Sanne Taekema

Motivation by ideal : A reaction to J. David Velleman

Moral ideals should not be seen as simple and purely personal, but as complex values with a social dimension that transcend attempts to formulate or realize them. Orientation towards ideals needs a realistic component: people should identify with the quest for an ideal, not with the ideal itself, and consider the possibility of negative consequences of their pursuit. Such realism about ideals includes acknowledging that ideals are not the only, nor the most important, motivating force of morality.

Vita Brevis, Ars Longa: In Memoriam Willem Witteveen

In this contribution we sketch the most important themes of Willem Witteveen’s work. Rather than providing an academic overview we use one of his favourite metaphors, that of the house, to show the breadth of his interests and the approach that characterizes both his writings and his public achievements. Although most legal scholars will know of his work on legislation and the Rechtsstaat , his interest in legal theory, literature and art is equally significant to understand his contribution to legal scholarship. His work is unified by his rhetorical stance, which was always open to different voices of the present and the past.

Fragments and Continuities of Law and ICT: A Pragmatist Approach to Understanding Legal Pluralism

Regulation of the Internet is a favorite example of legal scholars who argue that law is a globalized phenomenon (Berman 2007, p. 316; Fischer-Lescano & Teubner 2004, pp. 1010–11; Michaels 2009, p. 247). Internet law is fascinating from a legal theoretical perspective because it shows clearly that it is problematic to use state law to govern a global network, and that it is equally problematic to find international or non-state forms of law capable of regulating it adequately. It is therefore not surprising that many attempts to conceptualize problems of law and Internet do so on the basis of a theory of legal pluralism. Theories of legal pluralism take the plurality of law seriously and theorize about what legal pluralism means. This conceptual exercise is then related back to digital phenomena, which, I would argue, is a fruitful way to account for and understand Internet law. There is, however, not one way of theorizing the plurality of law. Different conceptualizations of legal pluralism are on offer, which take rather different starting points. One of the points about which theories of legal pluralism differ relates to the boundaries of legal orders: should we see these as closed systems, or as open and flexible? In this paper, I will take this issue as central to discussing the nature of legal pluralism. With respect to the topic of this volume, the question then is which conceptualization is the most convincing when it comes to understanding the pluralism of normative orders.

Introduction to Law as Plural Phenomenon: Confrontations of Legal Pluralisms

markdownabstract__Abstract__ The traditional and dominant view among lawyers is that law is a system and that it originates with the state. Today’s contrary view among some lawyers and a host of researchers from other disciplines says that law is plural in form and in source. Both views seem to rule each other out, seem to speak different languages, differ in assumptions and assign different normative tasks to law. Legal pluralism is the topic of this special issue, addressed in different ways, from different theoretical perspectives and in different empirical contexts. The first two articles in this special issue make clear that the debate over law as a plural phenomenon firstly bears a civilizing historical trait, and secondly has an ethnocentric component. Both articles make clear why many lawyers have a problem with viewing law as plural.