Ryszard Wójcicki

Theory of Logical Calculi

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Formal Methods in the Methodology of Empirical Sciences

A.- Some problems of formal methodology.- Approximate truth and truthlikeness.- A multiple sentential logic for empirical theories.- An axiomatic foundation for the logic of inductive generalization.- A two-dimensional continuum of a priori probability distributions on constituents.- Inductive logic and theoretical concepts.- A pragmatic approach to the formalization of empirical theories.- Uncertainty, probability and empirical knowledge.- The concept of empirical data.- Interpretation of theoretical terms: In defence of an empiricist dogma.- Definability problems in the methodology of science.- Laws, identities and reduction.- On logical analysis of methods.- Axiomatization in expected utility theory.- A logical model for game-like situations and the transformation of game-like situations.- Indeterminate probabilities.- Theoretical laws.- Causality, ontology and subsumptive explanation.- On the introduction of intensions into set theory.- Types of information and their role in the methodology of science.- Classification and ranking models in the discrete data analysis.- What have physicists learned from experience about inductive inference?.- B (Papers presented by title).- Verisimilitude: Popper, Miller and Hattiangadi.- On a general scheme of causal analysis.- Logic of quantum mechanics.- On possibilities and limits of the application of inductive methods.- Correspondence principle and the idealization.- Pragmatic meaning and truth.- Semantic complementarity in quantitative empirical sciences.- Marxs concept of law of science.- The impossibility theorem for universal theory of prediction.- Scientific knowledge-formation.- The methodology of behavioral theory construction: Nomological-deductive and axiomatic aspects of formalized theory.- Intertheory relations on the formal and semantical level.

The Problem of Analyticity

Our purpose in the present paper is to give an account of certain results that have been obtained within the field of logical methodology by the Polish logicians in recent years. The problem of analyticity constitutes one of the main points on which these investigations have concentrated. The studies on the problem have brought about a series of papers written by several authors and containing results which seem interesting enough to be presented in this place. The work in this field has, to a great extent, been initiated by Ajdukiewicz. His interesting paper [1] poses the problem concerning the dependence of the analytic sentences on experience in a way which stimulates further inquiries. Almost all the recent papers concerned with this problem might be thought of as a kind of response to that stimulus. It should be noticed, however, that their authors make use of very different conceptual and formal frameworks. Any attempt to present their results in each author’s original terminology would thus lead to a very complicated and incoherent exposition. Therefore, we have decided to present all the results which have been taken into account within one uniform conceptual framework. It has been possible to arrive, in this way, at a comparatively simple and coherent exposition. But not all of the existing results could be included into it. Some papers must have been left out completely, some others—partly; and those which are included have undergone a more or less essential reformulation. For this reason, the present exposition can by no means be considered as an exhaustive survey of all results obtained in the field in question. The more so that it often goes beyond the mere statement of the existing results, filling some gaps in the picture to be presented.

Twenty-Five Years of Logical Methodology in Poland

Methodology and Metascience.- The Problem of the Rationality of Fallible Methods of Inference.- The Problem of Justifying Analytic Sentences.- Axiomatic Systems from the Methodological Point of View.- The Problem of Probabilistic Justification of Enumerative Induction.- Enumerative Induction and the Theory of Games.- On Testability in Empirical Sciences.- On the Theoretical Sense of the So-Called Observational Terms and Sentences.- The Pragmatic Foundations of Semantics.- Mathematical and Empirical Verifiability.- Meaning and Functional Reason.- On a Certain Condition of Semantic Theory of Knowledge.- On the Difference between Deductive and Non-Deductive Sciences.- On Ostensive Definitions.- The Controversy: Deductivism versus Inductivism.- Concepts and Problems in General Methodology and Methodology of the Practical Sciences.- The Foundations of a Methodological Analysis of Mills Methods.- Semantic Representation of the Probability of Formulas in Formalized Theories.- Classification as a Kind of Distance Function. Natural Classifications.- The Physical Magnitude and Experience.- Probabilistic Definition on the Example of the Definition of Genotype.- Analytic Sentences in the Semantic System.- The Model of Empirical Sciences in the Concepts of the Creators of Marxism.- On the Empirical Meaningfulness of Sentences.- A Model-Theoretic Approach to the Problem of Interpretation of Empirical Languages.- Empirical Meaningfulness of Quantitative Statements.- The Problem of Analyticity.- A Method of Deciding between N Statistical Hypotheses.- Interpretations of the Maximum Likelihood Principle.- Two Concepts of Information.- Semantical Criteria of Empirical Meaningfulness.- Basic Concepts of Formal Methodology of Empirical Sciences.- Rational Belief, Probability and the Justification of Inductive Inference.

