Sabien Dobbelaere

Insider power and wage determination in Bulgaria: an econometric investigation

Using a unique three‐digit firm‐level data set of all medium‐ and large‐sized manufacturing enterprises in Bulgaria covering the years 1997/1998, and investigation is conducted into how wage determination is related to ownership status. Building on a slightly modified version of the right‐to‐manage model, the pooled OLS, panel and first‐difference TSLS estimates show statistically significant differences in the share of rents taken by workers employed in state, private domestic and foreign firms. Taking account of firm heterogeneity, it is found that rent sharing is nearly non‐existent in foreign‐owned firms, while the level of pay is higher compared with state‐owned companies. Further, rent sharing seems to be highly pronounced in state‐owned enterprises, while on average domestically private‐owned companies are characterised by less rent sharing. Overall, the robustness checks confirm these findings.

Interaction between product market and labour market power: evidence from France, Belgium and Chile

This article jointly estimates price-cost mark-ups and union bargaining power of manufacturing firms in France, Belgium and Chile. Our GMM results provide strong evidence of price-cost mark-ups being underestimated when labour market imperfections are ignored, corresponding to the omission of the part of product rents captured by the workers.

Collective Bargaining Under Non-Binding Contracts

We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract under binding risk-neutral efficient bargaining. We also demonstrate that our non-cooperative equilibrium wages and profits coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.

Demand Lotteries, Abandonment Options and the Decision to Start R&D and Process Innovation

We study different determinants of real-life R&D decisions within a net present value framework. Besides entry threat, Bertrand competition and multi-stage R&D with an abandonment option, our model includes demand uncertainty, modelled as a lottery. A lottery becomes more divergent when the difference between the outcomes of the lottery increases. We derive under which lottery probabilities more divergent demand lotteries positively or negatively affect the decision to start R&D. Using CIS IV data for about 2600 German firms, we find that for firms facing lotteries where the good state is more likely to prevail a 10% increase in the degree of divergence of the demand lottery increases the likelihood of undertaking R&D by 1.2 percentage points. For firms facing a demand lottery where the bad state is most likely to prevail, a 10% increase in the degree of divergence of the demand lottery decreases the likelihood of undertaking R&D by 4.6 percentage points. Having the option to abandon R&D projects significantly increases the likelihood of undertaking R&D.

Starting an R&D Project under Uncertainty

We study a two-stage R&D project with an abandonment option. Two types of uncertainty influence the decision to start R&D. Demand uncertainty is modelled as a lottery between a proportional increase and decrease in demand. Technical uncertainty is modelled as a lottery between a decrease and increase in the cost to continue R&D. We relate differences in uncertainty to differences in risk premia. We deduct testable hypotheses on the basis of which we empirically analyze the impact of uncertainty on the decision to start an R&D project. Using data for about 4000 German firms in manufacturing and services (CIS IV), our model predictions are strongly confirmed.

The Economics of First-Contract Mediation

This paper provides an economic foundation for non-binding mediation to stimulate first collective bargaining agreements, as implemented in British Columbia since 1993. We show that the outcome of first-contract mediation is Pareto efficient and proves immune to the insider-outsider problem of underhiring. We also demonstrate that equilibrium wages and profits under mediation coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.