responsible’ owners and, as a result, produce a foundation on which economic reconstruction and growth would flourish. These expectations have on the whole failed to materialize. Restructuring in privatized firms has been slow, fixed production assets show a significant rate of wear, and innovation activity is low as is the competitiveness of domestic goods. Significantly, the inability of new owners to lead the firms forward has been consistently identified by experts as one of the causes of the poor economic performance of Russian companies (Nellis, 1999; Desai and Goldberg, 2000).