Sadra Yazdanbod

ETR-Completeness for Decision Versions of Multi-player (Symmetric) Nash Equilibria

As a result of some important works [4, 5, 6, 10, 15], the complexity of 2-player Nash equilibrium is by now well understood, even when equilibria with special properties are desired and when the game is symmetric. However, for multi-player games, when equilibria with special properties are desired, the only result known is due to Schaefer and Stefankovic [18]: that checking whether a 3-player NE (3-Nash) instance has an equilibrium in a ball of radius half in \(l_{\infty }\)-norm is ETR-complete, where ETR is the class Existential Theory of Reals.

The Minimum Vulnerability Problem

We revisit the problem of finding

The computational complexity of genetic diversity

k

∃R-Completeness for Decision Versions of Multi-Player (Symmetric) Nash Equilibria

k paths with a minimum number of shared edges between two vertices of a graph. An edge is called shared if it is used in more than one of the

Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare

k

Forming external behaviors by leveraging internal opinions

k paths. We provide a