Sandra Rousseau

The scientific wealth of European nations: Taking effectiveness into account

In this study we continue the application of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the R&D effort of European countries. We use GDP, active population and R&D expenditure as inputs, and publications and patents as outputs. Being effective means that, in order to obtain a maximum efficiency score countries are forced to perform on every output goal. A discussion of each countrys performance and a comparison with MaysScience results concludes our analysis.

Data envelopment analysis as a tool for constructing scientometric indicators

It is shown that Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) ca be used to construct relative scientific and technological indicators. The method is explained and illustrated using countries as objects of study; GDP, active population and R&D expenditure as inputs, and publications and patents as outputs. Using these parameters the efficiency of countries is assessed.

Empirical Analysis of Sanctions for Environmental Offenses

Sanctions are a crucial part of enforcing environmental regulations. We discuss the determinants and the levels of monetary penalties for environmental offenses found in practice. Three major categories of variables are distinguished: the circumstances of the offense, the characteristics of the offenders, and the indirect political and institutional effects. Some general trends emerge: fines increase with the harm caused by the offense and fines are higher for repeat offenders as well as for intentional offenses. Also, the studies discussed indicate that political and institutional factors matter. The empirical studies provide some initial insights into the objective functions of courts and agencies.

Evaluating Environmental and Resource Economics Journals: A TOP-Curve Approach

This article applies an alternative approach to the measurement of scholarly quality, namely the use of TOP-curves, in order to rank journals in the field of environmental and resource economics. This measure summarizes the incidence, intensity, and inequality of these journals’ highly cited articles. Moreover, TOP-curves allow analysts to rank journals according to TOP-dominance. The journal ranking based on the TOP-dominance criterion does not match the ranking based on the journals’ impact factors. Indeed, TOP-curves provide more detailed information on the relative ranking of journals since they take into account the composition and the distribution of citations within the top group.

Journal Evaluation by Environmental and Resource Economists: A Survey

Using an online survey, we have asked the researchers in the field of environmental and resource economics how they themselves would rank a representative list of journals in their field. The results of this ranking are then compared to the ordering based on the journals’ impact factors as published by Thomson Scientific. The two sets of rankings seem to be positively correlated, but statistically the null hypothesis that the two rankings are uncorrelated cannot be rejected. This observation suggests that researchers interpret the current quality of journals based on other factors in addition to the impact factors.

The potential of auctioning contracts for conservation policy

This article studies the possibility of using auctions as a policy instrument in conservation programs. In particular, it provides insight into the main concerns that need to be dealt with when implementing conservation auctions. To show the cost saving potential of this policy instrument, we also calculate the social welfare improvement that can be obtained for an afforestation project in Flanders. When developing conservation policies, it is thus worthwhile to consider auctions as an alternative policy instrument.

How do chocolate lovers balance taste and ethical considerations

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate how chocolate lovers balance taste and ethical considerations when selecting chocolate products. Design/methodology/approach – The data set was collected through a survey at the 2014 “Salon du Chocolat” in Brussels, Belgium. The authors distributed 700 copies and received 456 complete responses (65 percent response rate). Choice experiments were used to estimate the relative importance of different chocolate characteristics and to predict respondents’ willingness to pay for marginal changes in those characteristics. The authors estimate both a conditional logit model and a latent class model to take possible preference heterogeneity into account. Findings – On average, respondents were willing to pay 11 euros more for 250 g fairtrade labeled chocolate compared to conventional chocolate. However, taste clearly dominates ethical considerations. The authors could distinguish three consumer segments, each with a different tradeoff between taste and fairtra...

Policy options for afforestation in Flanders

This paper analyses current and alternative afforestation policy instruments in Flanders. First we select forest sites that maximize net social benefits given a constraint on the total area of new forests and then we select policy instruments that yield this optimal combination of sites. For each policy option, we calculate the associated costs for landowners and government as well as net social benefits for society. Our empirical illustration shows that the welfare gain is considerable if the afforestation subsidy is conditioned on an objective criterion rather than a case-by-case approach. Our results also show that it is worthwhile to consider alternative policy instruments, such as auctions, not previously used in Belgian legislation.

Auctioning Conservation Contracts: An Application to the Flemish Afforestation Policy

This paper studies the possibility of using auctions as a policy instrument in conservation programs. In particular, it provides insight into the main concerns that need to be dealt with when implementing conservation auctions. To show the cost saving potential of this policy instrument, we also calculate the social welfare improvement that can be obtained for an afforestation project in Flanders.

Learning About Compliance Under Asymmetric Information

Over time, inspection agencies gather information about firms’ pollution levels and this information may allow agencies to differentiate their monitoring strategies in the future. If a firm is less successful than its peers in reducing emissions, it faces the risk of being targeted for increased inspections in the next period. This risk of stricter monitoring might induce high-abatement cost firms to mimic low-abatement cost firms by choosing lower emission levels, while the latter might try to avoid being mimicked. We explain firms’ compliance decisions and the inspection agencys monitoring strategy by means of a signaling game which incorporates dynamic enforcement and learning. Interestingly, we show that the ongoing signaling game between firm types might lead to firms over-complying with the emission standard.