Roy Allison

Central Asian security : the new international context

This volume is the first comprehensive scholarly analysis of the strategic reconfiguration of Central Asia as Russia has become more disengaged from the nations in the region and as these nations have developed new relations to the south, east, and west. The international implications are enormous because of the rich energy sources --oil and natural gas --located in the Caspian Sea area. The authors assess a variety of internal security policy challenges confronting these states --for example, the potential for conflict arising from such factors as a mixed ethnic population, resource scarcity, particularly in relation to water management, and an Islamic revival. They also examine the security policy content of relations between the Central Asian states and regional and international powers --specifically the stakes, interests, and policies of Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, and the United States. These internal challenges and the evolution of relations with external powers may result in new cooperative relationships, but they may also lead to destabilizing rivalry and interstate enmity in Central Asia. It is important to identify new patterns of relevance for future security cooperation in the region, but the potential for a new security system or for new institutions to manage security in the region remains uncertain. These issues are explored by a team of prominent specialists from Western Europe, the United States, Russia and China.

The Russian case for military intervention in Georgia: international law, norms and political calculation

Abstract The Russian military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 has raised significant questions about Russian thinking and practice on the legitimate use of military force abroad, especially in relation to neighbour states. The arguments advanced by Russia to justify this campaign show how Russian interpretations of customary international law as well as norms related to the use of force have served as an instrument of state policy, rather than being rooted in any broader international consensus. The Russian discourse in this context about sovereignty, self-determination and the legitimacy of recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia as states appears similarly to be strongly influenced by political self-interest and Russian views about its entitlement within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. Among Russian claims, Moscows commitment to support its ‘citizens’ abroad has been particularly controversial. This article examines these issues and also the possibility that, through its justifications for waging war against Georgia, Russia is more broadly contesting the interpretation of certain international norms, that it regards as essentially constructed by Western states. Some potential implications of these legal and normative arguments for future Russian policy in the CIS region, including Ukraine, are also examined.

Belarus between East and West

Belarus has a historically divided identity and presently finds itself ‘in between’ the European Union member states and Russia. An analysis of official statements, focus groups and survey results suggests that foreign and security policy is made overwhelmingly by the countrys powerful presidency, and that it is often more pragmatic than at first sight appears. Official statements avoid an unambiguous commitment to ‘east’ or ‘west’. This duality is also apparent within the foreign policy community, and at the popular level. Western governments have for the most part condemned the Lukashenko regime as ‘Europes last dictatorship’ and reduced official contacts to a minimum; a policy of ‘constructive engagement’ might be less likely to push it towards a ‘Slavic choice’ including a greater degree of integration with the Russian Federation and the CIS.

NATO: The View from the East

Abstract Relations between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and NATO have placed more emphasis on cooperation than confrontation since the Cold War, and Ukraine has begun to move towards membership. At the popular level, on the evidence of national surveys in 2004 and 2005, NATO continues to be perceived as a significant threat, but in Russia and Ukraine it comes behind the United States (in Belarus the numbers are similar). There are few socioeconomic predictors of support for NATO membership that are significant across all three countries, but there are wide differences by region, and by attitudinal variables such as support for a market economy and for EU membership. The relationship between popular attitudes and foreign policy is normally a distant one; but in Ukraine NATO membership will require public support in a referendum, and in all three cases public attitudes on foreign policy issues can influence foreign policy in other ways, including the composition of parliamentary committees. In newly independent states whose international allegiances are still evolving, the associations between public opinion and foreign and security policy may often be closer than in the established democracies.

Soviet Policy on Conventional Force Reductions

The Soviet Union is committed through the November 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, unilateral declarations, and bilateral accords with Eastern European states to a very substantial reduction in its conventional military arsenal in Europe and to the withdrawal of most if not all of its military forces stationed abroad. In itself this is a revolutionary programme. But Soviet conventional forces remaining within the frontiers of the USSR are also likely to be significantly restructured beyond CFE requirements in the early 1990s. In the first half of the decade the Soviet military reduction is likely to remain a combination of unilateral and multilateral negotiated efforts, although the balance between the two approaches may be tipped in favour of the former. Unilateral Soviet reductions in Europe are underwritten by the CFE Treaty, although this treaty postponed the issue of military personnel, and unilateral cuts intended for the future in the USSR may be locked into additional East-West agreements. A comprehensive regime of verification and monitoring should be established on Soviet territory, alongside other confidence and security building measures, which will further reinforce stability in Europe.