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Dive into the research topics where Russell T. Hurlburt is active.

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Featured researches published by Russell T. Hurlburt.


Consciousness and Cognition | 2008

The phenomena of inner experience

Christopher L. Heavey; Russell T. Hurlburt

This study provides a survey of phenomena that present themselves during moments of naturally occurring inner experience. In our previous studies using Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) we have discovered five frequently occurring phenomena--inner speech, inner seeing, unsymbolized thinking, feelings, and sensory awareness. Here we quantify the relative frequency of these phenomena. We used DES to describe 10 randomly identified moments of inner experience from each of 30 participants selected from a stratified sample of college students. We found that each of the five phenomena occurred in approximately one quarter of sampled moments, that the frequency of these phenomena varied widely across individuals, that there were no significant gender differences in the relative frequencies of these phenomena, and that higher frequencies of inner speech were associated with lower levels of psychological distress.


Trends in Cognitive Sciences | 2001

Telling what we know: describing inner experience

Russell T. Hurlburt; Christopher L. Heavey

It is claimed that psychological science can obtain accurate reports about peoples inner experience. We reconsider three criticisms of introspection: Nisbett and Wilsons critical review of introspection, the failure of introspectionists to agree about imageless thought, and Skinners behavioral position. We show that rather than dismissing introspection, these criticisms point the way towards technical improvements in the methods used to produce accurate descriptions of inner experience. One such method, Descriptive Experience Sampling, is described and used as an example to illustrate our conclusion that, although exploring inner experience is not trivially easy, it can provide important knowledge for many areas in cognitive science.


Archive | 2006

Exploring inner experience : the descriptive experience sampling method

Russell T. Hurlburt; Christopher L. Heavey

Written for the psychologist, philosopher, and layperson interested in consciousness, Exploring Inner Experience provides a comprehensive introduction to the Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) method for obtaining accurate reports of inner experience. DES uses a beeper to cue participants to pay attention to their experience at precisely defined moments; participants are then interviewed to obtain high-fidelity accounts of their experience at those moments. Exploring Inner Experience shows (a) how DES uncovers previously unknown details of inner experience; (b) how the implications of this method affect our understanding of inner experience and the human condition more generally; (c) how DES avoids the traps that destroyed the introspections of the previous century; (d) why DES reports of inner experience should be considered reliable and valid; and (e) how to use the DES method. This book will be basic reading for all psychologists, philosophers, and students interested in consciousness, as well as anyone who is seriously concerned with understanding the human condition.(Series B)


Journal of Research in Personality | 1979

Random sampling of cognitions and behavior

Russell T. Hurlburt

Abstract A new approach to the study of thinking and personality is described, and applications to cognitive and behavioral analysis and psychotherapy discussed. The method involves randomly sampling a subjects thoughts or behaviors over extended periods of time throughout all his natural activities. An exemplary study provides a quantitative description of the thinking of undergraduate volunteers. Subjects wrote down their current thought and behavior when interrupted at random intervals by a portable device. Each sampled thought could be reliably rated on scales assessing certain aspects of thinking. Subjects were consistent in their thinking, and the thought processes of males (but not females) depended on the time of day.


Consciousness and Cognition | 2013

Toward a phenomenology of inner speaking

Russell T. Hurlburt; Christopher L. Heavey; Jason M. Kelsey

Inner speaking is a common and widely discussed phenomenon of inner experience. Based on our studies of inner experience using Descriptive Experience Sampling (a qualitative method designed to produce high fidelity descriptions of randomly selected pristine inner experience), we advance an initial phenomenology of inner speaking. Inner speaking does occur in many, though certainly not all, moments of pristine inner experience. Most commonly it is experienced by the person as speaking in his or her own naturally inflected voice but with no sound being produced. In addition to prototypical instances of inner speaking, there are wide-ranging variations that fit the broad category of inner speaking and large individual differences in the frequency with which individuals experience inner speaking. Our observations are discrepant from what many have said about inner speaking, which we attribute to the characteristics of the methods different researchers have used to examine inner speaking.


