Sandra L. Suárez

Explaining the Global Digital Divide: Economic, Political and Sociological Drivers of Cross-National Internet Use

We argue that the global digital divide, as measured by cross-national differences in Internet use, is the result of the economic, regulatory and sociopolitical characteristics of countries and their evolution over time. We predict Internet use to increase with world-system status, privatization and competition in the telecommunications sector, democracy and cosmopolitanism. Using data on 118 countries from 1997 through 2001, we find relatively robust support for each of our hypotheses. We conclude by exploring the implications of this new, powerful communication medium for the global political economy and for the spread of democracy around the world.

Developing the Internet: entrepreneurship and public policy in Ireland, Singapore, Argentina, and Spain

The Internet has not developed uniformly throughout the world. Data on 141 countries indicate that, after controlling for per capita income and installed telephone lines, cross-national differences in the numbers of Internet users and hosts have to do with favorable conditions for entrepreneurship and investment. We find little evidence that competition and privatization of telecommunications services matters. After examining international patterns of development for the world as a whole, differences between two matched pairs of countries are systematically compared: Ireland and Singapore, and Argentina and Spain. Patterns of entrepreneurship and public policy in each country are shown to have differed systematically, with distinctive consequences for the development of the Internet.

MOBILE DEMOCRACY: TEXT MESSAGES, VOTER TURNOUT AND THE 2004 SPANISH GENERAL ELECTION

Mobile phones have the potential to foster political mobilisation. Like the Internet, mobile phones facilitate communication and rapid access to information. Compared to the Internet, however, mobile phone diffusion has reached a larger proportion of the population in most countries, and thus the impact of this new medium is conceivably greater. The Spanish general election of 2004 occurred in the wake of an unprecedented terrorist attack, but its outcome reflects the potential that mobile phones have to provide the user with independent information and bring about voter mobilisation. The impression – whether true or not – that the government was withholding information about the attack outraged a small number of voters who, empowered with mobile phones, sent text messages (known as SMS), resulting in unprecedented flash demonstrations on election day eve. Traditional media outlets contributed further to a growing chorus of citizens who felt misled. Those who tend not to vote, young voters and new voters, were galvanised to go to the polls, and they disproportionately favoured the opposition party. While it is too early to determine the political effects of mobile phone diffusion, the events in Spain suggest that mobile technology may come to play an important role in political participation and democracy.

The Global Crisis of 2007–2009: Markets, Politics, and Organizations

In this article, we examine the different causal chains leading to the crisis in the United States and around the world, emphasizing the market developments, political decisions, and organizational factors that led to the financial and economic meltdown. We argue that a series of political, regulatory, and organizational decisions and events prepared the ground for a major breakdown of financial and economic institutions, a “normal accident” that produced systemic reverberations across markets around the world. In the United States, political, regulatory, and organizational decisions made during the 1990s led to a situation of simultaneously high complexity and tight coupling in the financial system. The global economy also became more complex and tightly coupled during the 1990s, contributing to the rapid spread of the crisis across countries. We propose that solutions to the crisis will need to be tailored to the specific ways in which countries experienced the meltdown and the political preferences of interest groups and citizens. For the United States, the best approach would be to allow for a complex and innovative financial system but with a much reduced degree of coupling so as to avoid another financial normal accident.

Symbolic Politics and the Regulation of Executive Compensation: A Comparison of the Great Depression and the Great Recession

When politicians feel popular pressure to act, but are unwilling or unable to address the root cause of the problem, they resort to symbolic policymaking. In this paper, I examine excessive executive compensation as an issue that rose to the top of the political agenda during both the Great Depression and the Great Recession. Presidential candidates, members of Congress, the media, and the public alike blamed corporate greed for the economic downturn. In both instances, however, enacted legislation stopped short of changing the way in which executive pay was determined or placing effective, enforceable limits on it. I analyze the nature of the democratic process and contend that public policy scholars need to pay more attention to the occurrence of symbolic policies. The category of symbolic policies offers a more accurate approach to understanding the politics of executive compensation in the United States during the two crises and helps explain why, in spite of the recent legislative efforts, it continues to rise.

Deliberating American Monetary Policy: A Textual Analysis. By Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013. 536p.

The U.S. Federal Reserve is one of the most powerful institutions in America, with influence over monetary policy both at home and, indirectly, abroad. In Deliberating American Monetary Policy , Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey uses textual analysis to make an in-depth examination of how monetary policy is determined at the policy meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee and Congress’ oversight of these policies. Peter Howells praises the book for its interesting conclusions about the role of the Fed in policy-making, and recommends it as a fascinating read for both students of committee decision-making and for economists.