Rubén Arrondo García

The Effects of Ownership Structure and Board Composition on the Audit Committee Meeting Frequency: Spanish evidence

This paper examines the factors that affect the activity of the audit committees in Spain. The data used in the analyses are collected from the Spanish stock market in 2003. The results show the existence of a non-linear relationship between the managerial stock ownership and the activity of the audit committee. We have also verified the existence of a lower audit committees activity in highly leveraged firms and when the ownership structure is concentrated in the hands of large shareholders. The large firms have more active committees than small firms. Finally, we have not found any evidence of a significant influence of the composition of the board or the audit committee on the activity of the latter.

Monitoring by Busy and Overlap Directors: An Examination of Executive Remuneration and Financial Reporting Quality

ABSTRACT We examine the influence of multiple board directorships and boards’ committee memberships on three board supervisory outcomes: executive remuneration, external auditor opinion, and earnings management. The study uses a panel of 122 non-financial companies listed on the Spanish Stock Exchange over the period 2004–2011. Our results show that firms with busy directors offer low executive remuneration and present a low probability of a qualified audit opinion. Furthermore, the results indicate that firms with overlap directors exhibit a higher probability of receiving a qualified audit opinion. Additionally, we find evidence that the overcommitment effects of busy and overlap directors are more evident for large firms. Overall, our findings suggest that busy (overlap) directors are beneficial (detrimental) to the monitoring capability of the board in the Spanish context.