Rui J.P. de Figueiredo

Are Patriots Bigots? An Inquiry into the Vices of In-Group Pride

One view in the study of intergroup conflict is that pride implies prejudice. However, an increasing number of scholars have come to view in-group pride more benignly, suggesting that such pride can be accompanied by a full range of feelings toward the out-group. In this article, we focus on a substantively interesting case of in-group/out-group attitudes—national pride and hostility toward immigrants. We explore the relationship in two fundamental ways: first by examining the prejudice associated with various dimensions of pride, and second by embedding these relationships in a comprehensive model of prejudice. We find that national pride is most validly measured with two dimensions—patriotism and nationalism—two dimensions that have very different relationships with prejudice. While nationalists have a strong predilection for hostility toward immigrants, patriots show no more prejudice than does the average citizen.

Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation

Why are government bureaus not necessarily organized to implement policy effectively? One view holds that a main culprit is political uncertainty. Elected officials know that they will not hold office forever, so they use “insulating” structures that constrain bureaucratic discretion, making bureaus less subject to sabotage but also less effective. I revise this theory by modeling how public officials choose administrative structures. I show that in systems with few veto points, groups will be most likely to act cooperatively on policy when political uncertainty is greatest. In contrast, in systems with many veto points, only electorally weak groups will insulate policies from future interference, therefore shifting focus from uncertainty to electoral strength. Because the conditions that lead to policy insulation are rare, electoral competition should not be thought of as a primary cause of bureaucratic inefficiency.

Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto

Forty-three of the fifty states of the United States have granted item veto authority to their governors as part of state constitutions. In this paper, I test four explanations of why and when a legislature would cede institutional power. Using data from 1865 to 1994, I show that these measures are most likely proposed by fiscal conservatives who fear the loss of power in the future; in order to protect their interests for those periods when they will be in the minority, therefore, they seek to obtain institutions such as the item veto which will limit future, liberal legislatures. The results therefore shed light on two important substantive areas. First, by endogenizing budgetary institutions, it clarifies that they are not necessarily adopted for economic efficiency. Second, it provides evidence in support of theories which have posited that electorally weak groups will heavily ‘insulate’ policies in periods in which they momentarily hold power (e.g. Moe 1989, de Figueiredo 2000.

The Political Economy of State-Level Administrative Procedure Acts

One of the most important developments in theories of American bureaucracy has been the claim that organizational procedures that are enacted by public officials have a significant impact on the nature of both bureaucratic control and performance. This development has been accompanied, however, by limited empirical investigation. We address this gap by examining the conditions under which administrative procedure acts (APAs) are adopted by the states. In particular, we test five hypotheses derived from the literature as to when a state‐level APA (SLAPA) will be adopted. In general, two conditions increase the likelihood that a SLAPA will be adopted: (1) when Democratic legislative supermajorities face a Republican governor and (2) when Democratic control is perceived to be temporary. These results indicate that existing theories emphasizing agency and dynamic effects are empirically valid, albeit with an important qualification: there is a distinctive partisan bias in the usefulness of administrative procedures for these purposes.One of the most important developments in theories of American bureaucracy has been the claim that organizational procedures that are enacted by public officials have a significant impact on the nature of both bureaucratic control and performance. This development has been accompanied, however, by limited empirical investigation. We address this gap by examining the conditions under which administrative procedure acts (APAs) are adopted by the states. In particular, we test five hypotheses derived from the literature as to when a state-level APA (SLAPA) will be adopted. In general, two conditions increase the likelihood that a SLAPA will be adopted: (1) when Democratic legislative supermajorities face a Republican governor and (2) when Democratic control is perceived to be temporary. These results indicate that existing theories emphasizing agency and dynamic effects are empirically valid, albeit with an important qualification: there is a distinctive partisan bias in the usefulness of administrative procedures for these purposes.

Why Do Regulatory Outcomes Vary so Much? Economic, Political and Institutional Determinants of Regulated Prices in the Us Telecommunications Industry

Regulatory outcomes can vary substantially from one US state to the next. For example, at the end of 2002 regulated prices for access to the local loops of incumbent telephone networks varied from

Managerial Decision-Making in Non-Market Environments: A Survey Experiment

2.79 per month in downtown Chicago, IL to

How Risky Are Illiquid Investments

7.70 in Manhattan, NY to

Why Are Firms Rigid? A General Framework and Empirical Tests

12.14 in Houston, TX. Regulatory outcomes can also vary substantially over time within a state. For example, the regulated price for local loops in downtown Little Rock, AR rose from

Inherited Agglomeration Effects in Hedge Funds

14.00 in 1998 to

Learning on the Job? Entrepreneurial Spawning in the Asset Management Industry *

18.75 in 2000 before falling to