Ryan T. Cragun

Recognizing and Categorizing the Secular: Polysecularity and Agendas of Polysecularism

What may count as a “secular” organization, or a “secular” movement? How should secular societies be studied, classified, and compared? The amount of research into group manifestations of secular energy and activism has been limited and disjointed, most likely due to a general lack of clarity and rigor. This chapter offers a well-defined framework for classifying and contrasting the compositions and agendas of organizations for secular people. That framework must be assembled gradually and carefully, which requires initial sections of this chapter for describing how the secular and secularity can be studied scientifically. The second section shows how to liberate a free-standing conception of the secular from pre-fabricated contrasts against religious normalcies. The third section explains how to avoid the prevalent fallacies in the social sciences that distort the identities of secular people. The fourth section introduces the idea of “polysecularity” to better discriminate the many types of secular people. The fifth section introduces the idea of “polysecularism” to cover primary modes of activism chosen by some secular people in the public sphere, which need not be characterized only by negative opposition to religion. The sixth section orients research into public secular attitudes through the positive self-identities and chosen agendas of secular individuals. The highly diverse array of choices for expressing secularist views and participating in secular agendas in turn sets the stage for the seventh section, which categories a variety of prominent secular organizations in America according to their efforts to serve one or another portion of that diverse array. This chapter concludes by pointing out under-served and neglected segments of the sizable secular population in America, using the example of New Atheism to illustrate how that regrettable situation could occur in the internet age. The terms “secular” and “secularity” lend themselves to multifaceted and multidimensional conceptions, applicable in many ways to individuals, organizations, social institutions, and whole societies (see Rechtenwald and Richter, this volume). Despite their utility for analytic frameworks in research, the work of observing secularity, tracking secularity, and explaining features of sec-

Your Wedding, Your Way: Personalized, Nonreligious Weddings through the Universal Life Church

Wedding ceremonies in the United States are increasingly personalized and nonreligious, a trend facilitated in part by the Universal Life Church (ULC), which will ordain anyone nearly instantly.While it does not identify as a secular or nonbeliever organization, the ULC provides a popular pathway for self-described nonreligious couples to achieve a unique wedding that honors their beliefs and relationships. As a church, its ministers are capable of solemnizing marriages legally; and as a religion that allows anyone to become a minister, it permits secular people to perform legally valid weddings. Although civil ceremonies are secular, they are not often customized for specific couples. Secular celebrants who are certified by nonbeliever organizations are few and far between, and in most states their weddings are not recognized legally. Given that nonbeliever organizations have not prioritized secular alternatives to religious rites of passage, nonreligious couples find alternatives that facilitate such rituals, even paradoxically yet pragmatically by utilizing a religious resource such as the ULC. The ULC thus complicates notions of “organized secularism” because it shows how many avowedly secular people take up a strategic religious identity in order to achieve a desired nonreligious ritual in an individualized manner. The rise of nonreligious weddings in the 21 century tracks with several developments in American society and technology, particularly the rise of the “nones” and widespread use of the internet. Since 1990, more Americans have declared that they have no religious affiliation, rising from 8% in 1990 to 21% in 2014, according to the General Social Survey (Hout and Smith 2015, 1). A 2014 Pew survey claims that 23% of Americans are religiously unaffiliated (2015, 3). Younger cohorts are more likely to be unaffiliated, with 33% of those aged 18–24 claiming no religious affiliation (Hout and Smith 2015, 3). During this same time, the rates of Americans who earn bachelor’s and graduate degrees, engage in premarital sex, cohabit before marriage, delay marriage and childbirth, and forego marriage entirely have increased. In 2010, the median age for first marriage was 29 for men and 27 for women, up from 26 and 24 in

A Typology of Organized Atheists and Secularists in Germany and the United States

