Salvador Parrado

Activating Citizens to Participate in Collective Co-Production of Public Services

User and community co-production of public services first became topical in the late 1970s, both in private and public sectors. Recent interest has been triggered by recognition that the outcomes for which public agencies strive rely on multiple stakeholders, particularly service users and the communities in which they live. Extra salience has been given to the potential of co-production due to fiscal pressures facing governments since 2008. However, there has been little quantitative empirical research on citizen co-production behaviours. The authors therefore undertook a large-sample survey in five European countries to fill this gap. This article examines an especially significant finding from this research – the major gulf between current levels of collective co-production and individual co-production. It explores the drivers of these large differences and examines what the social policy implications would be if, given the potential benefits, the government wishes to encourage greater collective co-production.

Failed policies but institutional innovation through “layering” and “diffusion” in Spanish central administration

Purpose – This paper aims to show that the Spanish central administration, as a representative of the Napoleonic tradition, has undergone considerable managerial changes in non‐autonomous and semi‐autonomous agencies characterised by their direct involvement in service delivery in spite of the failure of macro‐changes and radical reforms of public administration.Design/methodology/approach – This paper provides case studies of “paths” of changes in three organisations.Findings – Through “layering” and “diffusion” of institutions as social mechanisms included in the historical new institutionalism account for innovation, specific organisations like the tax agency, social security and property registry have become more managerial in a state dominated by public law.Research limitations/implications – More in‐depth case studies would make possible generalisation of how small changes can produce similar impacts or results than reform efforts at the macro‐level.Originality/value – The use of historical neo‐inst...

The role of Spanish central government in a multi-level State

The Spanish polity has made the transition in the last three decades from a centralized system to a quasi-federal one characterized as having features of a shared power model with overlapping powers among levels of government. The new system has implied a change in the functions of central government from service delivery to planning and policy design. Enquiring beyond the hierarchy—non-hierarchy role of central government of intergovernmental studies, this article applies control concepts of oversight, mutuality, competition and contrived randomness from grid & group cultural theory in order to empirically examine the evolution of the role of central government in intergovernmental relations. Although the institutional features of the Spanish polity are expected to foster cooperative intergovernmental relations and a brokerage role of central government fostering mutual (peer) relations of the regions, the text suggests that institutional praxis and the ‘youth’ of the Spanish decentralization process are accountable for the direction taken by the Spanish polity. The system is characterized by central government still embedded in the inertia of oversight (with examples of fostering mutuality at times and in some policy fields) and by the regions seeking unilateralism through contrived randomness. Points for practitioners This text tries to unveil two distinct aspects of central government’s role in intergovernmental relations. First, it crosses the traditional axis (hierarchy and autonomy) between central/federal government and the regions/states when examining intergovernmental relations by including cases of competition and collegiality among the constituent parts. Second, it assumes that early stages of intergovernmental relations are likely to be conflictual regardless of the formal (cooperative) institutional design of the system. By acknowledging this, promoters of decentralization should be aware not only of the formal aspects of cooperation, but also of the informal mechanisms for building up cooperative practices.

The institutionalization of meritocracy in Latin American regulatory agencies

Research into 72 regulatory authorities in four policy sectors (pharmacy, telecommunications, finances and pensions) in 18 Latin American countries shows that the institutionalization of meritocratic practices in the recruitment and careers of its staff has not been widespread, even in countries with a professionalized bureaucracy. The implementation of meritocracy could be partially explained through the policy sector and the influence of epistemic communities while alternative explanations like administrative legacies or the autonomy of the regulatory authorities to devise and implement personnel policies play a less important role. The institutionalization of meritocracy in ‘islands of excellence’ has policy implications for sustained merit-based strategies for the civil service. Points for practitioners This research has shown that the institutionalization of meritocracy is not widespread when considering recruitment and staff careers in 72 regulatory Latin American agencies. Successful meritocratic practices are partially explained by the policy sector in which these agencies operate. Economic regulated sectors (financial services, delivery of pensions and telecommunications) are more meritocratic than social regulated areas (pharmacy). Two explanations have been offered for this. On the one hand, meritocracy seems to be influenced by particular epistemic communities in which competition plays an important role (for instance, economists). On the other hand, agencies need to increase their credibility and attract the confidence of international donors and private regulated enterprises. These findings suggest that the introduction of meritocracy could be more successfully approached through a more individualized process (i.e. by targeting individual agencies) instead of launching overall civil service reforms with uncertain consequences.

Agents never become stewards: explaining the lack of innovation in public–private partnerships:

Design–Build–Finance–Maintain–Operate contracts, as a specific public–private partnership, supposedly provide opportunities for innovation due to the long-term perspective, the use of output specifications and the collaborative environment. The literature suggests that the dynamics between procurers and consortia influence the actual contribution of these conditions to innovative practices. We therefore assess in three cases in the Netherlands and Spain how and to what extent the relationship between procurers and consortia affect these three conditions and therewith the possibilities for realising innovation and for capturing economic and social value. Findings show that the potential of Design–Build–Finance–Maintain–Operate contracts for innovation is hampered because procurers and consortia behave like principals and agents who distrust each other and who let short-term self-interested goals prevail over long-term pro-organisational goals. The cases have shown that the limited realisation of innovation and less-than-expected value generation seem to be due to the absence of a clear scheme that allows for capturing value. Points for practitioners • Potential innovation in Design–Build–Finance–Maintain–Operate contracts is restricted to the building of the infrastructure and the early operational phases of the contract because renegotiation clauses are normally too rigid. •   An adequate system to work out financial risks that create economic value for the contractor are needed to produce social value through innovation. • The contract needs to work out a ‘binding’ collaboration scheme among the consortium members to reap the benefits of innovation.

User and Community Coproduction of Public Services: What Influences Citizens to Coproduce?

The traditional concept of the state, as represented by Max Weber’s model of bureaucracy, is characterized by hierarchical and rule-based decision making and by public service delivery through government agencies. However, hierarchical authority is no longer the dominant element of the state, as participatory structures and processes in public administration have emerged. Coproduction is a core element in the institutional order of the participatory state.