Samson Lasaulce

Methodologies for analyzing equilibria in wireless games

Non exhaustive methodologies for characterizing equilibria in wireless games in terms of existence, uniqueness, selection, and efficiency are provided. The paper will focus on technical problems arising at the physical and medium access layers of a wireless network, and not on economic aspects related to it, like the auction problem for spectrum, even though it is also an important scenario where game theory is used.

On the Capacity Achieving Covariance Matrix for Rician MIMO Channels: An Asymptotic Approach

In this paper, the capacity-achieving input covariance matrices for coherent block-fading correlated multiple input multiple output (MIMO) Rician channels are determined. In contrast with the Rayleigh and uncorrelated Rician cases, no closed-form expressions for the eigenvectors of the optimum input covariance matrix are available. Classically, both the eigenvectors and eigenvalues are computed numerically and the corresponding optimization algorithms remain computationally very demanding. In the asymptotic regime where the number of transmit and receive antennas converge to infinity at the same rate, new results related to the accuracy of the approximation of the average mutual information are provided. Based on the accuracy of this approximation, an attractive optimization algorithm is proposed and analyzed. This algorithm is shown to yield an effective way to compute the capacity achieving matrix for the average mutual information and numerical simulation results show that, even for a moderate number of transmit and receive antennas, the new approach provides the same results as direct maximization approaches of the average mutual information.

Introducing hierarchy in energy games

In this work, we introduce hierarchy in wireless networks that can be modeled by a decentralized multiple access channel and for which energy-efficiency is the main performance index. In these networks users are free to choose their power control strategy to selfishly maximize their energy-efficiency. Specifically, we introduce hierarchy in two different ways: 1. Assuming single-user decoding at the receiver, we investigate a Stackelberg formulation of the game where one user is the leader whereas the other users are assumed to be able to react to the leaders decisions; 2. Assuming neither leader nor followers among the users, we introduce hierarchy by assuming successive interference cancellation at the receiver. It is shown that introducing a certain degree of hierarchy in non-cooperative power control games not only improves the individual energy efficiency of all the users but can also be a way of insuring the existence of a non-saturated equilibrium and reaching a desired trade-off between the global network performance at the equilibrium and the requested amount of signaling. In this respect, the way of measuring the global performance of an energy-efficient network is shown to be a critical issue.

Opportunistic interference alignment in MIMO interference channels

We present two interference alignment techniques such that an opportunistic point-to-point multiple input multiple output (MIMO) link can reuse, without generating any additional interference, the same frequency band of a similar pre-existing primary link. In this scenario, we exploit the fact that under power constraints, although each radio maximizes independently its rate by water-filling on their channel transfer matrix singular values, frequently, not all of them are used. Therefore, by aligning the interference of the opportunistic radio it is possible to transmit at a significant rate while insuring zero-interference on the pre-existing link. We propose a linear pre-coder for a perfect interference alignment and a power allocation scheme which maximizes the individual data rate of the secondary link. Our numerical results show that significant data rates are achieved even for a reduced number of antennas.

Energy-Efficient Precoding for Multiple-Antenna Terminals

The problem of energy-efficient precoding is investigated when the terminals in the system are equipped with multiple antennas. Considering static and fast-fading multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channels, the energy-efficiency is defined as the transmission rate to power ratio and shown to be maximized at low transmit power. The most interesting case is the one of slow fading MIMO channels. For this type of channels, the optimal precoding scheme is generally not trivial. Furthermore, using all the available transmit power is not always optimal in the sense of energy-efficiency [which, in this case, corresponds to the communication-theoretic definition of the goodput-to-power (GPR) ratio]. Finding the optimal precoding matrices is shown to be a new open problem and is solved in several special cases: 1. when there is only one receive antenna; 2. in the low or high signal-to-noise ratio regime; 3. when uniform power allocation and the regime of large numbers of antennas are assumed. A complete numerical analysis is provided to illustrate the derived results and stated conjectures. In particular, the impact of the number of antennas on the energy-efficiency is assessed and shown to be significant.