The typology proposed in this chapter is the result of a transnational study that was carried out in the years from 2006 to 2013. It had been motivated by media reports on atheist activism in Germany, in particular the staging of so-called “religion-free zones” during the Catholic World Youth Day festival in Cologne in 2005. It was reported that this activism was carried out by secularist organizations, some of which had been in existence for many years. Initial research made it clear that little was known about these organizations, their networks, activities, and supporters, despite the fact that they might qualify as a social movement. Furthermore, the early stages of the conception of this project coincided with the popularization of the term “new atheism” by Gary Wolf (2006) and the ensuing reports and debate on the authors and books labeled as such. This, too, pointed to the existence of a secularist movement, an international one at that, which seemed to be experiencing a wave of mobilization at the time. The aim of this research project, as it was conceptualized back then, was twofold. On the one hand, it was conceived to map and delineate the field of secularist, humanist, atheist, and freethought (what the previous chapter called SHAF) organizations in parts of the Western world, and to argue for its classification as a social movement. Germany and the United States, with their marked differences regarding private religiosity and church-state separation, were chosen as representative cases from both sides of the secular/religious divide within the West. On the other hand, the aim was to investigate the motives and biographies of the members of a certain type of those organizations in both countries. Who are those people who, despite having grown up and living under very different socio-religious conditions, feature the commonality of not only being nonreligious, but of being a member of organized atheism? Over the years during which this particular study was carried out, the research landscape on nonreligion, secularity, and organized atheism has changed dramatically. While at the study’s inception such an academic field was almost nonexistent, the phenomenon of “new atheism” prompted an explosion of research activity in this area within a number of different scientific disciplines

Communal Secularity: Congregational Work at the Sunday Assembly

The Sunday Assembly is young. It is still developing as an international organization, and is in the early stages of making its mark in the broader secular community. Exactly what this mark will be remains to be seen. Despite its youth and status as essentially a 21 century secular congregational experiment, it appears to be maturing quickly and is unquestionably meeting a demand within a certain sector of the secular population in the west and other parts of the globe. Especially because of its newness, it is important to begin a discussion of the Sunday Assembly, and the idea of communal secularity more abstractly, by outlining the basics of its formation and operation in order to understand both its uniqueness within, and relevance to, organized secularism generally. After examining the key components of its history and early development, this chapter explores the interactional details of what I call “communal secularity,” (Smith 2017) with the Sunday Assembly serving as a salient case study of the concept. This involves a sociological discussion of congregational and identity dynamics, and the application of social psychological insights regarding ritual, emotion, morality, and other symbolic dimensions of this type of collective expression of the secular. I conceptualize communal secularity as the particular relationship of these elements vis-à-vis the secular, and by way of defining the process by which some secular people in contemporary culture address and express their secular identities, values, and worldviews.

Rejecting Rejection Identities: Negotiating Positive Non-religiosity at the Sunday Assembly

On a sunny Saturday morning in May of 2015, a group of over 80 non-religious Americans and Britons gathered in the basement of a Presbyterian church in the heart of Atlanta, Georgia. As individuals and groups of two and three trickled in, grabbing bagels and coffee and finding their seats, a band was setting up in the front of the room. At 9:00 a.m. sharp, the band gathered the room’s attention and soon everyone in the basement was belting out the lyrics to the themesong from the 1980s comedy Ghostbusters. Some sang, clapped, and danced in the aisles, while others laughed sheepishly and followed along as best they could by reading the lyrics displayed on the large overhead behind the band. The band was equipped with a saxophone, a piano, a guitar, and both lead and backup vocals, and they quickly orchestrated a “call and response” dynamic with the audience during the choruses.When the band asked, “Who you gonna call?” the audience yelled back gleefully, “Ghostbusters!” Everyone was on their feet and smiling, looking around at their neighbors with knowing glances that signaled shared memories of the movie and the irony of singing about ghosts at a gathering devoted to secular worldviews. The occasion for this secular sing-a-long was the second annual international conference of the Sunday Assembly, a growing network of “secular congregations” that selectively appropriate and replicate the Protestant church model to build community among the non-religious. Organizers and members had come from all over the United States and Britain to meet one another, share questions and concerns, and celebrate their successes as a growing organization. The organization, which began in London in early 2013, has quickly spread to over 70 local assemblies across the globe, though primarily within Britain and America. Local assemblies meet on Sundays, sing songs and listen to speakers, and they focus their gatherings on building community and pursuing a more meaningful life.1 They seek out ways to volunteer and engage with their local com-

