Sandra Cavaco

CSR and financial performance: complementarity between environmental, social and business behaviours

This article analyses the interactions between various dimensions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) that mediate the relationship between CSR and financial performance. We hypothesize that the absence of consensus in the empirical literature on the CSR–financial performance relationship may be explained by the existence of synergies (complementarity) and trade-offs (substitutability) between the different CSR components. We investigate such relationship using a final unbalanced panel sample of 1094 observations (around 300 firms per year) from 15 countries over the 2002–2007 period. Our results show that responsible behaviours towards employees (human resources dimension) and towards customers and suppliers (business behaviour dimension) appear as complementary inputs of financial performance, indicating mutual benefits and less conflict between those stakeholders. Conversely, responsible behaviours towards customers and suppliers and towards the environment appear as substitutable inputs of financial performance, suggesting more conflict between or over-investment towards those stakeholders.

Board independence and operating performance: analysis on (French) company and individual data

ABSTRACT This article studies the relationship between board independence and firm operating performance in French listed companies. We take advantage of an original database, with a time-series dimension that can be used to mitigate heterogeneity and dynamic endogeneity issues. In addition, this database can be disaggregated at the individual (director) level. This design enables us to introduce firm fixed effects and individual fixed effects in firm performance equations, thereby controlling for heterogeneity at the firm and individual levels. Our main result is to document a significant negative relationship between independence and accounting performance. This result suggests that, in the French context, the costs of independence (i.e. the informational gap supported by independent directors compared to insiders and affiliated directors) outweigh the benefits of independence (i.e. the reduction in agency costs).