Rupayan Pal

Network Externalities and Strategic Managerial Delegation in Cournot Duopoly: Is There a Prisoners’ Dilemma?

Abstract This paper analyzes the implications of network externalities on strategic managerial delegation contracts in a Cournot duopoly. It shows that, in the presence of strong network externalities, firms obtain higher profits in the equilibrium under strategic managerial delegation compared with that under no-delegation. Unlike as in the case of weak or no network externalities, owners of firms do not face a Prisoners’ Dilemma type of situation while deciding incentive schemes – sales-oriented vis-à-vis based on profits only – for managers in the presence of strong network externalities. However, both consumers’ surplus and social welfare are higher in the equilibrium under strategic managerial delegation compared to those under no delegation, irrespective of the strength of network externalities.

Delegation and Emission Tax in a Differentiated Oligopoly

This paper examines how product differentiation as well as strategic managerial delegation affects optimal emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare, under alternative modes of competition. It shows that, under pure profit maximization, the optimal emission tax rate is not necessarily decreasing in degree of product differentiation. Moreover, the impacts of delegation on the scope for the optimal emission tax rate to be lower for higher degree of product differentiation are very different under alternative modes of competition. Under price (quantity) competition, the equilibrium emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare are lower (higher) in the case of delegation.

Cournot vs. Bertrand under relative performance delegation: Implications of positive and negative network externalities

This paper demonstrates that relative-performance based strategic managerial delegation does not lead to the equivalence of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in the presence of network externalities, regardless of the strength and type of network externalities — positive or negative. In the presence of positive network externalities, under relative-performance based delegation, Bertrand competition yields lower prices and profits, and higher quantities, consumers surplus and welfare than Cournot competition. On the contrary, these rankings are completely reversed in the presence of negative network externalities. It also discusses the endogenous choice of price or quantity contract under delegation in the presence of network externalities.

Cooperative Managerial Delegation, R&D and Collusion

Existing literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an oligopoly game through cooperative managerial delegation. In contrast, this paper shows that, if managers are delegated to choose R&D, in addition to choosing production levels, full-collusive outcomes cannot be achieved through cooperative delegation. Moreover, (i) under cooperative delegation, semi-collusion always yields lower profit, higher R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than that in the case of competition and (ii) cooperative delegation leads to a higher profit lower R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than the no delegation case, irrespective of product market conduct.

The relative impacts of banking, infrastructure and labour on industrial growth: evidence from Indian states

This article analyses the impacts of outreach of banking services, infrastructure penetration, and labour market rigidity on the growth of manufacturing industries across 14 major states in India in the post-liberalization period (from 1991–92 to 2002–3). It documents that the outreach of the banking sector as well as infrastructure penetration has a significant positive impact on the growth of industries. Interestingly, the counteracting effect of labour market rigidity does not appear to be significant, if the effects of infrastructure and banking services are controlled for. This article also assesses the relative magnitudes of the impacts of these three institutional factors on industrial growth.

Wage Commitment, Signalling, and Entry Deterrence or Accommodation

We analyse the wage choice of a monopoly union against entry threat. The wage carries information about market demand, which is crucial to an uninformed entrant, and in addition affects the entrants post-entry cost through labour market institutions. The union may wish to deter or accommodate entry depending on whether the entrant will hire from a different source or from the union. Equilibrium wage is distorted downwardly (upwardly) for deterrence (accommodation); but because of wage correlation a low (high) wage can also turn entry profitable (unprofitable). Therefore, separating equilibrium may not always exist, and entry outcomes may be inefficient. Copyright 2006 The Authors. Journal compilation CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006.

Why tax effort falls short of capacity in Indian States: A Stochastic frontier approach

This article attempts to measure tax capacity and tax effort of fourteen major Indian states from 1991–1992 to 2010–2011 using stochastic frontier analysis. It shows that the variation across states in tax effort is wide and increasing over time. While per capita gross state domestic product, literacy rate, and labor force participation have positive association with tax capacity, a greater share of agriculture has negative association. Furthermore, intergovernmental transfers, given tax capacity, have negative association with tax effort of states. Expenditure on debt repayment is also adversely associated with tax effort but to a lower extent than outstanding liabilities. Enactment of Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act is associated with improvement in states’ tax effort. Both within-state political competition and governance indicators have positive association on tax effort.