Sanae Okamoto-Barth

Do chimpanzees learn reputation by observation? Evidence from direct and indirect experience with generous and selfish strangers.

Can chimpanzees learn the reputation of strangers indirectly by observation? Or are such stable behavioral attributions made exclusively by first-person interactions? To address this question, we let seven chimpanzees observe unfamiliar humans either consistently give (generous donor) or refuse to give (selfish donor) food to a familiar human recipient (Experiments 1 and 2) and a conspecific (Experiment 3). While chimpanzees did not initially prefer to beg for food from the generous donor (Experiment 1), after continued opportunities to observe the same behavioral exchanges, four chimpanzees developed a preference for gesturing to the generous donor (Experiment 2), and transferred this preference to novel unfamiliar donor pairs, significantly preferring to beg from the novel generous donors on the first opportunity to do so. In Experiment 3, four chimpanzees observed novel selfish and generous acts directed toward other chimpanzees by human experimenters. During the first half of testing, three chimpanzees exhibited a preference for the novel generous donor on the first trial. These results demonstrate that chimpanzees can infer the reputation of strangers by eavesdropping on third-party interactions.

Value Signals in the Prefrontal Cortex Predict Individual Preferences across Reward Categories

Humans can choose between fundamentally different options, such as watching a movie or going out for dinner. According to the utility concept, put forward by utilitarian philosophers and widely used in economics, this may be accomplished by mapping the value of different options onto a common scale, independent of specific option characteristics (Fehr and Rangel, 2011; Levy and Glimcher, 2012). If this is the case, value-related activity patterns in the brain should allow predictions of individual preferences across fundamentally different reward categories. We analyze fMRI data of the prefrontal cortex while subjects imagine the pleasure they would derive from items belonging to two distinct reward categories: engaging activities (like going out for drinks, daydreaming, or doing sports) and snack foods. Support vector machines trained on brain patterns related to one category reliably predict individual preferences of the other category and vice versa. Further, we predict preferences across participants. These findings demonstrate that prefrontal cortex value signals follow a common scale representation of value that is even comparable across individuals and could, in principle, be used to predict choice.

Tracking and Inferring Spatial Rotation by Children and Great Apes

Finding hidden objects in space is a fundamental ability that has received considerable research attention from both a developmental and a comparative perspective. Tracking the rotational displacements of containers and hidden objects is a particularly challenging task. This study investigated the ability of 3-, 5-, 7-, and 9-year-old children and great apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans) to (a) visually track rotational displacements of a baited container on a platform and (b) infer its displacements by using the changes of position or orientation of 3 landmarks: an object on a container, the color of the containers, and the color of the platform on which the containers rested. Great apes and 5-year-old and older children successfully tracked visible rotations, but only children were able to infer the location of a correct cup (with the help of landmarks) after invisible rotations. The ability to use landmarks changed with age so that younger children solved this task only with the most explicit marker on the baited container, whereas older children, particularly 9-year-olds, were able to use landmark orientation to infer correct locations.

Development of using experimenter‐given cues in infant chimpanzees: longitudinal changes in behavior and cognitive development

The use of gaze shifts as social cues has various evolutionary advantages. To investigate the developmental processes of this ability, we conducted an object-choice task by using longitudinal methods with infant chimpanzees tested from 8 months old until 3 years old. The experimenter used one of six gestures towards a cup concealing food; tapping, touching, whole-hand pointing, gazing plus close-pointing, distant-pointing, close-gazing, and distant-gazing. Unlike any other previous study, we analyzed the behavioral changes that occurred before and after choosing the cup. We assumed that pre-choice behavior indicates the development of an attentional and spatial connection between a pointing cue and an object (e.g. Woodward, 2005); and post-choice behavior indicates the emergence of object permanence (e.g. Piaget, 1954). Our study demonstrated that infant chimpanzees begin to use experimenter-given cues with age (after 11 months of age). Moreover, the results from the behavioral analysis showed that the infants gradually developed the spatial link between the pointing as an object-directed action and the object. Moreover, when they were 11 months old, the infants began to inspect the inside of the cup, suggesting the onset of object permanence. Overall, our results imply that the ability to use the cues is developing and mutually related with other cognitive developments. The present study also suggests what the standard object-choice task actually measures by breaking the task down into the developmental trajectories of its component parts, and describes for the first time the social-physical cognitive development during the task with a longitudinal method.

Human Cognitive Specializations

What makes the human mind different from the minds of other animals? Here, the cognitive abilities of human and nonhuman primates are compared and contrasted in three general domains: (1) self-awareness, (2) social cognition, and (3) physical cognition. Our analysis of the data is framed in terms of an overarching theory of human cognitive specialization. We postulate that many aspects of the human and the nonhuman primate mind are remarkably conserved. As a result, human and nonhuman primates share many cognitive and behavioral capabilities. However, we will argue that, despite the many similarities between the human and nonhuman mind, one fundamental feature of our species’ psychology is its ability to interpret observable variables in terms of unobservable (causal) forces. Consequently, although animals can develop rules premised on observable causes, humans can reason about both observable and unobservable causes, resulting in the kind of cognitive and behavioral flexibility that characterizes our species.

Building the Leviathan--Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humans.

The prevalence of cooperation among humans is puzzling because cooperators can be exploited by free riders. Peer punishment has been suggested as a solution to this puzzle, but cumulating evidence questions its robustness in sustaining cooperation. Amongst others, punishment fails when it is not powerful enough, or when it elicits counter-punishment. Existing research, however, has ignored that the distribution of punishment power can be the result of social interactions. We introduce a novel experiment in which individuals can transfer punishment power to others. We find that while decentralised peer punishment fails to overcome free riding, the voluntary transfer of punishment power enables groups to sustain cooperation. This is achieved by non-punishing cooperators empowering those who are willing to punish in the interest of the group. Our results show how voluntary power centralisation can efficiently sustain cooperation, which could explain why hierarchical power structures are widespread among animals and humans.