S Thakchoe

Status of Conventional Truth in Tsong khapa's Madhyamika philosophy

This paper examines how and why conventional truth is, in Tsong khapas view, false and deceptive yet indeed truth that stands shoulder to shoulder with ultimate truth. The first part of the paper establishes the complementary nature of the two truths by responding to the question ‘Why is conventional truth “truth” at all?’ The discussion in the second part examines the uses of conventional discourse within the Mādhyamika philosophical framework—partly by discussing Tsong khapas response to the question ‘Why is conventional truth “false” and “deceptive”?’, and partly by considering his views on the application of the worldly convention within the Prāsangika Mādhyamika system.

Candrakīrti on deflated episodic memory: Response to Endel Tulving’s challenge

ABSTRACT In my response to Ganeris [2018] paper, I take Buddhagoshas deflationary account of episodic memory one step further through the analysis of the Madhyamaka philosopher Candrakīrti (ca. 570-640) who, like Buddhagosha, explicitly defends episodic memory as a recollection of the objects experienced in the past, rather than subjective experience. However, unlike Buddhagosha, Candrakīrti deflates episodic memory by showing the incoherence of the Sautrāntika-Yogācāras thesis that episodic memory requires the admission of reflexive awareness. Also unlike Buddhagosha, Candrakīrti shows the incoherence of the Mimāṁsāka-Naiyāyikas self-implication requirement thesis, therefore directly countering Tulvings challenge to the Buddhist philosophers, by arguing that episodic memory is capable of mental time travel without any reference to the operation of enduring self. I will thus suggest that Candrakīrti may have even greater success in deflating the self-implication requirement of episodic memory.

How many truths? Are there two truths or one in the Tibetan Prāsa[ndot]gika Madhyamaka?

This paper demonstrates that the Tibetan Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka offers both pluralistic and monistic paradigms for interpreting the Buddha’s doctrine of the two truths. Tsong khapa’s interpretation, the paper argues, represents a pluralistic model, while Go rampa’s interpretation represents a monistic model. The arguments are considered through two separate moves. The first move forms the basis for the second. In the first move the paper explores the arguments relating to the ‘basis of the division of the truths’, while the second move integrates the essence of the discussions in the first move to explicitly examine Tsong khapa and Go rampa’s views concerning the key question: Are there really two truths or just one? The debate among the modern interpreters of Madhyamaka philosophy belongs to two different camps: Chr. Lindtner (1986, 321), Jaideva Singh (1989, 52), Stcherbatsky (1998, 19), T. R. V. Murti (1985, xxvi) and the like argue that the Mādhyamika is ontologically absolute and monist about the truth. In their view the Mādhyamika vehemently rejects the validity of conventional truth and upholds ultimate truth as the absolute truth. On the contrary, interpreters such as Kalupahana (1991, 69), Jay Garfield (2002, 24–5), Jeffrey Hopkins (1983, 418–9), Paul William (1996, 71) and Guy Newland (1992, 60)—all maintain that the distinction between the two truths is minimal and strictly epistemological in nature. Conventional and ultimate truth are, in their understanding of Madhyamaka philosophy, mutually entailing—that the two truths are not ontologically hierarchical. Therefore a Mādhyamika is, they hold, not an absolute monist about the truth. This debate, not surprisingly, has been an ongoing phenonenon among the traditional Buddhist thinkers. This paper compares and contrast the two Tibetan Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas—Tsong khapa Blo bzang Grags pa (hereafter Tsong khapa, 1357–1423 A.D.) and Go rampa bSod nams Senge’s (hereafter Go rampa, 1429–1489 A.D.) on issues related to this debate. As we shall see, the comparative analysis will involve their responses to two principle questions. Firstly, ‘what is divided into the two truths?’ or, in other words, ‘what is the basis of the division’ (dbye gzhi, jñeya)? Secondly, ‘are there really two truths or just one?’ These two questions are