Sabine Hügelschäfer

Higher incentives can impair performance: neural evidence on reinforcement and rationality

Standard economic thinking postulates that increased monetary incentives should increase performance. Human decision makers, however, frequently focus on past performance, a form of reinforcement learning occasionally at odds with rational decision making. We used an incentivized belief-updating task from economics to investigate this conflict through measurements of neural correlates of reward processing. We found that higher incentives fail to improve performance when immediate feedback on decision outcomes is provided. Subsequent analysis of the feedback-related negativity, an early event-related potential following feedback, revealed the mechanism behind this paradoxical effect. As incentives increase, the win/lose feedback becomes more prominent, leading to an increased reliance on reinforcement and more errors. This mechanism is relevant for economic decision making and the debate on performance-based payment.

Inertia and Decision Making

Decision inertia is the tendency to repeat previous choices independently of the outcome, which can give rise to perseveration in suboptimal choices. We investigate this tendency in probability-updating tasks. Study 1 shows that, whenever decision inertia conflicts with normatively optimal behavior (Bayesian updating), error rates are larger and decisions are slower. This is consistent with a dual-process view of decision inertia as an automatic process conflicting with a more rational, controlled one. We find evidence of decision inertia in both required and autonomous decisions, but the effect of inertia is more clear in the latter. Study 2 considers more complex decision situations where further conflict arises due to reinforcement processes. We find the same effects of decision inertia when reinforcement is aligned with Bayesian updating, but if the two latter processes conflict, the effects are limited to autonomous choices. Additionally, both studies show that the tendency to rely on decision inertia is positively associated with preference for consistency.

Detecting gender before you know it: How implementation intentions control early gender categorization

Gender categorization is highly automatic. Studies measuring ERPs during the presentation of male and female faces in a categorization task showed that this categorization is extremely quick (around 130ms, indicated by the N170). We tested whether this automatic process can be controlled by goal intentions and implementation intentions. First, we replicated the N170 modulation on gender-incongruent faces as reported in previous research. This effect was only observed in a task in which faces had to be categorized according to gender, but not in a task that required responding to a visual feature added to the face stimuli (the color of a dot) while gender was irrelevant. Second, it turned out that the N170 modulation on gender-incongruent faces was altered if a goal intention was set that aimed at controlling a gender bias. We interpret this finding as an indicator of nonconscious goal pursuit. The N170 modulation was completely absent when this goal intention was furnished with an implementation intention. In contrast, intentions did not alter brain activity at a later time window (P300), which is associated with more complex and rather conscious processes. In line with previous research, the P300 was modulated by gender incongruency even if individuals were strongly involved in another task, demonstrating the automaticity of gender detection. We interpret our findings as evidence that automatic gender categorization that occurs at a very early processing stage can be effectively controlled by intentions.

Cognitive Reflection, Decision Biases, and Response Times.

We present novel evidence on response times and personality traits in standard questions from the decision-making literature where responses are relatively slow (medians around half a minute or above). To this end, we measured response times in a number of incentivized, framed items (decisions from description) including the Cognitive Reflection Test, two additional questions following the same logic, and a number of classic questions used to study decision biases in probability judgments (base-rate neglect, the conjunction fallacy, and the ratio bias). All questions create a conflict between an intuitive process and more deliberative thinking. For each item, we then created a non-conflict version by either making the intuitive impulse correct (resulting in an alignment question), shutting it down (creating a neutral question), or making it dominant (creating a heuristic question). For CRT questions, the differences in response times are as predicted by dual-process theories, with alignment and heuristic variants leading to faster responses and neutral questions to slower responses than the original, conflict questions. For decision biases (where responses are slower), evidence is mixed. To explore the possible influence of personality factors on both choices and response times, we used standard personality scales including the Rational-Experiential Inventory and the Big Five, and used them as controls in regression analysis.