Santiago Moreno-Bromberg

Pollution permits, Strategic Trading and Dynamic Technology Adoption

This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can invest both in low-emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and allowance price are generated endogenously and are interdependent. It is shown that the non-cooperative permit trading game possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the allowance value rejects the level of uncovered pollution (demand), the level of unused allowances (supply), and the technological status. These conditions are also satisfied when a price support instrument, which is contingent on the adoption of the new technology, is introduced. Numerical investigation confirms that this policy generates a floating price floor for the allowances, and it restores the dynamic incentives to invest. Given that this policy comes at a cost, a criterion for the selection of a self-financing policy (based on convex risk measures) is proposed and implemented.

CRRA Utility Maximization under Risk Constraints

This paper studies the problem of optimal investment with CRRA (constant, relative risk aversion) preferences, subject to dynamic risk constraints on trading strategies. The market model considered is continuous in time and incomplete; furthermore, financial assets are modeled by ItA´ processes. The dynamic risk constraints (time, state dependent) are generated by risk measures. The optimal trading strategy is characterized by a quadratic BSDE. Special risk measures (Value-at-Risk, Tail Value-at-Risk and Limited Expected Loss ) are considered and a three-fund separation result is established in these cases. Numerical results emphasize the effect of imposing risk constraints on trading.

An algorithm for computing solutions of variational problems with global convexity constraints

We present an algorithm to approximate the solutions to variational problems where set of admissible functions consists of convex functions. The main motivation behind the numerical method is to compute solutions to Adverse Selection problems within a Principal-Agent framework. Problems such as product lines design, optimal taxation, structured derivatives design, etc. can be studied through the scope of these models. We develop a method to estimate their optimal pricing schedules.

The Shadow Costs of Repos and Bank Liability Structure

Making use of a structural model that allows for optimal liquidity management, we study the role that repos play in a bank’s financing structure. In our model the bank’s assets consist of illiquid loans and liquid reserves and are financed by a combination of repos, long–term debt, deposits and equity. Repos are a cheap source of funding, but they are subject to an exogenous rollover risk. We show that the use of repos inflicts two types of indirect (“shadow�?) costs on the bank’s shareholders: first, it induces the bank to maintain higher liquid reserves in order to alleviate the additional default risk; second, it adds to the cost of long–term debt financing. These shadow costs limit the bank’s appetite for cheap but unstable repo funding. This effect is, however, weakened under poor returns on risky assets, access to deposit funding and the depositor preference rule. We also analyze the impact of a liquidity coverage ratio, payout restrictions and a leverage ratio on the bank’s financing choices and show that all these tools are able to curb the bank’s reliance on repos.

The shadow cost of repos and bank liability structure

Making use of a structural model that allows for optimal liquidity management, we study the role that repos play in a banks financing structure. In our model the banks assets consist of illiquid loans and liquid reserves and are financed by a combination of repos, long--term debt, deposits and equity. Repos are a cheap source of funding, but they are subject to an exogenous rollover risk. We show that their use adds to the cost of long--term debt financing, which limits the banks appetite for unstable repo funding. This effect is, however, weakened under poor returns on assets, abundant deposit funding and the depositor preference rule. We also analyze the impact of a liquidity coverage ratio, payout restrictions and a leverage ratio on the banks financing choices and show that all these tools are able to curb the banks reliance on repos.