Sachin S. Pandya

The First Liability Insurance Cartel in America, 1896-1906

This article studies the rise and fall of the first liability insurance cartel in the United States. In 1886, insurance companies in America began selling liability insurance for personal injury accidents, primarily to cover business tort liability for employee accidents at work and non-employee injuries occasioned by their business operations. 1 In 1896, the leading liability insurers agreed to fix premium rates and share information on policyholder losses. In 1906, this cartel fell apart. Although largely forgotten until now, the rise and fall of this cartel confirms the expectations of both cartel theory and past studies of insurance cartels, largely in fire insurance, showing how insurers engaged in unstable price-fixing efforts and shared information to better estimate future claims costs. 2 Moreover, this liability insurance cartel offers a

Detecting the Stealth Erosion of Precedent: Affirmative Action after Ricci

This paper presents a method for detecting stealth precedent erosion, i.e., when an appellate court majority deliberately writes the opinion in case y to reduce the scope of its precedent x, but does not expressly refer to precedent x in the opinion. Applying this method, the paper provides a strong basis for concluding that in Ricci v. DeStefano (2009), a United States Supreme Court case decided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court majority eroded by stealth United Steelworkers of America v. Weber (1979), and Johnson v. Transportation Agency (1987), both cases that read Title VII to permit employers to consider race or sex in employment decisions pursuant to affirmative action plans. In so doing, the paper contributes to research on the stare-decisis norm, fills a gap in the growing literature on the Ricci case, and identifies a critical development in the judicial treatment of employer affirmative action plans in the United States.