Russ Shafer-Landau

LIBERALISM AND PATERNALISM

Joel Feinbergs brief against legal paternalism, which is the central focus of his Harm to Self , is undoubtedly the most scrupulous, nuanced, and thorough critique of the view yet provided by a liberal philosopher. I was once convinced of Feinbergs case and am now less sure. This makes me uneasy, both because I have strong liberal instincts that I would prefer to be able to justify, and also because I suppose I have not thought about the matter with the kind or degree of care that Feinberg himself did. In assessing his antipaternalist arguments, I include here a number of excerpts from Feinbergs own writings to remind us of his subtlety and precision, his broad range of references, his elegant and informed style, his sound good sense, his ability to provide the revealing, compelling example, and his supple cast of mind. That my commentary is bound to pale by comparison is inevitable, but I take some comfort in thinking that one cannot be held liable for what cannot be helped.

Moral and Theological Realism: The Explanatory Argument

There are striking parallels, largely unexplored in the literature, between skeptical arguments against theism and against moral realism. After sketching four arguments meant to do this double duty, I restrict my attention to an explanatory argument that claims that we have most reason to deny the existence of moral facts (and so, by extrapolation, theistic ones), because such putative facts have no causal-explanatory power. I reject the proposed parity, and offer reasons to think that the potential vulnerabilities of moral realism on this front are quite different from those of the theist.