Sally Blount

Preference Reversals between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Options: A Review and Theoretical Analysis

Arguably, all judgments and decisions are made in 1 (or some combination) of 2 basic evaluation modes-joint evaluation mode (JE), in which multiple options are presented simultaneously and evaluated comparatively, or separate evaluation mode (SE), in which options are presented in isolation and evaluated separately. This article reviews recent literature showing that people evaluated options differently and exhibit reversals of preferences for options between JE and SE. The authors propose an explanation for the JE/SE reversal based on a principle called the evaluability hypothesis. The hypothesis posits that it is more diffecult to evaluate the desirability of values on some attributes than on others and that, compared with easy-to-evaluate attributes, difficult-to-evaluate attributes have a greater impact in JE than in SE.

FAIR MARKET IDEOLOGY: ITS COGNITIVE-MOTIVATIONAL UNDERPINNINGS

Public opinion research shows that most people espouse egalitarian ideals and acknowledge substantial income inequality in society, but they consistently perceive the economic system to be highly fair and legitimate. In an attempt to better understand this paradox by considering the cognitive and motivational bases of ideological support for the free market system, we draw on and integrate a number of social psychological theories suggesting that people want to believe that the systems and institutions that affect them are fair, legitimate, and justified. We have developed an instrument for measuring fair market ideology, and we have found in several samples that its endorsement is associated with self-deception, economic system justification, opposition to equality, power distance orientation, belief in a just world, political conservatism, right-wing authoritarianism, and scandal minimization. We also present evidence that people evince a system-justifying tendency to judge profitable companies to be more ethical than unprofitable companies. In addition, results from an experimental study we conducted in Hungary indicate that support for the free market system is strongest among people who score high in self-deception under conditions of system threat, suggesting the presence of a (nonrational) defensive motivation. Finally, we discuss several organizational and societal implications of the tendency to idealize market mechanisms and to view market-generated outcomes as inherently fair.

The Claiming Effect: Why Players Are More Generous in Social Dilemmas Than in Ultimatum Games

The term procedural frames is introduced and defined as different representations of structurally equivalent allocation processes. Study 1 compared 2 well-known games, sequential social dilemmas and ultimatum bargaining, that share the same structure: Player 1 creates an allocation of a resource and Player 2 decides whether to allow it or deny it. Study 1 found that Player 1 made more favorable allocations and Player 2 accepted more unfavorable allocations in a social dilemma frame than in an equivalent ultimatum bargaining frame. Study 2 revealed the critical deterininant was whether Player 2 had to respond to an allocation by accepting or rejecting it (as in the ultimatum game) or by making a claim (as in the social dilemma). Two additional studies explored how these actions are perceived. The inconsistency of behavior across procedural frames raises methodological concerns but illuminates construal processes that guide allocation. Two of the most-studied paradigms in mixed-motive research have been social dilemmas and ultimatum bargaining games (Komorita & Parks, 1995). These allocation procedures differ substantially in how the actions of participants are described. In ultimatum bargaining games, players propose a division of a common resource and accept or reject the proposal; in social dilemmas, players make a claim from a common resource. However, versions of these games have been developed that are structurally equivalent but that appear to induce different rates of cooperation. Players appear to be more generous in sequential social dilemmas than in ultimatum bargaining games. The following research tests the existence of the social dilemma-ultimatu m bargaining framing effect. The findings offer insight into a specific bias in bargaining, which we call the claiming effect, as well as the more general role that the subjective interpretation of action plays in allocation decisions.

Explaining how preferences change across joint versus separate evaluation

Abstract This paper examines how preferences for outcomes change across joint versus separate evaluation of alternatives. In joint evaluation, two (or more) options are presented and evaluated simultaneously. In separate evaluation, each option is presented and evaluated separately. We review a growing body of evidence demonstrating this type of preference shift and discuss how it is different from existing biases and preference reversals documented in the literature. We then review and integrate three competing explanations for this type of preferential inconsistency.

