Sai Ding

Why has China Grown So Fast? The Role of Physical and Human Capital Formation

Cross-province growth regressions for China are estimated for the reform period. Two research questions are asked. Can the regressions help us to understand why China as a whole has grown so fast? What types of investment matter for Chinas growth? We address the problem of model uncertainty by adopting two approaches to model selection to consider a wide range of candidate predictors of growth. Starting from the baseline equation, the growth impact of physical and human capital is examined using panel data techniques. Both forms of capital promote economic growth. ‘Investment in innovation’ and private investment are found to be particularly important. Secondary school enrolment contributes to growth, and higher education enrolment even more so.

Why Does China Invest So Much

China has had a remarkably high ratio of investment to output ever since economic reform began in 1978, surpassing almost all other economies. This is an important proximate determinant of Chinas high growth rate. This paper gathers together the available evidence to explain why investment is so high: factors both on the demand and on the supply side, and in the latter case the availability of both resources and funds. It analyzes the rate of return on capital and its evolution, and the factors that have kept it up. It draws on the literature to explain the high saving rate, and considers why the imperfect capital market and institutional deficiencies have not constrained investment. The state-owned and private sectors are treated separately because of their different objectives, behavior, and funding.

Does China overinvest? Evidence from a panel of Chinese firms

This paper uses a dataset of more than 100,000 firms over the period of 2000–2007 to assess whether and why Chinese firms overinvest. We find that corporate investment is more efficient in the non-state sector. Within all ownership categories, we uncover evidence indicating a degree of overinvestment among firms that invest more than their industry median or more than their predicted optimal investment. The free cash flow hypothesis provides a good explanation for China’s overinvestment in the non-state sectors, whereas in the state sector, overinvestment is attributable to the poor screening and monitoring of enterprises by banks.

Negative investment in China: financing constraints and restructuring versus growth

This paper attempts to address a puzzle in China’s investment pattern: despite high aggregate investment and remarkable economic growth, negative net investment is commonly found at the microeconomic level. Using a large firm-level dataset, we test three hypotheses to explain the existence and extent of negative investment in each ownership group: what we term the efficiency (or restructuring) hypothesis, the (lack of) financing hypothesis, and the (slow) growth hypothesis. Our panel data probit estimations shows that negative investment by state-owned firms can be explained mainly by inefficiency: owing to over-investment or mis-investment in the past, these firms have had to restructure and to get rid of obsolete capital in the face of increasing competition and hardening budgets. The financing explanation holds for private firms, which have had to divest in order to raise capital. However, rapid economic growth weighs against both effects in all types of firms, with a larger impact for firms in the private and foreign sectors. A tobit model, estimated to examine the determinants of the amount of negative investment, yields similar conclusions.