Cognitive Therapy and Research | 2002

Descriptive Experience Sampling Demonstrates the Connection of Thinking to Externally Observable Behavior

Russell T. Hurlburt; Margie Koch; Christopher L. Heavey

Cognitive models of psychotherapy assume a connection between thinking and behavior but have examined that connection with the use of only retrospective reports of thinking. However, such retrospective reports may not be trustworthy. Descriptive experience sampling (DES), a nonretrospective procedure for examining inner experience (thinking, feelings, etc.), has demonstrated links between thinking and behavior in some psychiatric populations but not yet in general. Here, DES was used to compare 7 undiagnosed individuals who share an externally observable characteristic (high rate of speech) to 7 normal-speech-rate individuals. High-speech-rate individuals had fewer instances of simple inner speech, more instances of complex inner experiences, fewer feeling experiences, and more “just doing” experiences, thus demonstrating a connection between inner experience and external behavior, and that DES is useful for exploring inner experience.


Cognitive Therapy and Research | 2002

Interobserver reliability of descriptive experience sampling

Russell T. Hurlburt; Christopher L. Heavey

The descriptive experience sampling (DES) method is a procedure for providing descriptions of the inner experience of individuals. Although analytic arguments for its reliability are found, there have been no conventional interobserver reliability studies of the method. We took a stratified random sample of 10 participants and obtained 6 DES samples from each. Two interviewers independently interviewed the participants and rated them on the presence or absence of 16 characteristics of inner experience, 5 of which occurred frequently enough to analyze separately. The single-sample interobserver-reliability kappas for those 5 characteristics ranged from .52 to .92 (median 0.76). Spearman–Brown adjustment showed that reliabilities for typical 19-sample averages would range from .92 to .98, comparable to highly reliable questionnaires.


Cognitive Therapy and Research | 1980

Validation and correlation of thought sampling with retrospective measures

Russell T. Hurlburt

The thought-sampling method (Hurlburt, 1976, 1979) interrupts individuals at random intervals and asks them for self-reports of the particular thought that was occurring to them at the instant of interruption. This method is gaining attention as being a potentially useful way of describing a persons inner experience. The thought-sampling method can be contrasted with retrospective means of describing the stream of thought (Singer, 1975). In the retrospective methods, individuals are asked to characterize their thinking patterns in general, responding to questions that are typically arranged in scales such as the Imaginal Processes Inventory (Singer & Antrobus, 1970). The two methods have the same goal, namely, description of mental life; the means, however, are much different. Thought sampling asks an individual to describe a single actually occurring, immediately recalled thought, and repeats the single-thought description process intermittently until a series of thought reports is obtained. This series of reports is then analyzed by the experimenter, who produces a description of the individuals mental life. The retrospective method, on the other hand, asks the individual to describe his or her own mental life and this description is probably produced without referring to any single actually occurring thought. Therefore, it is a question of considerable interest whether descriptions generated by the two procedures are similar for any given individual. There are, as yet, no data on this point, past what is presented by Hurlburt (1976), and those data should be regarded as suggestive at best since they are


Cognitive Therapy and Research | 1984

Random sampling of thought and mood

Russell T. Hurlburt; Brian C. Lech; Sonja Saltman

In two studies, subjects were interrupted at unpredictable times and asked to rate their immediate experience on 42 rating scales tapping thought and mood variables. In the first study, the interruptions were random signals in the subjects natural everyday environment; in the second study, the interruptions occurred while subjects watched the movie Annie Hall.Both sets of ratings were subjected to identical factor analyses, and factor structures were quite similar. Stable factors were identified as Aggressive/Bad Mood, Pleasant Sexual, Daydreaming/Past Sexual, Clear Thought, Self-Critical, and Thought or Mood Duration.


Emotion | 2012

Toward a Phenomenology of Feelings

Christopher L. Heavey; Russell T. Hurlburt; Noelle L. Lefforge

Our understanding of emotion cannot be complete without an understanding of feelings, the experiential aspect of emotion. Despite their importance, little effort has been devoted to the careful apprehension of feelings. Based on our apprehension of many randomly selected moments of pristine inner experience, we present a preliminary phenomenology of feelings. We begin by observing that often feelings occur as directly experienced phenomena of awareness; however, often no feelings are present in experience, or if they are present, they are too faint to be observed by a process intended to observe them. Feelings range from vague to distinct and sometimes do, but other times do not, include bodily sensations. When bodily sensations are present, there is a wide range of clarity and location of these sensations. Sometimes people experience multiple distinct feelings and sometimes people experience one feeling that is a mix or blend of different feelings. We also discuss what feelings are not, including instances when feelings do not appear to be present, despite evidence suggesting the presence of underlying emotional processes (e.g., behavioral evidence of emotion). These instances of emotion but not feeling lead us to speculate that experiencing feelings is a skill developed over time through an interaction of interpersonal and intrapersonal events.

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