Realism vs Relativism in Philosophy of Science (Some Comments on Tarski’s Theory of Truth)

Realism need not to be opposed to relativism. It may certainly be opposed to various other positions.1 But, as I maintain in this paper, in philosophy of science the two doctrines play complementary roles. Consequently, every departure from realism, the philosophy which I defend, is a step towards accommodating some views characteristic of relativism. At the same time, it is obvious that uncompromising, orthodox realism is untenable. In particular, I argue that any acceptable version of realism must substantially revise one of the main components of the doctrine — Tarski’s conception of truth.

Semantical Criteria of Empirical Meaningfulness

This paper is an attempt to apply some methods of model theory in order to analyse the concept of empirical meaningfulness (significance), and to investigate some of its properties. In my introductory remarks I shall discuss briefly Carnap’s last definition of empirical significance [3]. I have to explain why I am reopening a problem which is widely considered as satisfactorily solved (cf. [1]). Besides I want to recall some notions of methodology of empirical sciences, and some basic ideas connected with the object of the essay. In the concluding parts of the article philosophical comments will be rather short.

A Logic is Referential iff it is Selfextensional

The title of this paper is a theorem, which I am going to state and prove. The theorem extends from prepositional to predicate languages the result I presented in [5].

Theories in Science

From an informal point of view, an empirical theory is a set of empirical laws that govern phenomena of a certain specific kind. Thus, for instance, Mendelian Genetics is a theory of heredity, while Newtonian Particle Mechanics is a theory of mechanical movement of physical bodies.

Polish Logic in Postwar Period

During the 10th Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Florence, August 19–25, 1995), I took part in a panel discussion on the situation of logic in Eastern Europe during the time of Soviet domination. This essay, originally written to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Polish Academy of Sciences1, is primarily based on the paper I presented on that occasion2. The list of people with whom I consulted while preparing first the Florence paper and then the present one is rather long.3 I appreciate the assistance of all of them. My special thanks are due to Wojciech Buszkowski, Andrzej Grzegorczyk, Witold Marciszewski, Wiktor Marek, Roman Murawski, Jerzy Tiuryn and Jan Zygmunt, who in addition to offering various suggestions, remarks and criticism provided me with brief overviews of selected areas of logical investigations carried out by Polish logicians. The postwar Polish logic is too rich and too diversified for one person to be able to present it in an adequate manner, and I would not have been able to complete this paper without these people’s kind assistance. Yet, it goes without saying that the final responsibility for this paper is mine. I tried as far as I was able to evaluate critically all pieces of information I was offered and occasionally revise them. In this manner, the Polish version of this survey was prepared in cooperation with Jan Zygrnunt, who was also the author of the initial draft of its English version. The latter was accessible on the Studia Logica home page for quite some time. Eventually, I rewrote its various parts taking into account suggestions offered to me by its readers. Of those, I particularly appreciate the remarks and comments offered by Z. Adamowicz, J.M. Dunn, W. Marek, R. Murawski, Z. Pawlak, J. van Benthem, and H. Wansing. I also express my gratitude to Tom Brunty who took the effort to polish this translation.

Physics, Theoretical Knowledge and Weinberg's Grand Reductionism

The two main points of this contribution are the following: (1) Applied mathematical theories might complement physical theories in an essential way; some applied mathematical theories allow us to understand phenomena we are unable to explain by resorting to physical theories alone, (2) In the case of social sciences it might be necessary to account for examined phenomena by resorting to the idea of goal-oriented activity (the causal approach typical for natural science might be unsatisfactory). Weinbergs idea of grand reductionism ignores the two above mentioned facts and hence overestimates the foundational role of physics and its methodology.