Sandra León

How does decentralization affect electoral competition of state-wide parties? Evidence from Spain

The literature is still undecided on whether sub-state elections conform more to a national or regional logic of voting. In this article, I argue that the impact of national politics on regional elections is contingent upon the level of decentralization. I hypothesize that the greater the number of policy areas and resources in the hands of regional governments, the lesser the influence of national coat-tails on regional elections. Using the electoral results of the Spanish Socialist Party in national and regional elections from 1979 to 2009, the empirical analysis shows that regional politicians’ electoral performance is correlated to that of their national counterparts. However, this correlation has weakened as regional governments have gained greater decision-making and financing powers. This has been particularly evident in elections when the regional branch of the party rules a single-party government and competes against strong regionalist parties.

Intergovernmental Cooperation in a Decentralised System: the Sectoral Conferences in Spain

One of the challenges of decentralised systems is ensuring intergovernmental cooperation. This paper attempts to shed some light on the conditions that bring about cooperation between central and sub-national governments. Drawing on extensive data based on the Spanish case, empirical findings show that factors that have a bearing on cooperation are associated with non-tangible assets of intergovernmental relations (such as informal contacts among representatives) or more general and long-term political dynamics. Public practitioners have little room to modify these conditions, which highlight the limitations of administrative reforms to promote intergovernmental relations.

Passing the buck? Responsibility attribution and cognitive bias in multilevel democracies

Abstract This paper explores the effect of national partisanship and Euroscepticism on individuals’ causal responsibility attribution in European multilevel democracies. It is particularly focused on the average differences in responsibility attribution in federal and non-federal states, as well as in countries belonging to different European Union enlargement waves. Using a pooled dataset of the 2004, 2009, and 2014 European Election Studies, results show that when poor economic outcomes are at stake, partisans of the national incumbent in federal states are more likely to assign responsibility to regional governments following a blame-attribution logic, while this logic is absent in non-federal states. Likewise, Eurosceptic individuals are more likely to assign responsibility to European authorities when they hold negative views of the economy and they belong to countries that have been European Union members for a longer period.

Asymmetric federalism and economic voting

Although federal arrangements adopt a multiplicity of forms across and within federations, this article suggests that some models of power division are better than others at enhancing clarity of responsibility and electoral accountability. This conclusion is the result of exploring responsibility attribution and economic voting in a state where decentralisation arrangements vary across regions: the Spanish State of Autonomies. Using electoral surveys and aggregated economic data for the 1982–2012 period, the empirical analysis shows that regional economic voting is most pronounced in regions where decentralisation design concentrated authority and resources at one level of government, whereas it is inexistent in regions where devolution followed a more intertwined model of power distribution. The implication of the empirical findings is that the specific design of intergovernmental arrangements is crucial to make electoral accountability work in federations.

Geography Matters: The Conditional Effect of Electoral Systems on Social Spending

There is a large body of research showing that the provision of social policies is higher under proportional electoral systems than under majoritarian systems. This article helps advance this literature by showing that the geographic distribution of social recipients plays an essential role in moderating the impact of electoral institutions on social provision. Using data from twenty-two OECD countries, the results show that majoritarian systems increase the provision of social spending when recipients are concentrated in certain regions. When levels of concentration are high, social spending in majoritarian countries can surpass levels of provision in proportional representation systems.

Intergovernmental councils in Spain: Challenges and opportunities in a changing political context

ABSTRACT This paper reviews the most important characteristics and of the Spanish Intergovernmental Councils (IGCs) and theorizes about the effect of the increasing fragmentation of the party system on the nature and dynamics of multilateral bargaining in IGCs. The essential argument is that party system fragmentation may have an impact on IGCs through its effect on the formation of minority and coalition governments. These types of governments may put an end to the two-bloc confrontation, bring to the system higher levels of party congruence between levels of government and lower the costs of compromise, three factors that may help to grease the bargaining process and, in turn, enhance the achievement of intergovernmental cooperation agreements. The positive effect will be conditional on several factors, namely the ideological coherence of inter-party alliances, the predominant type of government in the system (coalition or single-party minority) and the duration of governments.

Territorial cleavage or institutional break-up? Party integration and ideological cohesiveness among Spanish elites

The literature that explores the relationship between decentralisation and the structure of the party system has barely explored an important dimension of party integration, namely the degree of ideological cohesiveness among parliamentary elites. This paper purports to fill the literature gap by analysing heterogeneity in attitudes towards devolution among representatives from Spanish state-wide parties (the People’s Party (PP) and the Socialist Party (PSOE)). Drawing from a sample of 460 parliamentary elites, results show that within-party variation in preferences towards regional self-rule are accounted by the territorial cleavage (historical regions vs ordinary ones) as well as by an institutional cleavage, defined by the type of assembly – regional or national – in which representatives are elected. However, parties’ political and organisational trajectories moderate the impact of those cleavages: territory prevails in accounting for internal variation within the PSOE, whereas the institutional cleavage is more important to explain internal cohesiveness among PP’s party elites.

Economic crises and the nationalisation of politics

The literature on party system nationalisation has yet to provide a better understanding of the impact of short-term factors upon the nationalisation of politics. This article helps to fill this literature gap by analysing the effect of economic conditions on party system nationalisation. The argument is that economic crises will decrease levels of nationalisation by amplifying territorial variation in preferences for redistribution, limiting political parties’ capacity to coordinate divergent interests across districts and triggering the emergence of new political forces. Data on 47 countries for the 1960–2011 period confirm this hypothesis and show that lower economic growth during the years prior to the election is associated with a decrease in levels of party system nationalisation in the next election. The result is robust to variation in the specification of the econometric model and to the use of different measures of nationalisation. Results also show that federal institutions increase the impact of economic conditions on the nationalisation of politics, whereas any moderating effect of electoral system proportionality on the economy is not found.

The Organization of Spain: Ideology, Territory and Representation in the State of Autonomies

The consolidation of regional power has weakened the integration of the Spanish party system. Yet there are no studies that explore whether the transformation of the relationship between national and regional power in the Spanish party system is reflected in the preferences of parliamentary elites. This chapter fills this empirical gap in the literature in two ways. First, it introduces a descriptive analysis of the preferences of national and regional MPs regarding issues related with the territorial model of the State. Second, it tests a series of hypotheses on what factors may account for the internal (within-party) variation in preferences on the territorial organization of the State among MPs of the two most important statewide parties, PP and PSOE.

Muddling up Political Systems? When Regionalization Blurs Democracy: Decentralization and Attribution of Responsibility: When regionalization blurs democracy

The rise of regional governments in Europe has been often espoused on democratic grounds. Yet the democratic promise of political decentralization should be evaluated in light of its potential undermining effects upon the essential mechanism to make accountability work: citizens’ capacity to assign responsibility for policy outcomes. People may get it wrong when assigning responsibility because they are not sure who is responsible for policy outcomes when powers are vertically fragmented between different levels of government and/or simply because their responsibility judgements are biased by political beliefs, which act as lenses through which attribution is filtered. How can we then make electoral accountability work in decentralized systems? This paper will explore this question by delving into the most important theoretical and empirical challenges in the study of attribution of responsibility and electoral accountability in decentralized contexts. At the theoretical level, there is still need of a better understanding of the relationship between federal institutional conditions and individuals’ use of cognitive bias to cope with institutional complexity when assigning responsibility. The empirical challenge is to overcome the lack of comparable individual†level data on responsibility attribution for a broad range of country cases.