Ruth H. Warner

Stereotypes as Justifications of Prejudice

Three experiments investigate how stereotypes form as justifications for prejudice. The authors created novel content-free prejudices toward unfamiliar social groups using either subliminal (Experiment 1, N = 79) or supraliminal (Experiment 2, N = 105; Experiment 3, N = 130) affective conditioning and measured the consequent endorsement of stereotypes about the groups. Following the stereotype content model, analyses focused on the extent to which stereotypes connoted warmth or competence. Results from all three experiments revealed effects on the warmth dimension but not on the competence dimension: Groups associated with negative affect were stereotyped as comparatively cold (but not comparatively incompetent). These results provide the first evidence that—in the absence of information, interaction, or history of behavioral discrimination—stereotypes develop to justify prejudice.

Observer Perceptions of Moral Obligations in Groups With a History of Victimization

The authors investigated when observers assign contemporary group members moral obligations based on their group’s victimization history. In Experiment 1, Americans perceived Israelis as obligated to help Sudanese genocide victims and as guiltworthy for not helping if reminded of the Holocaust and its descendants were linked to this history. In Experiment 2, participants perceived Israelis as more obligated to help and guiltworthy for not helping when the Holocaust was presented as a unique victimization event compared with when genocide was presented as pervasive. Experiments 3 and 4 replicated the effects of Experiment 1 with Cambodians as the victimized group. Experiment 5 demonstrated that participants perceived Cambodians as having more obligations under high just world threat compared with low just world threat. Perceiving victimized groups as incurring obligations is one just world restoration method of providing meaning to collective injustice.

Accounting for group differences in appraisals of social inequality: Differential injustice standards

We tested whether differential appraisals of inequality are a function of the injustice standards used by different groups. A confirmatory standard of injustice is defined as the amount of evidence needed to arrive at the conclusion that injustice has occurred. Consistent with a motivational shifting of standards view, we found that advantaged and disadvantaged group members set different standards of injustice when judging the magnitude of gender (Study 1) and racial (Study 2) wage inequality. In addition, because advantaged and disadvantaged group members formed - based on their differential standards - divergent appraisals of wage inequality, they experienced differential desire to restore inter-group justice. We discuss the implications of promoting low confirmatory standards for changing perceptions of social reality and for motivating justice-restorative behaviour.

Are the latter-day saints too latter day? Perceived age of the Mormon Church and attitudes toward Mormons

Two studies examine how social distance toward Mormons is affected by the relative recency of the Mormon religion. In Study 1, we found that the perceived age of the Mormon religion predicted social distance toward Mormons such that people who perceived Mormonism as more recent wanted more social distance from Mormons. In Study 2, we manipulated the antiquity or recency of the Mormon religion. We found that emphasizing the long history of the religion reduced social distance from Mormons (relative to emphasizing the religion’s newness), an effect that was mediated by perceived legitimacy of the Mormon religion. These findings support past research showing that the longevity of a practice implies its goodness and that this inference extends to practitioners as well.

Judgments of Sexual Abuse Victims

Three experiments address how people react to a sexual abuse victim compared to a nonvictim when a justification for negative evaluation is available or not available. A harm-doing victim was rated lower on expected job performance and higher on desired social distance than a harm-doing nonvictim. When subsequent harm-doing was absent, judgments of a victim and nonvictim did not differ on expected job performance or social distance. Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1 and revealed that the order in which victimization history and harm-doing information were presented had no effect. Experiment 3 showed that participants desired greater social distance from a harm-doing victim compared to a non-harm-doing victim to the extent they thought the target should have derived benefits from the childhood victimization. Implications for judgments of harm-doers—depending on whether their victimization history is known or not—are considered.