Rudra Chaudhuri

Turkish-Kurdish Relations and the European Union: An Unprecedented Shift in the Kemalist Paradigm?

The struggle for recognition within a wider political arena has become an essential ingredient for a state, or a group of people within a state, if they are to survive and avoid social and economic extinction. It is widely accepted that the possibility of Turkey’s accession to the European Union not only could bridge the cultural gap between the East and the West but would bolster the ailing Turkish economy and create an opening for the EU to Asia.1 In order to attain these aspirations, the Turkish state will have to fulfi ll the conditions stated in the Copenhagen criteria.2 This would mean that the Kemalist state

The Rumsfeld Doctrine and the Cost of US Unilateralism: Lessons Learned

Taylor and Francis FDEF_A_255784.sgm 10.1080/14702430701559263 Defence Studies 470-2436 (pr nt)/1743698 (online) Original Article 2 07 & F ancis 730 00September 2 07 Seni L c u er FotiosMoustakis br c ssia @n ta.mod.uk In the era of liberal globalization that followed the end of the Cold War, the power of the West was pre-eminent. A significant component of the West’s pre-eminence was its military superiority. A combination of United States (US) spending power, great advances in military technologies, and associated developments in training and tactics led to what has been called a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). 1 The ability of the US military to support itself in almost any theatre, to observe and understand the battlefield, to coordinate its forces, and to strike precisely at targets, has given US forces unrivalled destructive power on the conventional battlefield. However, it is important to understand that war is not just about destructive power. War is a political act and it is fought for political outcomes. A concentration on the ‘supply side’ of the RMA – the new technologies, tactics and doctrines of Western forces, reveals part of the transformation that is taking place in the post-Cold War world. It was not just smarter technology that raised the utility of military force for the West, it was the link made between the West’s military power and its liberal politics. The association between Western military power and Western politics manifested itself on several levels. At a grand strategic level, the US and its allies had enormous capacity not only to coopt support for their interventions, but also to shape the context in which force could legitimately be used. The power of the West was often able to de-legitimize nonWestern practices of war while framing its own use of force in terms of empowering international law for the benefit of all. The West promised a world of international institutions that one day might transcend all the

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962

Abstract Strategic historians and practitioners associated with the 32-day Sino-Indian border conflict of autumn 1962 have for long argued that Indias appeal for US military assistance during the war led to the abandonment of Indias foreign policy of non-alignment. By asking for military assistance, India entered into an alliance with the US. Triangulation of different accounts of the war, declassified US State Department Papers and correspondence between Indian leaders during the time of the war counter these claims. This article demonstrates how Indias political elite, informed by cultural beliefs had in fact resisted allying with the US. Cultural beliefs, and not rational claims prescribing alliances, guided the strategic decision-making process in this period of national security crisis.

The Limits of Executive Power: Domestic Politics and Alliance Behavior in Nehru's India

This article explores the extent to which Indian domestic debate shapes strategic behavior. It makes the case that domestic politics, and more importantly, the role played by domestic elites–from within the ruling party and the opposition–have historically set limits on the exercise of executive power. Specifically, it maps the relative importance of domestic politics on Indian foreign policy during the Nehru years (1947 to 1964), investigating the tension between elite domestic contestation and Indias approach to alliances. In sum, it seeks to recover a part of Indian strategic history that appears to have fallen prey to a dominant historical narrative that is wrapped around the persona, rhetoric, and vision of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

THE PROXY CALCULUS

Abstract The subject of Kashmir was side-stepped during President Obamas recent state visit to New Delhi, but it nevertheless continues to exercise both India and Pakistan, frustrating relations between South Asias two nuclear powers. Barriers to its resolution stubbornly remain. Meanwhile, the proxy calculus has shifted to Kabul. Rudra Chaudhuri argues that both international and regional efforts must focus on Indo-Pakistani relations in Afghanistan.

The Making of an ‘All Weather Friendship’ Pakistan, China and the History of a Border Agreement: 1949–1963

ABSTRACT China and Pakistan share what is widely known as an ‘all weather friendship’. The historical roots of this friendship can be traced to 1963, when the two countries entered into a border agreement that divided territory in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Since then, China has provided missile and nuclear technology to Pakistan. It has limited the potential for escalation in the time of war between India and Pakistan and is the largest economic investor in Pakistan. The benefits of this friendship for Pakistan are clear. Yet, there is little detail on what led to the making of the ‘all weather friendship’. This article provides a detailed account of Sino–Pakistani relations between 1949 and 1963. It argues that whilst the 1963 agreement led to a turning point, the Pakistani establishment – military and civilian – sought to engage China since 1949. They did so to create strategic options for themselves in the event that the US and the UK – Pakistans main allies following independence – limited or worse, ended their support for Pakistan in its troubled relations with India. This article is based on primary sources available in the US, Britain, as well as recently declassified and hitherto unused papers in India.

Indian “Strategic Restraint” Revisited: The Case of the 1965 India-Pakistan War

ABSTRACT Political scientists and analysts have long argued that Indian strategic restraint is informed primarily by Indian political leaders’ aversion to the use of force. For some scholars, India’s apparent fixation with restraint can be traced to the very foundation of the modern Indian state. This article contests what it considers to be a reductionist position on strategic restraint. Instead, it argues that Indian strategic restraint has in fact been shaped more by structural issues such as the limited availability of logistics and capabilities, the impact of domestic political contest, the effect of international attention to a crisis and the need for international legitimacy, and the political, economic, and military cost-benefit analysis associated with the use of force and the potential for escalation. In sum, it contributes a historically grounded understanding of strategic restraint. The article looks closely at India’s decision-making process in one major experiment with the use of force against Pakistan in 1965. The case clearly shows that political leaders were hardly uncomfortable or unsure about the use of force. It was the military leadership at the time that sought to temper the ambitious and potentially escalatory policies considered by the then prime minister.

Re-reading the Indian Emergency: Britain, the United States and India’s Constitutional Autocracy, 1975–1977

ABSTRACT The period known as the “Emergency” in India—June 1975 to March 1977—is widely recognised as one of the darkest episodes in the nation’s 70-year history. Fundamental rights were suspended, whilst the courts had little or no authority. The security services received emergency powers to make arrests without explanation. Although the political, social, and economic history of the Emergency remains well known, there is nothing on the international history of this period. This analysis provides the first contribution to its diplomatic history. Examining the role played by the United States and Britain, in particular, finds basis largely on declassified papers available in the Indian, American, and British national archives as well as a survey of over 300 newspaper articles on and around the Indian Emergency.

Book Review: A. Vinod Kumar, India and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime: The Perennial Outlier

A. Vinod Kumar, India and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime: The Perennial Outlier. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. 2014. 233 pages. ₹795.

War and peace in Modern India: a strategic history of the Nehru years

War and Peace in Modern India firmly establishes a new standard in the contemporary and diplomatic history of South Asia. Elegantly written, methodically researched, and persuasively argued, this m...