Sang Hoo Bae

A model of piracy

Abstract This paper develops a simple model of software piracy to analyze the short-run effects of piracy on software usage and the long-run effects on development incentives. We consider two types of costs associated with piracy: the reproduction cost that is constant across users and the degradation cost that is proportional to consumers’ valuation of the original product. We show that the effects of piracy depend crucially on the nature of piracy costs. Policy implications concerning copyright protection are also discussed.

Outsourcing with Quality Competition: Insights from a Three Stage Game Theoretic Model

Outsourcing decisions by organisations have strategic and operational implications. Strategically, understanding the market and competition is necessary to make effective outsourcing decisions. In this paper we recognise this concern and model the situation where an organisation with quality and cost pressures and operational strategies may arrive at different outsourcing solutions based on competitor quality strategy traits. We develop a three-stage game-theoretic oligopolistic model based on the differentiated product strategy and integrating quality expectations of the market. The model is solved for equilibrium points on price, outsourcing activity, and investments in quality. The results show that these decision factors are sensitive to market expectations and quality performance of competitors. Performance measures based on profitability and market share results are also presented within this model. Observations and insights are also presented.

PREDATORY BEHAVIOR OF GOVERNMENTS: THE CASE OF MASS KILLING

In this paper we seek to answer the question: why do governments engage in mass killing? Tullock (1974) gives gain or avoidance of loss as the motive. We construct a three‐stage theoretic framework to explain the choice of a ruler of a country. The conditions that must be met for a mass killing regime to win over alternative regimes are derived. Using the COW project data over the period 1816–1997, we estimate two models: negative binomial regression of number of battle‐related deaths and a probit model for the choice of mass killing. The paper concludes with suggestions for data collections and further research.

The optimal number of firms with an application to professional sports leagues.

This article analyzes a cartel’s optimal choice of the number of firms in Salop’s circular city model under different assumptions about cooperative behaviors among firms. The authors consider two scenarios: (a) a cartel operates under a fully collusive regime in which it controls the number of firms and their pricing, and (b) a cartel operates under a semi-collusive regime in which it controls only the number of firms and pricing is left to individual firms. The authors compare the outcomes in both scenarios to the socially optimal and free entry outcomes. They then apply these comparisons to the case of a professional sports league’s optimal choice of the number of franchises.

An exploratory empirical investigation of environmental audit programs in S&P 500 companies

Purpose – This study investigates the relationship between environmental audit programs and various organizational characteristics in S&P 500 companies.Design/methodology/approach – The data for the study are derived from two different sources. First, environmental audit related data were obtained from the corporate environmental profiles database (CEPD) which is published by the Investor Research Responsibility Center (IRRC). All firms who responded to the survey between 1998 and 2003 were included for the study. In total, 192 firms responded during this time period. Second, other firm specific and industry data were obtained from research insight (i.e. COMPUSTAT) database, which is published by Standard and Poors.Findings – The results show that an increasing number of companies are adopting environmental audit programs and industry‐specific factors affect an organizations decision to adopt environmental audit programs.Research limitations/implications – Since the paper relies on the survey data, one ...

Greening Transportation Fleets

The greening of organizational transportation fleets, especially trucks and automobiles, has gained increasing attention by companies in a variety of industrial sectors. The reasons for this concern and attention are due to regulatory and competitive pressures, but also increasing costs of fossil-fuels. Surprisingly the amount of research and modeling for fleet management overall has been rather limited, with the focus on managing green vehicle investments virtually non-existent. In this study we develop a two-stage game theoretic model that helps evaluate, from both policy and organizational perspectives, the implications of greening of transportation fleets. Various parameters are evaluated including factors such as innovations in green vehicle technology, levels of service differences, cost of fuel, adjusting tax policy, regulatory compliance requirements, and adaptation costs. This evaluation provides practical insights into actions that could be considered by regulators and organizations to encourage environmental investments.

The Public Economics of Self Control

This paper analyzes self-control problems in intertemporal consumption of a sin good where current consumption imposes a negative externality on one’s future selves due to the existence of present-biased preferences. We introduce the negative externality dubbed ‘internality’, which is augmented by the cumulative distribution function of the sum of previous consumption. We show that the shot-run self with self-control problem over consumes the sin good compared to that of the long-run self without present-biased preferences. Further, we investigate the effectiveness of self-bargaining with the presence of an external control devise as possible punishment. The short-run self faces three possible options: do nothing, accept the long-run self’s offer, or reject the offer. In the latter case an external control devices is implemented. It is shown that successful self-bargaining depends on the efficiency of the control device.

A game theoretic analysis of firms' entry mode decisions

Limited research has been completed using formal modelling to investigate a firms entry mode decisions. Addressing this issue, we formulate Dunnings eclectic model as a game theoretic problem. We develop a novel three-stage game theory model to investigate the relationships and nuances of the core constructs of the eclectic model, i.e., ownership advantage, location advantage and internalisation (OLI). We develop an equilibrium solution to identify the optimal entry decisions for firms entering new markets using a two firm-two country scenario when parameters including ownership advantage of firms, market size, production cost and country risks are varied. The results obtained provide insight for future research as well as having significant practical implications.

Modeling Mass Killing: For Gain or Ethnic Cleansing?

3 A bargaining theory perspective on war 29 Charles H. Anderton and John R. Carter 4 Modeling mass killing: for gain or ethnic cleansing? 52 Attiat F. Ott and Sang Hoo Bae 5 The economics of destructive power 79 Mehrdad Vahabi 6 The government budget allocation process and national security: an application to the Israeli–Syrian arms race 105 Itay Ringel and Asher Tishler 7 Characteristics of terrorism 143 Karen Pittel and Dirk Rübbelke 8 Confl ict and corruption 172 John R. Hudson 9 Confl ict in space 195 Vasilis Zervos 10 The economics of peacekeeping 237 Vincenzo Bove and Ron Smith 11 Peacekeeping, private benefi ts and common agency 265 Ugurhan G. Berkok and Binyam Solomon 12 The longterm costs of confl ict: the case of the Iraq War 293 Linda J. Bilmes and Joseph E. Stiglitz 13 Macroeconomics and violence 311 Jurgen Brauer and J. Paul Dunne