Building Bridges in the Shadows of Steeples: Atheist Community and Identity Online

I met Sam and Joanna Southerland in a small conference room in the downtown branch of our city’s public library. The two had known each other most of their lives but had been married only two years at the time of our interview. Both exJehovah’s Witnesses, Sam (48) left the religion voluntarily in his early 20s and Joanna (51) had been forced out four years before we spoke. The couple reconnected via Facebook after Sam learned Joanna was no longer with the church. When asked, they liked to joke that they “met online.” As we talked about their involvement with their local atheist organizations and their experience navigating their minority worldview among a generally theistic population, the role of the Internet and social media emerged as a prominent feature of their secular lives. For Joanna, still new to her identity outside of the insular Jehovah’s Witnesses world, the community she found with the Midwest Atheist Coalition both online and in person proved to be essential to her new social life. Sam was the first to demonstrate the importance of the Internet in both their lives, explaining that the difference in their paths out of religion sometimes made it difficult for them to talk through the feelings Joanna was having, particularly early on in their relationship. The atheist communities, especially the online resources, were there for her in a way Sam could not be. He explained: “She’s done a very good job of establishing these Internet friendships in a way that she has someone to talk to. I mean, I’m not going to shut her off to talk about these things. But for me it’s a different path that we’re on.” Joanna then added her own thoughts: “And the atheist community is a whole thing online itself. They are trying to rally the troops basically because eventually people are going to wise up and see that religion is the cause of so many problems in the world.” “Catharsis, I think, is the bottom line of why we participate, support, and are drawn to the YouTube, Facebook, online [atheist] community,” said Sam, finishing the discussion. Sam and Joann illustrate what others (Hunsberger and Altemeyer 2006; LeDrew 2013) have called “active atheism,” i.e., individuals who actively seek out a community of other atheists. While most atheists do not physically congregate

Inside The Minds and Movement of America’s Nonbelievers: Organizational Functions, (Non)Participation, and Attitudes Toward Religion

Both Campbell’s Toward a Sociology of Irreligion (1971) and Budd’s Varieties of Unbelief (1977) described how some members of the secular/freethought movements in late 19 century Britain took a militant approach to religious doctrines, theology, the Bible, and the authority of the church. To these individuals, religion was, at best, nonsense, and, at worst, harmful. Other members preferred a more conciliatory approach characterized by politeness and civility. The latter’s goal was obtaining respectability and social acceptance for secularists and atheists. It was their view that the former hostile approach barred those who possessed “advanced religious opinions” from the desired circle of increased social status and thus out of positions of political influence. Indeed, Budd described this division in terms of “militant” and “respectable” wings (Budd 1977, 46, 49, 69), referring to them also as “negative” and “positive” secularism, respectively (also see Rectenwald, this volume). There are similar divisions between conciliatory and militant views and approaches to secular, humanist, atheist, and freethought (SHAF) movement activism in America today (see Fazzino and Cragun, this volume; Kettell 2013). The noted similarity between this issue today and as described by Campbell and Budd served as the impetus for the study that follows. Has this tension persisted across time, space, and culture? If so, why? Obviously the context covered by Campbell and Budd was quite different from contemporary America, and yet, the term “accommodationist” has come to characterize the conciliatory position for modern American nonbelievers. This term is often applied pejoratively to nonbelievers who are accommodationists by nonbelievers who are not,1 whereas

“Splitters!”: Lessons from Monty Python for Secular Organizations in the US

Aside from a handful of books from secular authors like Susan Jacoby (2004, 2009) and David Niose (2012) and even fewer scholarly publications (Cady 2010; Blankholm 2014; LeDrew 2016; Turner 1986), little is known about the origins and evolution of American secularism or the factors that contributed to the proliferation of secularist organizations (though see Rectenwald, this volume, for the origins of secularism in the UK). In this chapter, we begin by recounting some of the history of organized secularism in the US, including some emphasis on the tensions and the splits that occurred. We then turn our attention to two specific figures in the movement – Paul Kurtz (1929–2012) and Madalyn Murray O’Hair (1919–1995) – and argue that, while these individuals were obstinate, autocratic, and even over-bearing at times, they were arguably the very types of personalities that were necessary during the Cold War in the US to maintain a small, but vocal movement of stigmatized nonbelievers. We conclude by arguing that the divisions and the tensions have transformed organized secularism in the US into a de-centered, segmented, polycephalous movement (see Gerlach and Hines 1970). While the movement may be more diffuse than some think is in its best interest, we argue that there are potential advantages to such an arrangement.

