Samson Yemane Hadush

Offshore wind power generation and transmission tariff design options

The aim of this study is to conduct a comparative evaluation of different transmission tariff design options and to draw conclusions for offshore wind power generation (OFWG) investment. The study uses a transmission expansion planning (TEP) model to evaluate the cost and the resulting cost is allocated to grid users using four cost allocation methods: Postage Stamp (PS), Marginal Participation (MP), Aumann-Shapley (AS) and Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC). Cost allocations are made for all possible combinations of Generation-Load (G-L) split. Numerical case studies were provided using 4 and 12 node network. Results show that LRMC, MP and AS send economic signals but with different levels of strength where the LRMC is superior. However, this might put the development of offshore wind generation at stake. For OWPG, PS is found to be the most attractive method. Furthermore, the cost allocation results and the ranking of the methods are sensitive to G-L split.

The Effect of Welfare Distribution and Cost Allocation on Offshore Grid Design

Innovative offshore grid designs such as integrating offshore wind farms (OWFs) with interconnectors are gaining popularity. Adequate investment in these designs requires aligning the interest of stakeholders through an appropriate cost allocation method. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it shows how welfare distribution can influence a stakeholders offshore grid design choice. Second, it evaluates the effect of various cost allocation schemes in aligning diverse stakeholder interests toward efficient grid design. The results confirm that an investment in an efficient offshore grid design may not be guaranteed as long as the chosen cost allocation method ignores the welfare distribution effect. Most methods fail in this regard. Even when they provide cost incentives, they do not always ensure cooperation. Cognizant of this limitation, this study proposes a method that allocates costs in proportion to the incremental net benefit (PINB) of each stakeholder. This method reflects both the distribution of welfare and cost savings.

TSO-TSO seams issues

The UK model of incentive regulation of power grids was at one time the most advanced, and elements of it were adopted throughout the EU. This model worked well, particularly in the context of limited investment and innovation, a single and strong regulatory authority, and limited coordination between foreign grid operators. This enlightening book shows that since 2010 the whole context has changed and regulation has had to catch-up and evolve. The EU is entering a wave of investment, and an era of new services and innovation which has created growing tensions between national regulatory authorities in terms of coordinating technical standards and distribution systems. This is being played out against an increasingly disruptive backdrop of digitzation, new market platforms and novel business models.The UK model of incentive regulation of power grids was at one time the most advanced, and elements of it were adopted throughout the EU. This model worked well, particularly in the context of limited investment and innovation, a single and strong regulatory authority, and limited coordination between foreign grid operators. This enlightening book shows that since 2010 the whole context has changed and regulation has had to catch-up and evolve. The EU is entering a wave of investment, and an era of new services and innovation which has created growing tensions between national regulatory authorities in terms of coordinating technical standards and distribution systems. This is being played out against an increasingly disruptive backdrop of digitzation, new market platforms and novel business models.The UK model of incentive regulation of power grids was at one time the most advanced, and elements of it were adopted throughout the EU. This model worked well, particularly in the context of limited investment and innovation, a single and strong regulatory authority, and limited coordination between foreign grid operators. This enlightening book shows that since 2010 the whole context has changed and regulation has had to catch-up and evolve. The EU is entering a wave of investment, and an era of new services and innovation which has created growing tensions between national regulatory authorities in terms of coordinating technical standards and distribution systems. This is being played out against an increasingly disruptive backdrop of digitzation, new market platforms and novel business models.The UK model of incentive regulation of power grids was at one time the most advanced, and elements of it were adopted throughout the EU. This model worked well, particularly in the context of limited investment and innovation, a single and strong regulatory authority, and limited coordination between foreign grid operators. This enlightening book shows that since 2010 the whole context has changed and regulation has had to catch-up and evolve. The EU is entering a wave of investment, and an era of new services and innovation which has created growing tensions between national regulatory authorities in terms of coordinating technical standards and distribution systems. This is being played out against an increasingly disruptive backdrop of digitzation, new market platforms and novel business models.The UK model of incentive regulation of power grids was at one time the most advanced, and elements of it were adopted throughout the EU. This model worked well, particularly in the context of limited investment and innovation, a single and strong regulatory authority, and limited coordination between foreign grid operators. This enlightening book shows that since 2010 the whole context has changed and regulation has had to catch-up and evolve. The EU is entering a wave of investment, and an era of new services and innovation which has created growing tensions between national regulatory authorities in terms of coordinating technical standards and distribution systems. This is being played out against an increasingly disruptive backdrop of digitzation, new market platforms and novel business models.

Locational signals in electricity market design: Do they really matter?

This study identifies potential electricity market design (EMD) approaches of sending Locational Signals (LS) that guide the location of generation plants. The stability, predictability and strength of LS from each approach are evaluated using cases from European electricity market. Additionally, important LS outside EMD are identified and compared against the signals from EMD. The paper concludes that LS from EMD do not always matter. Policy makers should be aware of the many factors influencing generation investments when setting up or changing an EMD and assess the potential of the envisaged incentives in relation with other incentives within and outside the EMD.