THE MESSENGER BIAS: A RELATIONAL MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE VALUATION

Abstract How do managers value the knowledge that they encounter in organizations? A rational perspective assumes that managers carefully and accurately cull the best knowledge from their environments, while a random model situates managers in a chaotic organization, filled with preferences and solutions that are temporally matched. This paper develops a third view, a relational perspective, which describes how social relationships between knowledge messengers and knowledge receivers affect the way that managers evaluate new knowledge. We begin by focusing on two key dimensions of relational perception: social identification and threat appraisals. We then use these dimensions to derive a typology of six “relational schemas” that are commonly perceived between knowledge messengers and knowledge receivers at work. Next, we reveal how, holding knowledge content constant, these relational schemas bias the ways in which managers evaluate new knowledge. While network research demonstrates that relationships determine which knowledge managers see, this paper demonstrates that these relationships also have psychological implications by affecting how managers evaluate the knowledge that they see.

Fair-Market Ideology: Its Cognitive-Motivational Underpinnings

Public opinion research shows that most people espouse egalitarian ideals and acknowledge substantial income inequality in society, but they consistently perceive the economic system to be highly fair and legitimate. In an attempt to better understand this paradox by considering the cognitive and motivational bases of ideological support for the free market system, we draw on and integrate a number of social psychological theories suggesting that people want to believe that the systems and institutions that affect them are fair, legitimate, and justified. We have developed an instrument for measuring fair market ideology, and we have found in several samples that its endorsement is associated with self-deception, economic system justification, opposition to equality, power distance orientation, belief in a just world, political conservatism, right-wing authoritarianism, and scandal minimization. We also present evidence that people evince a system-justifying tendency to judge profitable companies to be more ethical than unprofitable companies. In addition, results from an experimental study we conducted in Hungary indicate that support for the free market system is strongest among people who score high in self-deception under conditions of system threat, suggesting the presence of a (nonrational) defensive motivation. Finally, we discuss several organizational and societal implications of the tendency to idealize market mechanisms and to view market-generated outcomes as inherently fair.

Individual Temporality in the Workplace: How Individuals Perceive and Value Time at Work

This chapter draws from psychological and organizational research to develop a conceptual model of individual temporality in the workplace. We begin by outlining several general cognitive and motivational aspects of human temporal processing, emphasizing its reliance on (a) contextual cues for temporal perception and (b) cognitive reference points for temporal evaluation. We then discuss how an individuals personal life context combines with the organizational context to shape how individuals situate their time at work through: (1) the adoption of socially constructed temporal schemas of the future; (2) the creation of personal work plans and schedules that segment and allocate ones own time looking forward; and (3) the selection of temporal referents associated with realizing specific, valued outcomes and events. Together, these elements shape how individuals perceive and evaluate their time at work and link personal time use to the broader goals of the organization.

The role of status differentials in group synchronization

Drawing from findings in sociology and anthropology on time as a symbol of status, this paper examines the role that status differentials affect how group members internally align the pace of their activities over time (group synchronization). We examine the psychological process of group synchronization from the perspective of the individual, the nature of status differentials in work groups, and how one’s status within a group affects a person’s willingness to adjust the timing of his/her activities to match other people’s timing. We then identify three types of status structures within work groups and analyze how each affects the group’s ability to synchronize. We close by considering the implications of our approach for better understanding temporal dynamics in work groups.

TIME IN GROUPS: AN INTRODUCTION

Conference presentations covered a broad range of topics. For example, Brett, Weingart and Olekans presented work that examines patterns in how group negotiations unfold over time; while Chen, Blount and Sanchez-Burks explored how group status structures influence how members align the pace of their tasks within a group. Zellmer-Bruhn, Waller and Ancona initiated the study of how groups can use pauses in work cycles to break out of embedded routines; while Medvec, Berger, Liljenquist and Neale sought to examine how organizational work groups can avoid the pitfalls of short-term time pressure in decision making.