Russell W. Mills

Agency policy preferences, congressional letter-marking and the allocation of distributive policy benefits*

When allocating distributive benefits, bureaucrats must balance their own policy preferences with requests from members of Congress. The elimination of earmarking may provide agency personnel with greater discretion in the allocation of distributive benefits. Using a novel data set of congressional letters written in support of their community’s air traffic control towers, we estimate a model that explores the Federal Aviation Administration’s decision to issue national interest exemptions to continue operations at towers slated for closure as a result of budget sequestration. Our analysis suggests that members of Congress do not enjoy the influence they possessed under earmarking when using a new method, letter-marking, to influence how agencies distribute benefits.

The interaction of private and public regulatory governance: The case of association-led voluntary aviation safety programs

Abstract The complex and globalized nature of many industries has led to a global governance deficit that has resulted in the rise of self-regulation by private firms. Despite well-developed body of literature, we know little about the interaction of private regulation and public governance. The questions this paper addresses are: How do private self-regulatory programs either fill a vacuum of regulation or complement existing regulatory structures, and how do these programs support or crowd out the development of government regulatory programs? This paper addresses these questions by developing case studies of internal audit, voluntary reporting, and data analysis programs operated by the International Air Transport Association (IATA). The results suggest that when there is a congruence of goals between industry and government, private regulatory programs can complement or even replace existing public sector regulatory regimes. Additionally, the results suggest that successful private self-regulatory programs can often be threatened by competing public programs.

Working Together: An Empirical Analysis of a Multiclass Legislative-Executive Branch Simulation

ABSTRACT Much of the research on the use of simulations in the political science classroom focuses on how simulations model different events in the real world, including political campaigns, international diplomacy, and legislative bargaining. In the case of American Politics, many simulations focus on the behavior of Congress and the legislative process, yet do so only in isolation, leaving unexamined the complete role of the branch in the policy-making process. We address this gap in the literature through the use of a novel, multiclass simulation that explores the role of the legislative and executive branches in the U.S. policy-making process. Using a quantitative approach, we examine student perceptions of a joint seminar in legislative-executive relations taught at Bowling Green State University in the spring of 2015. The results suggest the multiclass simulation enhanced perceived student learning when compared to traditional lecture or single-course simulations. These effects were conditional upon the student’s assigned role, GPA, and political interest. Our findings add to the growing pedagogical literature on the use of simulations in the university classroom and offer suggestions for practical implementation as well as future research.

Ensuring Compliance From 35,000 Feet Accountability and Trade-Offs in Aviation Safety Regulatory Networks

A puzzle that faces public administrators within regulatory networks is how to balance the need for public or democratic accountability with increasing demands from interest groups and elected officials to utilize the expertise of the private sector in developing process-oriented programs that ensure compliance. This article builds upon the network governance accountability framework developed by Koliba, Mills, and Zia to explore the dominant accountability frames and the accountability trade-offs that shape the process-oriented regulatory regime used by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to oversee and regulate air carriers in the United States.

Effects of Airline Industry Changes on Small- and Non-Hub Airports

This report is a guidebook and compendium of resources that describes policy and planning options for small- and non-hub airport operators and managers as they respond to changing conditions in the airline industry. Airport marketing and development programs are highly individualized, but common issues exist over which airports exert varying levels of control. With this context in mind, this report describes the forces that affect airline operations and airport planning and development and presents a structured approach to help create effective planning and development strategies. The report reviews airline industry trends, documents patterns of airline industry change, and assesses current programs that airports are using to respond to changes. Based on a review of relevant literature as well as use of focus groups and detailed case studies, the guidebook evaluates options and suggests viable programming strategies. Focus groups were selected from among the case studies to demonstrate noteworthy community involvement or use of innovative incentive programs. The report includes a discussion of lessons learned from these case studies and focus groups, presents a series of new measurement tools for assessing change in airport services, and provides an appendix with detailed data on all the airports included in the analysis. The options and strategies that emerged from this analysis were used to create a self-assessment tool to help stakeholders build action plans recognizing unique, individual airport requirements and characteristics. The complete data set from which the appendix is drawn is presented as a web-only Excel file on the TRB website.

The role of trust in the regulation of complex and high-risk industries: the case of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration’s voluntary disclosure programs

As part of the shift from command and control to process oriented regulatory regimes (Gilad 2010), building trust between regulators and the regulated firms has grown in importance. Collaborative mechanisms often rely on a free-flow of information and communication, which requires the building and maintenance of trust. This exchange of information and trust building is even more vital in complex and high-risk industries where potential information asymmetries and prevailing motivations could lend themselves to the hiding of information (Gormley 1986; May 2005). In this paper, we examine the evolution of the role of trust in the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration’s Voluntary Disclosure Programs by developing case studies of three voluntary disclosure programs: the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and the Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP). Using extensive interview and observational data, we demonstrate how trust is essential to the operation of the problems. We show how the FAA used institutional mechanisms to create trust at the national level, but at the local level, personal relationships had to be built to foster trust. The need for relationship-based trust building meant that the level of trust between the FAA and air carriers varied across regions and was often contingent upon the enforcement style of the regulator. While trust is necessary for the programs we describe and can provide substantial benefits to the public, it can also lead regulators to ignore warning signs and miss problems. We explore this darker side of trust using the Southwest Airlines incident.