Old Questions and New Issues for Organized Secularism in the United States

American secularism is a feature of American exceptionalism.1 It is unique in its origins as well as its composition. I have suggested that American history since 1776 has produced alternations between eras of Christian religious ‘awakenings’ and periods of ‘secular’ or non-religious dominance and so, in effect, a continuous ‘culture war’ over the nature and purpose of the American nation (Kosmin 2014a). Recently national social trends seem to suggest the country is entering a new secular phase (Kosmin 2013). The ARIS 2008 findings showed that half of U.S households did not currently belong to a religious congregation and on the average Sunday 73% of Americans did not go to Church.While 27% of Americans did not anticipate a religious funeral, 30% of Americans did not believe in a personal biblical style God (Kosmin et al 2009). And more recent surveys have confirmed these data and trends so we may be at an important tipping point in U.S. history. The evidence demonstrates that the Zeitgeist, if not the Force, is with the secular and secularizing Nones and this development makes the analysis and study of secularism per se of major relevance for American social science. Religious conservatism, faith-based initiatives, religion-related terrorism, the New Atheist texts, and increasing use of digital and ‘social’ media have energized and emboldened secularist advocates, networks, and organizations at both local and national levels. Accelerated growth in membership has been reported in recent years by nationwide organizations with clear secularist agendas including the Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF), Center for Inquiry (CFI), American Atheists (AA), American Humanist Association (AHA), Secular Student Alliance (SSA) and the Military Association of Atheists and Freethinkers (MAFF). On the intentional side, public advertising campaigns and events have been mounted in major cities. This new secularist surge of activism has been framed, in part, as an identity politics issue and movement in the United States. Some present themselves as members of a marginalized and maligned minority

Doing Death Without Deity: Constructing Nonreligious Tools at the End of Life

A growing body of literature is considering secularity and nonreligion from a variety of scholarly perspectives. In this volume, we see both the diversity of efforts towards secular organizing as well as of the diversity of strategies for researching these topics. To this discussion, we would like to contribute research on nonreligious organizing at the end of life. Nonreligious organizing at the end of life is not new, historically, but the ways in which these actions play out in the contemporary American context are novel and have much to teach us about broader discussions of secularization and the standing of nonreligion in U.S. society more generally. In this chapter, we use the terms “nonreligious” and “nonreligion” to refer to both the identities and worldviews of our research participants, though we recognize that other authors in the collection are using varying and potentially more specific language. For this project, we collected data from a broad array of individuals in a variety of settings. As such, it was not possible to learn of exact belief structures, identities, or more specific personal information that would allow us to typify our research participants in more nuanced ways. We use the term “nonreligious” as an umbrella term to cover those individuals who identify with various Atheist, Secularist, Humanist, Free-Thinker and Agnostic classifications in this project. A further note on language in this chapter is we are using terms such as “nonreligion”, “religion”, and “science” as generalities within this project in order to frame our discussion, but are sensitive to the notion that the empirical realities of these subjects are far more complex than our labels imply, as noted by Harrison (2006). Several centuries have passed since the Enlightenment, when religion began to be superseded by science and reason as the primary method for understanding and addressing problems in the natural and social world. Decline in the reliance on mysticism, magic, and God, and the rise of rationalization and intellectualization was referred to as the “disenchantment of the world” (Weber 1905). As explanatory religious frameworks continued to be challenged by science, religion was said to be pushed further out of public and into private life. As modernity progressed, the inclusion of religious meaning and symbolism in the public sphere continue to decline through processes of secularization (Berger 1967).