A Repeated Game Formulation of Energy-Efficient Decentralized Power Control

Decentralized multiple access channels where each transmitter wants to selfishly maximize this transmission energy-efficiency are considered. Transmitters are assumed to choose freely their power control policy and interact (through multiuser interference) several times. It is shown that the corresponding conflict of interest can have a predictable outcome, namely a finitely or discounted repeated game equilibrium. Remarkably, it is shown that this equilibrium is Pareto-efficient under reasonable sufficient conditions and the corresponding decentralized power control policies can be implemented under realistic information assumptions: only individual channel state information and a public signal are required to implement the equilibrium strategies. Explicit equilibrium conditions are derived in terms of minimum number of game stages or maximum discount factor. Both analytical and simulation results are provided to compare the performance of the proposed power control policies with those already existing and exploiting the same information assumptions namely, those derived for the one-shot and Stackelberg games.

Power allocation games for mimo multiple access channels with coordination

A game theoretic approach is used to derive the optimal decentralized power allocation (PA) in fast fading multiple access channels where the transmitters and receiver are equipped with multiple antennas. The players (the mobile terminals) are free to choose their PA in order to maximize their individual transmission rates (in particular they can ignore some specified centralized policies). A simple coordination mechanism between users is introduced. The nature and influence of this mechanism is studied in detail. The coordination signal indicates to the users the order in which the receiver applies successive interference cancellation and the frequency at which this order is used. Two different games are investigated: the users can either adapt their temporal PA to their decoding rank at the receiver or optimize their spatial PA between their transmit antennas. For both games a thorough analysis of the existence, uniqueness and sum-rate efficiency of the network Nash equilibrium is conducted. Analytical and simulation results are provided to assess the gap between the decentralized network performance and its equivalent virtual multiple input multiple output system, which is shown to be zero in some cases and relatively small in general.

Learning equilibria with partial information in decentralized wireless networks

In this article, a survey of several important equilibrium concepts for decentralized networks is presented. The term decentralized is used here to refer to scenarios where decisions (e.g., choosing a power allocation policy) are taken autonomously by devices interacting with each other (e.g., through mutual interference). The iterative long-term interaction is characterized by stable points of the wireless network called equilibria. The interest in these equilibria stems from the relevance of network stability and the fact that they can be achieved by letting radio devices to repeatedly interact over time. To achieve these equilibria, several learning techniques - the best response dynamics, fictitious play, smoothed fictitious play, reinforcement learning algorithms, and regret matching - are discussed in terms of information requirements and convergence properties. Most of the notions introduced here, for both equilibria and learning schemes, are illustrated by a simple case study, an interference channel with two transmitter-receiver pairs.

Distributed Learning Policies for Power Allocation in Multiple Access Channels

We analyze the power allocation problem for orthogonal multiple access channels by means of a non-cooperative potential game in which each user distributes his power over the channels available to him. When the channels are static, we show that this game possesses a unique equilibrium; moreover, if the networks users follow a distributed learning scheme based on the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory, then they converge to equilibrium exponentially fast. On the other hand, if the channels fluctuate stochastically over time, the associated game still admits a unique equilibrium, but the learning process is not deterministic; just the same, by employing the theory of stochastic approximation, we find that users still converge to equilibrium. Our theoretical analysis hinges on a novel result which is of independent interest: in finite-player games which admit a (possibly nonlinear) convex potential, the replicator dynamics converge to an e-neighborhood of an equilibrium in time O(\log(1/e)).

Quality-Of-Service Provisioning in Decentralized Networks: A Satisfaction Equilibrium Approach

This paper introduces a particular game formulation and its corresponding notion of equilibrium, namely the satisfaction form (SF) and the satisfaction equilibrium (SE). A game in SF models the case where players are uniquely interested in the satisfaction of some individual performance constraints, instead of individual performance optimization. Under this formulation, the notion of equilibrium corresponds to the situation where all players can simultaneously satisfy their individual constraints. The notion of SE, models the problem of QoS provisioning in decentralized self-configuring networks. Here, radio devices are satisfied if they are able to provide the requested QoS. Within this framework, the concept of SE is formalized for both pure and mixed strategies considering finite sets of players and actions. In both cases, sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the SE are presented. When multiple SE exist, we introduce the idea of effort or cost of satisfaction and we propose a refinement of the SE, namely the efficient SE (ESE). At the ESE, all players adopt the action which requires the lowest effort for satisfaction. A learning method that allows radio devices to achieve a SE in pure strategies in finite time and requiring only one-bit feedback is also presented. Finally, a power control game in the interference channel is used to highlight the advantages of modeling QoS problems following the notion of SE rather than other equilibrium concepts, e.g., generalized Nash equilibrium.